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Preface 
 
This publication contains proceedings of the international workshop on 
“Politics of Histories and Memories and Conflicts in Central and Eastern 
European Countries and Russia” held in Tallinn, Estonia, on 25-26 August 2014. 
The workshop was organised in the framework of a research project of the same 
title, which was subsidized by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS, 
“Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research”, 2013-2015, No.21653087). 
The project aims to grasp the historical narratives in Central and Eastern 
Europe and Russia after their regime transition, especially the transformation of 
histories and memories on their historical experiences under the WWII and 
socialist regime, focusing on the development of “politics of histories and 
memories” in each country and the mutual cooperation and conflicts between 
them. Thereby we pay attentions to the fact that the confrontation between 
Baltic and CEE countries’ historical perceptions and memories on the ground of 
concepts of “occupation” and “totalitarianism” on the one side, and Russian ones 
of “Great Patriotic War” on the other hand, has become the controversial issue 
not only for these countries but also for European international community and 
organizations. Alongside of it we suppose that insights into European experiences 
will bring the important suggestions and lessons for East Asian countries, where 
more and more antagonistic opposition of histories and memories is prevailing, as 
is in the western part of Eurasian Continent. 
The workshop composed of two parts: on the first day, we had a small 
conference at Tallinn University, and participants from Estonia (3), Poland (1) 
and Japan (10) made and listened to presentations and discussed about our 
theme; on the second day we organized an excursion of “Disputable Sites of 
Memory and History in Estonia”, including Bronze Soldier, a symbolic monument of 
“memory war” in Estonia and memorials of Nazi concentration camp in the suburb of 
Tallinn.  
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At the conference of the first day, four speakers gave presentations on our 
theme from their own viewpoints, and Japanese colleagues brought comments to 
them. Professor Yurii Kostyashov from Kaliningrad sent his report on the experience of 
“trialogue” between Kaliningrad, Torun and Frankfurt am Oder to the conference, and 
Professor Konrad Hugo Jarausch of The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill kindly 
sent his forthcoming paper for our discussion and gave his oral comments to papers via Skype. 
Dr Małgorzata Pakier also offered her paper co-written by Dr. Joanna Wawrzyniak on the 
memory studies in Eastern Europe for our discussion. Professor Siobhan Kattago kindly 
attended at the conference and wrote her general comments on these presentations and papers.  
I would like to say my deepest gratitude to all the participants and contributors, and 
ones who supported our workshop and publication, especially to Professor Raivo Vetik who 
hosted the workshop and Ms. Triin-Ketlin Siska who coordinated the excursion.  
The project will continue for one more year, and we will have an international 
conference on the politics of Histories and Memories and the conflict from the viewpoint of 
comparison between East and West of Eurasia in November 2015. I hope that this publication 
will contribute to deepen our consideration on our difficult theme. 
 
     Nobuya Hashimoto
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Part I 
 
Experiences of Estonia 
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 3  
Discursive Reproduction of Conflict in 
 Estonian-Russian Relationship 
 
Raivo Vetik 
 
Abstract 
Aggravation of the Estonian-Russian conflict during and after the ‘Bronze Soldier 
crisis’ in April 2007 indicates that collective historical memories constitute a major 
aspect of the relationship between these two states. It is therefore important to study, 
in addition to so called 'objective' factors of conflict, dominating in the mainstream 
literature, also the ways how collective historical memories are reproduced and 
particularly, what exactly facilitates inter-state conflict within these processes. The 
first section of the paper discusses literature on collective historical memory, including 
the contributions of Maurice Halbwachs, James Wertsch and Jeffrey K. Olick. Two 
analytical units - 'eventual chain of events' and 'conceptual chain of events' – are 
introduced for analyzing the cognitive mechanisms informing reproduction of inter-
state conflicts. The second section of the paper investigates discursive reproduction of 
the contents of the Russian and Estonian collective historical memories by analysing 
how respective ‘conceptual chains of events’ are essentialized into the narrative of ‘true 
history’ either along the story lines related to ‘civilizing mission’ (the Russian side) or 
the ‘liberation struggle of a small people’ (the Estonian side). The third section of the 
papber discusses how such essentialized narratives are utilized by conservative 
political forces, on the one hand, and deconstructed by liberal political forces, on the 
other hand, in Estonian domestic power-politics. 
  
This paper discusses discursive reproduction of conflict in the 
Estonian-Russian relationship. Worsening of Estonian-Russian relationship 
since Estonia joined the EU, particularly the so called ‘Bronze Soldier crisis’ 
in April 2007 in Tallinn, indicates that different interpretations of history 
tend to take even secondary disagreements between the states to an 
existential ground, resulting in aggravation of their conflictual relationship. It 
is therefore urgent to investigate, in addition to the so called 'objective' factors 
representing the mainstream of conflict studies, also cognitive mechanisms 
behind discursive reproduction of collective historical memories, which can be 
manipulated for political gain. 
The paper is divided into three sections. The first one focuses on the 
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structure of collective historical memory, by introducing the analytic units the 
'eventual chain of events' and the 'conceptual chain of events' as its elements. 
The second section investigates the substantive content of the Russian and 
Estonian collective historical memories by focusing on how the respective 
conceptual chains are essentialized into the narrative of true history’, either 
along the hierarchical or anti-hierarchical apprehension of history. The third 
section introduces the narrative of ‘many histories' as a contrast and 
discusses how conservative or liberal ends of political spectrum use these 
different narratives in Estonian domestic power-politics. 
 
Theoretical background 
Estonian-Russian relationship represents a puzzle for the students of 
international relations. One trend in the literature focuses on the 
confrontational character of these relations in the last two decades, relating it 
to close linkages between security and identity issues in post-Soviet politics 
and international relations (Kuus, 2002; Merritt, 2000). Another line of 
thought highlights the signs of decline of such discords, particularly during 
Estonia’s accession to the EU, explaining these as the effects of socializing 
processes (Aalto, 2003; Morozov, 2004; Noreen & Sjöstedt 2004). Years since 
2005 display remarkable sharpening of the relations between Russia and 
many of its neighboring states, including Estonia, which appears to provide 
more credence to the former point of view in literature. 
Literature on’subjective’ factors in post-Soviet politics and 
international relations has grown fast in recent years. Eva-Clarita Onken 
(2007) has developed a three-level framework for analyzing these phenomena, 
focusing on the World War II commemorations in Moscow in 2005. Jörg 
Hackmann and Marko Lehti have edited a volume in the ’Journal of Baltic 
Studies’ on the so called ’Bronze War’ between Estonia and Russia in April 
2007, discussing the linkages of collective memory to current political and 
inter-ethnic relationships (Hackmann & Lehti, 2008). Eiki Berg and Piret 
Ehin (2009) have edited a volume with Ashgate on memory politics as a key 
element of Baltic-Russian relationship. There is a number of other 
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contributions in the field uncovering different aspects of the Estonian-
Russian relationship in the recent years (Burch & Smith, 2007; Petersoo & 
Tamm, 2008, etc).  
The studies of Russia by James V. Wertsch (2008) are of particular 
importance to the argument of this paper, as these are devoted to cognitive 
aspects of memory politics. He has introduced the notion of ’deep collective 
memory’, which is mediated by cultural tools and socio-cultural context of 
inter-group relations. These cultural tools, especially in the form of narrative 
templates, shape thinking about the past and can be regarded an essential 
aspects of inter-group conflict (Wertsch, 2008). Marek Tamm (2008) has 
studied in the same line how the memories of different groups are conveyed 
and sustained, by analyzing the narrative templates as cognitive mechanisms 
in the Estonian national historiography. 
Research on subjective aspects of inter-group conflict reveals that 
collective historical memory functions not only in the form of remembering, 
but also in the form of forgetting certain events (Smith, 1991; Iggers, 1997, 
Olick, 2005). A famous remark by Ernst Renan in this regard goes as follows: 
'Forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor 
in the creation of a nation, which is why progress in historical studies often 
constitutes a danger to nationality' (Renan 1996: 45). Thus, manipulation is 
an important ingredient of cognitive processes related to the nation building 
processes. The basis for such a selective memory is a set of psychological 
patterns that are similar to those, which guide individual actors in construing 
their self-image - individuals, as a rule, tend to highlight the facts that 
contribute to their positive self-image and to hide those facts that hinder it 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979). There are exceptions to that rule in inter-state 
relations, like apologizing for the past injustice carried out towards another 
state. German president, for example, has apologized for Germany’s initiating 
of the World War II and actions during the war. A few years ago, the 
president Putin of Russia expressed apologes to Poland for the Katyun 
massacres during the World War II. However, Russia has not apologized for 
annexation of the Baltic States in 1940, as well as the injustice and suffering 
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caused to those nations by the Soviet regime, during the half-century to follow. 
What is the reason behind such a difference? The key conceptual idea 
of this article holds that inter-state conflict can be represented as a cognitive 
phenomenon, due to the fact that in applying meaning to a conflict, reality is 
replaced by a description. As different actors have different historical 
experiences, their descriptions of history tend to be different, which can be 
utilized in domestic power-politics. Such tension in inter-group relations is a 
common research topic in human and social sciences, that has been 
scrutinized in literature through dichotomies like 'truth and method', 'reality 
and interpretation', 'history and memory', and so on (Halbwachs, 1992; Le 
Goff, 1992; Olick & Robbins, 1998). In all those binary oppositions, the 
analytical levels of the 'language of observation' and the 'language of 
interpretation' are distinguished, which represent different levels of cognition 
and which complement each other. The argument of this paper holds that the 
analysis of how actors manipulate the narratives located in these two levels 
has a potential to illuminate the political mechanisms behind reproduction of 
inter-group conflict. 
Theoretical foundation for the analysis carried out in this paper is 
based on the analytic distinction between the notions of 'eventual chain of 
events' and 'conceptual chain of events' in the structure of collective historical 
memory (Zolian, 1994). This distintion represents another example of the 
oppositional pairs mentioned above. The eventual chain is formulated in the 
language of observation and represents just a formal chronology of historical 
events. Thus, the term ‘eventual chain of events’ does not signify ‘real’ history 
in the positivistic sense, but cognitive representation of reality on the level of 
empirical observation. ‘Conceptual chain of events’, on the other hand, 
represents a more general account reality that adds an extra interpretative 
dimension to the ‘chain of events’. ‘Conceptual chain of events’ highlights 
systematic patterns and teleological representation of the historical processes, 
which could have been realized in other ‘eventual chains of events’ as well.  
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Reproduction of the Russian and the Estonian collective 
historical memories  
I will argue in this section that mutual replacement of ‘eventual chain 
of events’ by respective ‘conceptual chain of events’ in reproduction of 
collective historical memories is one of the two basic cognitive mechanisms 
behind recent sharpening of conflict in the Estonian-Russian relationship. It 
results in denial of the facts in the ‘eventual chain of events’ that do not suit 
one's own ‘conceptual chain of events’, but carry, however, significance for the 
counterpart in the relatinship. Such a replacement brings about mutual 
allegations regarding distortions of history by the other side and tends to take 
even marginal disagreements to an existential level.  
Let us give few examples of such a replacement. The first example is 
related to signing of the Tartu Peace Treaty in February 2nd,1920. This event 
is a very significant element in the ‘conceptual chain of events’ in the 
Estonian historical memory and lays the groundwork for assigning meaning 
to most following (and in many ways also the preceding) ‘eventual chains of 
events’. However, in the Russian collective historical memory, the agreement 
is rather a secondary and in a way even a negative fact in the ‘eventual chain 
of events’, There are attempts to erase it from history by claiming that since 
the Bolsheviks rule was illegal, the treaties signed that time could not be 
considered of fundamental importance either (Illiashevich, 2007). Perception 
of Estonia in the ‘conceptual chain of events’ in the Russian historical 
memory is based rather on the Peace of Uusikaupunki of 1721. This treaty 
defines Estonian territory as a part of Russian Empire, which, however, is, 
aline to the ‘conceptual chain of events’ in the Estonian historical memory. 
Such a negation of certain events, which are important to the counterpart, 
inevitably obstructs a constructive dialogue between the two sides. 
The second example, directly related to recent sharpening of Estonian-
Russian relationship, is interpretation of the arrival of the Soviet Army in 
Tallinn in September 22nd, 1944. Despite the fact that both sides agree that 
such a fact took place in the ‘eventual chain of events’, their ‘conceptual 
chains of events’ are in contradiction. In the collective memory of the 
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Russians, it was Tallinn's liberation from fascists that took place that day; 
Estonians, on the other hand, interpret it as occupation by the Soviet Union 
(Smith, 2008). Replacing the ‘eventual chain of events’ with the ‘conceptual 
chain of events’ by both counterparts inevitably leads to the perception that 
the the other side lies. As a result, there are mutual allegations of distortion 
of history, which can become an independent factor aggravating tensions even 
further. For example, escalation of conflict in the Estonian-Russian 
relationship after removal of the Bronze Soldier monument in Tallinn in April 
2007 reached a highpoint where senior officials started reproaching their 
counterparts for fascist sympathies, on the one hand, and the attempt to 
reoccupy Estonia, on the other. As a result, a rather secondary disagreement 
over the proper location of the monument developed into an existential 
conflict.  
As one of the functions of collective historical memory is to promote 
positive self-concept of the actor, it is to a large extent unavoidable that on 
the level of common sense only the description of history of one's own group is 
perceived as 'real'. The cognitive mechanism behind the both cases described 
above is replacement of the ‘eventual chains of events’ by the ‘conceptual 
chains of events’ in reproduction of the collective historical memories. 
However, there is another cognitive mechanism as well, contributing to 
aggravation of conflicts in inter-group relations, stemming from the 
substantive contents of collective historical memories. It consists in specific 
representation of the contents of the collective memory, i.e. deriving it from 
the ‘natural course of things’, which can not be altered in principle. Such an 
essentializing of the ‘conceptual chain of events’ of one's own collective 
historical memory contributes to the assumption of ‘true history’ in which the 
own-group is represented in terms of ‘good’, while the outgroup in terms of  
‘evil’.  
Operation of these two cognitive mechanisms described above does not 
mean that ‘conceptual chain of events’ in collective historical memory is 
fundamentally static. As a social representation enforcing hegemony of the 
own-group in domestic politics, certain elements of ‘conceptual chain of events’ 
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can be dynamic as well, in response to changes in political context. However, 
existence of certain archetypes, is still relatively stable and informs basic 
dispositions of in-group towards outgroup over a longer period of time 
(Wertsch, 2008; Tamm, 2008). Let us try to uncover, in the following 
subsection, the nature of such archetypes in the functioning of both Russian 
and Estonian collective historical memories. 
 
The ‘conceptual chain of event’ in Russian collective historical memory 
Russian collective historical memory emphasizes uniqueness of Russia 
– she represents neither East nor West, but a higher type of civilization, 
aiming to combine the best qualities of both (Duncan, 2005; Kaiser, 1994). 
The most well-known ideological concept to depict such a cultural hierarchy is 
the notion of 'Russian Idea', which postulates Russia's civilizing mission in 
global culture and politics (Gorskii, 1977; Longworth, 2005). Concrete goals of 
this mission have varied over time, but it can be interpreted, at its essence, as 
a desire to bring Russia’s deeper culture and true liberty to other nations as 
well. The first ‘beneficiaries’ or rather targets of such a missionary ideology 
have been the peoples in the vicinity of Russia's border area, due to their 
geographical proximity. It is symptomatic, in the context of such an ideology, 
that in the Russian Empire the latter were perceived as the ‘not-yet-Russians’, 
inhabiting a lower level of cultural hierarchy and characterized by a 
civilizational retardation (Buldakov, 1995). Throughout history Russia has 
had a tendency to view its bordering nations not so much as sovereign 
subjects, but rather as satellites, i.e., the relationship of Russia to its 
neighbours has tended to be not partnership but an attempt to make them 
'forcefully' happy, instead (McDaniel, 1996). 
One should notice, however, that the idea of the ‘civilizing mission’ that 
is based on the concept of a hierarchy of cultures, is politically and 
psychologically contradictory, as its successful enforcement may threaten the 
privileged position of the ‘civilizer’ herself. Hence, in addition to the ‘civilizing’ 
efforts, that equalize cultures, means have been sought to reinforce 
hierarchies between Russia and its neighbours. Such a dualism has beean 
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essential element in the policies of state building in Russia. For example, the 
metaphor of 'Holy Russia', which can be considered a mental equivalent of its 
territorial expansion (Averintsev, 1991), does not refer to the egalitarian idea 
of popular sovereignty along the lines of Rousseau, forming the basis of 
national integration in the Western countries, but rather the privileged 
position of Russian culture, compared to other cultures. As Russia failed to 
create a nation-state before creating an empire, a kind of pre-nationalist 
ideology developed as the basis for state integration. It does not aim to melt 
other ethnic groups into itself through universalizing citizenship, but intends 
to engage them, on the one hand, and to preserve the cultural-political 
hierarchy of the Russian centre and the non-Russian periphery, on the other 
hand (Kuzio, 2002).  
As a result, the Russian expansion and adjoining the peripheral 
regions and cultural groups to the centre has been fundamentally different, 
compared to the most Western nations. It has not been targeted on 
assimilating these cultural groups into a unitary Russian nation, but rather 
on their symbolic integration around Russia's cultural and political core. 
However, such a pre-nationalist concept of nation building has made Russia's 
conquests, due to the size of its territories as well as the administrative 
incapacity to organize it as a unitary state, in many ways only imaginary. 
The most vivid confirmation of that statement is offered by the fact how 
quickly Soviet Union vanished from the world map in December 1991 – a 
state that had existed over 70 years collapsed only in a few days (Medvedev, 
1995). 
A similar pattern of the pre-nationalism has expressed itself during 
Soviet time in the ideology of 'Soviet people'. Unitary Soviet nation did not 
presume smaller nations to dissolve into the Russian nationality, but to 
integrate around humanistic values and political goals formulated in the 
Marxism-Leninism ideology (Iivonen, 1990). The above-mentioned 
controversy, which has political as well as psychological content, can also be 
witnessed here – on the one hand, equality of all cultures was declared, but 
on the other hand, a clear hierarchy was imposed as well, which is expressed 
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in such concepts in the Soviet era like ‘elder brother’, ‘leading nation’ etc 
related to Russians. As Russian language and culture were perceived to form 
the core of the public sphere in the Soviet Union, uniting all peoples and 
ensuring the hierarchy of centre and periphery, the ideology of the 'Soviet 
people' can be viewed as just another manifestation of the ‘civilizing’ mission 
that is the subject matter of the 'Russian Idea' (Kuzio, 2002). Eventually, due 
to its internally contradictory nature, the concept of ‘Soviet people’ appeared 
to reamin as imaginary as the entire Soviet Union. 
The ideology of the ‘civilizing’ mission and utilizing it for political 
purposes is expressed in the Russian post-Cold War politics towards its 
neighbours as well. The very term ’near abroad’, which refers to the former 
Soviet republics, is an example of it. It implies, that Russia treats the other 
post-Soviet republics as semi-foreign and hence semi-independent entities 
(Kozhemiakin & Kanet, 1998). Especially vivid was such a treatment of 
Estonian state during the 'Bronze Soldier' crisis. According to the 
interpretation of Russia the Bronze Soldier monument represents the victory 
of the Soviet Union over fascism in the World War II, conveying general 
human values like the desire for freedom, resistance to foreign conquerors 
and self-sacrifice for the sake of the whole humankind. In the ‘conceptual 
chain of events’ of Russian collective memory the Bronze Soldier is a symbol 
to support their positive self-image, for it is related to a great victory, whereas 
the removal of the statue from its dignified location in the Tallinn centre, and 
particularly the way it was carried out by the Estonian government, is 
perceived as entirely incomprehensible and demeaning (Lavrov, 2007).  
Thus, victory of the Soviet Union over fascist Germany is an element to 
convey central meaning in the current collective historical memory in Russia, 
that is interpreted not just as defending one's own country from invaders, but 
liberating the entire humankind from fascism (Tumarkin, 1994)). In such a 
context, the remainder of the war-related ‘eventual chains of events’ are 
reduced to marginal role in the context of broader historical processes. 
Estonia's incorporation into the Soviet Union, for example, is not interpreted 
in this ‘conceptual chain of events’ as a violent act (like it is done by the 
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Estonians), but as one element of the broader liberating mission, where 
acquisition of the Estonian territory was necessary for security reasons and 
self-defence (Ken & Rupasov, 2000). In the ‘eventual chain of events’ related 
to the incorporation, seemingly 'unpleasant' facts occurred as well – like 
deportations of the local people to Siberia – but in the context of the 
‘conceptual chain of events’ in Russian collective historical memory, these acts 
are justified by struggle for liberating the whole humankind, in the context of 
which such sacrifices were unavoidable. 
As a result, Russia has difficulties with comprehending the complains 
of Estonians regarding Soviet occupation, since from the standpoint of her 
own collective historical memory, Russia deserves Estonia's recognition for 
the liberation from fascism, instead. Thus, Russians tend to overlook the 
other side of the story and the fact that for majority of Estonians the end of 
World War II meant beginning of a new occupation, that brought about new 
suffering to hundreds of thousands people for half a century. In the 
framework of the ‘conceptual chain of events’ in Russian collective historical 
memory the question is not posed why most Estonians see in the Bronze 
Soldier monument a symbol of the Soviet power or how the Estonians’ feel 
about the Soviet time. In the context of hierarchical concept of culture, the 
policies of the Estonian state towards its minorities are reduced to pursuing 
retribution for the Soviet period, which, in the name of restoration of the 
Estonian nation state, discriminates against Russians (Semjonov, 2002). 
Thus, two cognitive mechanisms are operating in the reproduction of 
the Russian collective historical memory. First, by substituting the ‘eventual 
chain of events’ to her ‘conceptual chain of events’ other possible versions of 
history and even debate over historical issues is outruled. Second, by 
essentializing her own version of history as a series of acts of liberation, a 
strategy of cultural hierarchizaton is utilized, which privileges Russia and 
represents her version of history as the ‘natural order of things’ and in this 
sense the ‘true’ history.  
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The conceptual chain of the Estonian collective historical memory 
Such a representation is, however, in an unavoidable dissonance with 
the content of the Estonian collective historical memory, remaining from the 
viewpoint of the latter as illusory as the concept of the 'Soviet people' was. 
The core element of the ‘conceptual chain of events’ in the Estonian collective 
historical memory is struggle of a small people for liberation in the context of 
expansive neighbouring powers (Lauristin, 1997; Kuus, 2002; Tamm, 2008). 
It represents an anti-hierarchical mirror image of the concept of culture found 
in the ideology of the 'Russian Idea'. Estonians hold that despite the 
centuries-long foreign rule, their will for national self-determination survived 
and led to the foundation of their own state in February 1918. Such a pursuit 
for freedom is naturalized in the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia by 
the statement according to which the ‘aim of the independent Estonian state 
is to protect Estonian nation, culture and language’. 
At the same time, Estonians believe that Estonia's sovereignty 
continues to be threatened, due to the factors like smallness of its population, 
vulnerable geographical location and the painful historical experiences (Hiio, 
2007). These threat perceptions are an essential part of the Estonian 
collective historical memory even after the country has become a member of 
EU and NATO in 2004. It would have been safe to assume that after 
admission into these institutions a change would have followed in the 
national security discourse. But this has not happened, rather 'the transition 
has taken place not from exclusive to inclusive understanding of security, but 
from exclusions based on the notion of military threat to those invoking 
culture and values' (Kuus, 2002: 297). 
Russia represents the primary source of threat perceptions among 
Estonians, due to geographic as well as historical reasons, being the negative 
'other' in comparison to whom most of the positive features of ‘us’ are 
construed (see also Neumann, 1999, Petersoo, 2007). Two cognitive 
mechanisms reproducing such perceptions in the Estonian collective 
historical memory are, first, the placement of facts in ‘eventual chain of 
events’ (e.g. the Estonian citizenship policy, lack of the Estonian-Russian 
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border agreement, the construction of the Russian-German pipeline in the 
Baltic Sea, recent Russian-Georgian war, etc.) to the perspective of the 
‘conceptual chain of events’ described above, and, second, the certitude that 
Russian state is incapable of becoming a democracy, and that the need to 
dominate is encoded into its very essence. Thus, a black-and-white world is 
construed, populated by the forces of ‘good’ and ‘evil’. The ‘evil Russia’ is 
essentialized in such a discourse as a structural principle found in its core, 
and extrapolated to future. It is predicted, within such a ‘conceptual chain of 
events’ that as Russia has performed injustice towards Estonia in the past, it 
will do it again in future, if allowed. This, in turn, necessitates Estonian 
preparations to defend herself against Russia through all possible means (see 
for example Aasmäe, 2004). 
Such dispositions are constantly reproduced not only in the Estonian 
public debate, but in the academic discourse as well. This makes the latter 
somewhat anachronistic, in the light of theoretical advancement of the recent 
decades (see Brubaker, Loveman & Stamatov, 2004), in which essentialist 
presumptions are avoided, as a rule. A popular conceptual expression of such 
an essentialism is found in the description of the Estonian-Russian relations 
by the metaphor of clash of the civilizations', which encodes fundamental 
difference of 'our' norms, values and ideals from ‘theirs’ (Saar, 1998). It is 
worth noting that this kind of disposition has a long tradition in the Estonian 
national and theoretical thought. For example, Jüri Uluots, a past prime 
minister, wrote about Russians as being aggressive by nature, which is 
determined by their 'anthropological substance' (Uluots, 1990). One of the 
leading ethnographers of the pre-war Estonia, Oskar Loorits scrutinized the 
Estonian self-consciousness in the terminology of contradictions between the 
Ural and Aryan origins (see Tedre, 1999). In the modern social-theoretical 
literature, such essentialism is reproduced by the primordial conceptu-
alization of nations, based on principles of ‘methodological nationalism’ (see 
Wimmer & Schiller, 2003). It is done, for example, by interpreting different 
types of nationalism in the tradition initiated by Hans Kohn as different 
phases of nationalism. The ethnic-cultural nationalism as a specific type in 
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the original conceptualization of Kohn is, thus, interpreted not in terms of the 
exclusion of the 'other', but as carrier of liberal values, instead. However, one 
should add, there is also criticism of such a theoretical position found in 
Estonian academic discourse, holding that in such a naive framework, 'the 
transition from ethnos to nationality is unequivocal and problem-free as the 
awakening of a sleeper' (Piirimäe, 2007: 101). 
 
Collective historical memory in domestic politics in Estonia 
Essentializing tendencies in the collective historical memory are 
forcefully reproduced in the Estonian domestic politics as well, as 
conservative parties tend to amplify the 'Russian threat', as a part of their 
power strategy (Meikar, 2009). It is characteristic, in this respect, that the 
discourse of the 'Russian threat' in Estonia tends to focus not on the objective 
socio-economical processes and their possible political outcomes, but rather on 
discussing personality issues, like the KGB past of its current leaders, which 
is presumed to confirm the fundamental 'evil' of Russia (Aslund, 2005). What 
we are dealing with in this case is the attribution of motives to the 
counterpart that derives from one's own fears. Presuming that Russia cannot, 
in principle, be democratic, a vicious circle is created, where things to be 
prevented are discursively reproduced.  
A vivid example of such a circle is abortion of signing of the Estonian-
Russian border treaty, in 2005. After a settlement was reached by the foreign 
ministers of the two states, the Estonian Parliament unilaterally added new 
clauses to the preamble, referring to the Tartu Peace Treaty. It was justified 
by the argumentation of the need to prevent possible hostile action of Russia, 
based on the treaty, in the future (see also Berg & Oras, 2004). As such an 
addition was a violation of the foreign ministers' prior agreement, Russia 
claimed to have no other alternative than to freeze the ratification of the 
treaty. Thus, a prediction of the counterpart's motives, deriving from one's 
fears (and party-political calculations to use it for vote gain), turned into a 
'self-fulfilling prophecy', through a preventive action of the other side. By 
behaving as an enemy, exactly such a role was imposed on the opponent. 
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The most remarkable example of essentializing of the ’Russian threat’, 
as a part of domestic politics, can be found in the abovementioned Bronze 
Soldier Crisis. Ten months before Parliamentary elections in 2007, the leader 
of Reform Party Andrus Ansip declared that Soviet monuments do not belong 
in centre of Tallinn. His promise to remove the Bronze Soldier mobilized 
ethnic Estonians, and, as a result, the Reform Party received two times more 
votes at the elections in March 2007, compared to previous parliamentary 
elections (Anvelt, Poom & Ojakivi, 2007). After such a landslide victory it was 
difficult to withdraw the promise of removal, without losing face. Hence the 
new government started works on ground immediately after the elections, to 
relocate the Bronze Soldier monument, under the pretext of alleged plans 
from Russia to organise massive riots in Estonia on May 9th, which would 
threaten Estonian nationhood (Ansip, 2007). Preparations to remove the 
Bronze Soldier by government, however, provoked demonstrations in front of 
the monument among the Russian-speaking population in Estonia. The 
confrontation grew into vandalizing in Tallinn’s old town on April 26 during 
which over 1000 people were arrested (Vetik, 2008).  
The plotting and execution of the monument removal by Estonian 
government mobilized the entire society on ethnic grounds (Astrov, 2007). 
The events acquired the proportions of an international conflict after deputies 
of Russian Duma arrived in Tallinn to meet the Estonian MPs started 
requesting resignation of the Estonian government. In addition, the Estonian 
Embassy in Moscow was attacked by the Kremlin-lead ‘Nashi’ youth 
movement, and the massive cyber-attacks against Estonian official Internet-
sites took place (Ehala, 2010). As a result, the depicted events actualized the 
essentialist interpretations both among the ethnic Estonians as well as 
Estonian Russians, which substantially intensifed ethnocentric attitudes in 
society (Vetik, 2007). 
The given example indicates that the essentializing of the 'Russian 
threat’ tends to take even secondary disagreements to an existential ground, 
reducing the opportunities for a constructive relationship. Another 
consequence of such essentialism is spill-over of the threat perception related 
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to Russian state also to Estonian Russians. One of the most extreme 
examples of such spill-over in the recent years has been an open appeal to the 
international public, signed by a number of prominent Estonian cultural 
figures, as a reaction to Russia's continuous allegations about the violations of 
human rights in Estonia. In the appeal a very strong terminology reminiscent 
of Cold War, such as 'civil occupation' and 'persistence of aggression' was used, 
in signifying the Estonian Russians (Vahtre et al, 2005). Even though there is 
no doubt that Russia’s foreign policy utilizes the accusation of minority 
discrimination in its opportunistic interest, raising the issue when it suits her 
(Cohen & Volk, 2004), the use of the 'persistence of aggression' rhetoric in the 
open letter instantly after the Estonian admission to the EU and NATO 
shows the deepness of threat perceptions encoded into the Estonian historical 
memory, as well as the ability of the conservative wing of the political 
spectrum to utilize it in domestic politics. 
As a result of strong threat perceptions among Estonians, 
misperceptions have emerged not only in the Estonian-Russian relationship, 
but in Estonian relationship to the West. The writings of the former Estonian 
ambassador to Russia Mart Helme are particularly vivid in this respect, an 
example of which reads as follows: 'What we should definitely promote and 
support, is the replacement of the European big states' current realpolitik by 
politics that have a realistic attitude towards Russia as an imperialist state, 
the most important element of which is the idea that sacrifices should not be 
made to a voracious Moloch, however small and irrelevant those wouldn't 
seem' (Helme, 2004: 6). In a similar manner, a former Estonian ambassador 
to NATO, Harri Tiido iterates: 'The West occasionally seems to express a 
multilevel chain of unwishfulness. Firstly – truthful information is not 
desired about Russia. Secondly, in case it is received, it is not believed. 
Thirdly, if it is believed, it is not utilized for political purposes. The situation 
is occasionally quite depressing and it appears that not us, but instead many 
of our partners, tend to live in the past’ (Tiido, 2005: 15). 
Thus, the conservative wing of the Estonian politics is perplexed – why 
the West does not understand what is going on and why does the EU or the 
 18  
US do not stand sufficiently for the Estonian interests in connection to Russia 
(see also ‘Open letter to Barrack Obama’, 2009 in this regard)? Such a 
phrasing in Estonian public debate itself indicates that the field of 
international affairs is perceived along essentialist terminology of 
wisdom/ignorance, whereas the position of wisdom is ascribed to oneself. 
Dwelling from the position of the wise, it is concluded that Estonian partners 
in the West need to be ‘enlightened’ about ‘what Russia is really about’, as it 
seems that they are not clever enough to see through the 'Russian tricks'. In 
such a mode, for example, the editor in chief of an Estonian foreign policy 
magazine ’Diplomaatia’ complains that 'Things could be slightly different, if 
the European powerful states were led by somewhat more daring and 
principle people – the state of affairs with its leaders is rather poor at the 
moment ' (Liik, 2005: 16; for comparison see Lyne, 2006). 
In short – replacement of the ‘eventual chain of events’ with ‘conceptual 
chain of events’ in the collective historical memory is a cognitive form utilized 
to reproduce the narrative of ‘true history’ in Estonian public debate. The 
interpretation of whatever ‘eventual chains of events’ in terms of 'Russian 
threat' is the strategy utilized utilized by the conservative wing of political 
spectrum in Estonia. However, as the previous section revealed, such a 
substitution and interpretation is in discrepancy not only with the position of 
Russia, but often also the position of the West. This is the reason why Estonia 
is often perceived as a ‘one theme country’, incapable of reconciling with its 
past (Tiido, 2008). 
One of the factors contributing to the capability of the conservative 
wing of the political spectrum to hold its hegemony in domestic affairs in 
Estonia, by invoking the ‘Russian threat’, has been confrontational US-Russia 
relationship since the presidencies of Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a transformation ideology dominated in 
the US foreign policy discourse, aiming to support Russia in establishing 
democracy and market economy. However, later on the US interest in the 
Russian direction weakened, for Russia had become an ideologically harmless 
and an economically inferior state. Even though a possibility for a new start 
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in the US and Russia's interests arose after September 11th 2001, it did not 
develop into strategic cooperation, but faded into the 'democratization' of the 
Moslem world by the US, and new expansionism by Russia. Thus, on the one 
hand, the strategy of the Bush administration has been to be stronger than 
the possible existing adversaries and use military force, if necessary, to 
maintain its privileged position in world affairs (Kagan, 2003), which 
unavoidably impacted also the Estonian-Russian relations. On the other hand, 
under Putin’s rule Russia started to utilize symbolism of the Soviet era, which 
has created new threat perceptions among its neighbours. 
The argument of this paper holds that uncovering of the cognitive 
mechanisms behind reproduction of collective historical memories can 
contribute to better understanding of current tensions between Estonia and 
Russia. The previous analysis confirms that at the core of the conceptual 
chain of Russia's historical memory is a hierarchical concept of culture. Any 
divergence of the Estonian viewpoint from the Russian one is interpreted as 
expression of ethno-centric nationalism, within such a framework. There is no 
doubt that ethno-centric attitude exists in Estonia, to a certain extent, as in 
any other country. However, it is important to notice, that framing the 
Estonian policies towards Russian-language minorities exclusively in such 
terms is beneficial to the conservative wing of the Estonian political spectrum. 
Accusations of Russia towards Estonian policies inevitably increase threat 
perceptions among ethnic Estonians, which in turn generates ethno-centrism 
and strengthens the social basis of the conservative political agenda. Thus, a 
self-fulfilling prophecy comes into effect here – Russia's interpretation of the 
Estonian policies as exclusively ethno-centric contributes to the increase of 
ethno-centrism in Estonian society and politics, which is something Russia 
allegedly seeks to prevent. The boost in conservative ethnocentric dispositions 
among ethnic Estonians after the Bronze Soldier crisis confirms this 
unequivocally.  
On the other hand, at the core of the ‘conceptual chain of events’ in the 
Estonian historical memory there is the notion of ‘liberation struggle of a 
small people’ and particularly opposition to the hierarchical concept of culture 
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of Russia. In such a framework, anything Russia does or does not, tends to be 
interpreted as an attempt to enforce its dominance over neighboring countries. 
Here a self-fulfilling prophecy comes into effect as well. Even though there is 
no doubt, that Russia often has a tendency to view its national interests 
through domination over the former satellites, perceiving Russia exclusively 
in such a framework is counterproductive to Estonia’s national interest. The 
issue of signing of the Estonian-Russian border treaty in 2005, described 
above, is only one example of the pattern, where naturalizing the ‘Russian 
threat’ the Estonian side reproduces domination that the Estonian political 
elite allegedly seeks to prevent. 
Thus, gaining vote in Estonian domestic politics is heavily involved in 
the reproduction of the discourses of the Russian ‘civilizing mission’ or the 
‘Russian threat’. At the same time, opposition to such conservative discourse 
exist as well, even though the role of the discourse has remained marginal so 
far. Let us take as an example of the liberal discourse an article written by 
former foreign minister Toomas Hendrik Ilves 'The Europeanization of 
Estonian Politics' (Ilves, 1997). One can find the following lines in the article, 
aiming towards for constructive steps in Estonian-Russian relationship: 
'Several Estonian-Russian problems emerge from misinterprettation, but also 
from Russia's domestic political debate. Some of their circles gather domestic 
political recognition through attacks towards Estonia, but these should not be 
strengthened by our own unfounded assaults. Rather, we would need positive 
steps. Every Estonian should understand that the more we support the 
democratic tendencies in Russia with our balanced and benevolent behaviour, 
the smaller the chances are for the imperialist-minded to push their own 
program through' (Ilves, 1997: 13). 
The narrative of Ilves that time diverged sharply from the conservative 
mainstream in Estonia. Reason behind confrontation in the Estonian-Russian 
relationship is not attributed to Russia's internal ‘evil’ in the article, but 
rather to contextual factors. It means that Russia's aggressive attitudes 
towards their neighbours do not have an essentialist ground, deriving from 
some deeper essence, but are rather a result of certain political and social 
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circumstances. Among those are Russia's domestic politics, where xenophobic 
moods are exploited, as well as the fact that Russia has faced serious 
economic and social setbacks after the Soviet Union disintegration. For 
example, the economic reforms in Russia launched at the beginning of the 
1990s did not succeed, as western-minded reformists acted temerariously, not 
assuring the national support for the changes. The privatization process was 
corrupt, turning a thus far very egalitarian society into an extremely 
stratified one. In the course of the first ten years after dismantling of the 
Soviet Union, the Russian GDP sank threefold, falling from the third place in 
the world, to sixteenth (Graham, 2000). The way the market reforms were 
executed as a whole, gave rise to social setbacks that to many were 
comparable with the nationalizing carried out by Bolsheviks in 1920s. For 
example, according to the 'Human Development Report 2005' the rise in 
men's mortality rate in Russia during 1991-2002 brought up to 3 million 
additional deaths. This is history's largest human sacrifice in conditions of no 
war, famine or epidemics (United Nations Development Programme, 2005). 
The narrative of Ilves unorthodoxically claims that even though Russia 
can be characterized by a strong internal need to construct 'enemies' in their 
neighbours, due to post-Soviet political and social hardships, it is not in the 
Estonia’s interest to reciprocate by similar type of counter-attacks. This does 
not imply the renouncing of one's historical memory, but rather an attempt to 
exit a vicious circle, where mutual blame tends to reproduce confrontation. 
The narrative thus presumes that attempts to ‘enlighten’ the other side and 
to explain what ‘really’ happened in history cannot serve as a foundation for 
the constructive Estonian-Russian relationship. Rather, it should be 
substituted by the disposition of reflexive empathy, which demonstrates the 
ability to put oneself in the counterpart's shoes and project oneself into it's 
apprehension of the world (see Ross, 1995 in this regard). This represents an 
attempt to understand the other side, instead of attributing features from 
one's own fears to their psyche. Such an attempt does not mean agreeing to 
the other side, however, it creates an opportunity for a dialogue to decrease 
mutual misperceptions and undesired escalation of confrontation. 
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What follows is an example of an issue in the current Estonian-Russian 
relationship, which can be interpreted either from conservative or reflexive 
empathy position. The most typical confrontation in the Estonian-Russian 
relationship during the period after dismantling of the Soviet Union is the 
alleged discrimination of the Estonian Russians. According to the 
mainstream Estonian position, which is based on the presumption of ‘true 
history’ being on the Estonian side, Russia utilizes a conscious lie with this 
allegation, as 'in Estonia there in fact is no discrimination' (Estonian Bureau 
of the Minister of Population, 2008). However, from the perspective of the 
discourse of reflexive empathy, which is based on the concept of ‘multiple 
histories’, one can notice that such claims of Russia are not alien to 
experiences of many Estonian Russians, and are interpreted along the 
‘conceptual chain of events’ in their collective historical memory. Russia holds 
that people who migrated to Estonia during Soviet period are not co-
responsible for the policies of the Soviet regime. Thus, after Estonia regained 
independence, these migrants should have obtained Estonian citizenship 
automatically, similarly to the ethnic Estonians. However, the Estonian 
citizenship law of 1992 made them stateless. Loss of citizenship and, as a 
result, decrease in opportunities to succeed in the public sphere and labour 
market, created a feeling among many Estonian Russians of being 
discriminated against. One can note that exclusion and discrimination is felt 
not only by stateless persons, but by the Russian-speaking community as a 
whole, including top intellectuals (see Issakov, 2006). Such a feeling could be 
interpreted, from the position of the narrative of ’true history’, as an 
expression of the hierarchy archetype of the Russian historical memory, due 
to which ‘Russians are finding it difficult to come to terms with being defined 
as a „national minority“’ (Kuzio, 2002: 247). However, from the position of the 
discourse of ‘multiple histories’, based on reflexive empathy, it can be 
regarded a normal psychological reaction of people in such a condition. The 
fact is that 25 million people strong diaspora remained in the former Soviet 
Union republics after the disintegration of the USSR (Heleniak, 2004). One 
can argue from the standpoint of reflexive empathy, that if the well-being of 
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the Finno-Ugric nations living in Russia is emotionally relevant to many 
Estonians (Valton, 2008), then, why not to appreciate, that the well-being of 
the Russian diaspora could also be emotionally relevant to Russia. 
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper was to highlight the strategic role discursive 
reproduction of collective historical memories plays in the current Estonian-
Russian relationship. The paper asserts that shift towards reflexive empathy 
in the relationship would presume deconstruction of collective historical 
memories to ‘eventual chain of events’ and ‘conceptual chain of events’. 
Interpretation of the former should follow the discourse of ‘multiple histories', 
rather than the discourse of the true history’, if one is interested in resolution 
of conflicts.  
However, such a shift is not on the agenda in the current stage of the 
Estonian-Russian relationship, particularly in the light of current Ukrainian-
Russian crisis. Russia's role in the world affairs has weakened significantly 
during the past few decades, its current condition could be described as an 
empire's reluctant retreat from former domains of influence (Trenin, 2005). 
Such a condition is hard to cope by definition, both politically as well as 
psychologically. It is expressed, among other things, by the endeavour to 
maintain as extensive control over the 'near abroad' as possible by Russian 
authorities. However, history has witnessed empires with a very strong 
messianistic ideology, that have gradually been able to refrain from it - such 
as France (Revel, 2007). Thus, Russia stands on the crossroad and the 
direction she will take in future depends, besides geopolitical, socio-economic 
and other ‘objective’ factors (Light, 2003), also on the ways how she 
reproduces her collective historical memory.  
On the other hand, in the Estonian domestic politics a strong anti-Russian 
sentiment is still dominating. A vivid example is the statement of the chief editor 
of a cultural weekly ‘Sirp’ that 'even if an apology (for the occupation, RV) should 
arrive from the East, we could by no means accept it' (Tarand, 2009). Thus, the 
tendency to interpret whatever ‘eventual chains of events’ in terms of the 
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Russian ‘civilizing mission’, on the one hand, and the ‘Russian threat’, on the 
other hand, is strong in the Estonian public debate. The conservative wing of 
the political spectrum takes little interest in a constructive dialogue, as the 
conflict tend to play to their hand and can be utilized in the domestic power-
politics.  
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Academic and Popular Representations  
of the Recent Past on the Example of Estonia 
 
Olaf Mertelsmann 
 
As author of this short essay, I should acknowledge my own 
subjectivity on this topic. I was born and raised in West Germany, studied at 
the University of Hamburg and started my work as a historian with research 
on the German war economy of World War I. In 1994, I taught for the first 
time Estonian students at the University of Tartu. Only at my postdoctoral 
stage, I began research on Estonian history and was hired a couple of years 
later, in 2005, as associate professor in contemporary history by the 
University of Tartu. Thus, I am influenced through my German training and 
the upbringing on the other side of the Iron Curtain. In comparison to 
Estonian colleagues of my age, I never lived under Socialism. I only visited 
Socialist countries. In Estonia, I started as an outsider turning over the years 
into an insider being now for more than a decade involved in researching the 
country’s recent past. As a professional historian working at a university, I 
am probably full of prejudice towards popular history writing. 
Everywhere in the world, there are tensions between academic and 
popular history writing. Popular representations of the past as the name 
indicates reach a larger share of the audience, while academic works often 
remain the literature for much smaller circles and might influence the public 
more on the long run for example through school curricula and more slowly 
disseminating knowledge. Only on rare occasions, the findings of academic 
history reach a larger audience through bestselling books, longer coverage in 
the media or TV-documentaries. Partly academic historians are themselves 
responsible for not being read due to their unreadable style or because they 
follow too much the traditions of their field. In popular history, we meet 
trained historians, journalists or amateur historians. They write more 
accessible often reducing the complexity of the past, constructing identities or 
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creating myths. While virtually nobody would go voluntarily to an amateur 
dentist, amateur historians might become quite successful. For example the 
most influential popular “expert” on German contemporary history is Guido 
Knoop, a TV-journalist holding also a PhD in history. 1  Nevertheless, 
professional historians sometimes envy popular historians silently for 
reaching much larger audiences and being more influential. 
In the case of Estonia, which might be seen as somehow typical for 
post-socialist countries, the roots of today’s popular and academic writing on 
the recent past go back to the same period – the late 1980s, the time of 
perestroika or the last years of socialism. The main protagonists might have 
achieved already an acknowledged position or they were in their formative 
years. 
Some short remarks on Estonian recent history are necessary. 2 
Estonia was an independent state in 1918–40 after fighting successfully in a 
War of Independence against Bolshevik Russia and until 1934 a democracy. 
The Republic of Estonia was annexed like Latvia and Lithuania by the Soviet 
Union in 1940, occupied by the Germans during World War II in 1941–44 and 
regained independence only in 1991. All this influences the view on the recent 
past. Although the country was governed by a homegrown authoritarian 
regime since 1934, the interwar period witnessed enormous improvements for 
the broad population from culture and education to levels of wellbeing and 
increasing social equality. The violent time of Stalinism was such a shock 
that even the German occupation was seen by the majority of the population 
as a lesser evil.3 After the death of Stalin, the situation improved steadily 
and life became bearable. Still, the regaining of independent statehood and 
                                                       
1  See Jörg Baberowski, ’Geschichte für Trottel’ [History for Fools], Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung 30.05.2014. 
2 As a first introduction to the history of Estonia and the other two Baltic states I 
recommend: Andres Kasekamp, Baruto sangoku no rekishi: esutonia ratovia ritoania 
sekki jidai kara gendai made (Tōkyō : Akashishoten, 2014). 
3 Olaf Mertelsmann, ‘Das “kleinere Übel”? Das Generalkommissariat Estland im 
estnischen Vergangenheitsdiskurs’ [The “Lesser Evil”? The Generalkommissariat 
Estland in the Estonian Discourse on the Past], Sebastian Lehmann, Robert Bohn and 
Uwe Danker, Reichskommissariat Ostland: Tatort und Erinnerungsobjekt (Paderborn: 
Schöningh, 2012), pp. 349–366. 
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the generally successful post-socialist transformation made it nearly 
impossible that Soviet nostalgia could evolve on a larger scale during the last 
two decades. If we want to explore representations of the past, we should not 
ignore the direct life experience of the audience or the knowledge transmitted 
to younger members of society through family and friends.  
Due to the historical experience, there is a widespread image of 
Estonians as victims of history. Several commissions and groups of volunteers 
did the painstaking work of singling out the individual fate of forcefully 
mobilized, arrested, deported or executed citizens of Estonia under Soviet and 
Nazi rule. Huge volumes with the available data have been published.4 
Meanwhile, collaboration with Nazis or Soviets or the role of Estonians as 
perpetrators is far less discussed. Those questions turned up only by the late 
1990s. Quite recently the topic of violence, of “Red” and “White” terror during 
the War of Independence appeared.5 The heroes of Estonia’s recent past are 
clear in public opinion – those, who fought for independence in 1918–20, 
against the Soviets on the German side of the Eastern Front in 1941–44 or in 
armed resistance against Stalinism.  
Under late Socialism, there were three competing narratives of 
Estonia’s contemporary history. The first was the official one strongly 
censored by the Communist Party, still allowing for some variations and 
slightly critical voices. Those historians possessed limited access to the 
archives. One should not make the mistake to throw all those works into the 
dustbin. Some of them contained highly valuable information.6 Other authors 
published interesting sources. 7  We should not forget that Western 
historiography of Socialist countries during the Cold War was mainly based 
                                                       
4 For example Leo Õispuu has edited more than ten volumes with the findings of his 
voluntary research group alone. 
5 Taavi Miinik, ‘Der Teufelskreis der Gewalt: Terror und Repressionen in Estland 
1917–1919’ [The Vicious Circle of Violence: Terror and Repressions in Estonia 1917–
1919], Forschungen zur baltischen Geschichte 6 (2011), pp. 120–141. 
6 For example: Vilmar Ruus, Sotsialistlikud ümberkorraldused Eestis 1940–1941 [The 
Socialist Restructuring in Estonia 1940–1941] (Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1980). 
7  Evald Laasi et al. (eds.), Eesti NSV põllumajanduse kollektiviseerimine: 
Dokumentide ja materjalide kogumik [The Collectivization of Agriculture of the 
Estonian SSR: Collection of Documents and Materials] (Tallinn : Eesti Raamat, 1978). 
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on those censored publications, because most of the archives were not easily 
accessible for western scholars. The main problem with the official Soviet 
version of Estonia’s recent part was the fact that it had to tell a success story, 
which was at least partly contradicting the life experience of the audience. 
Given the fact that nearly every Estonian family had members, who fled to 
the West, were arrested, deported or even shot by the Soviets, and that most 
families had suffered during collectivization it seems to be understandable, 
why the official version could not be shared by everybody.  
The second narrative was the voice of the exile with virtually no access 
to primary sources, but as we know today being less biased and more 
accurate than Soviet Estonian historians. The exile produced many valuable 
works like one entire series of volumes on Estonia during the war.8 Two 
journals became an international platform for the Baltic exile, the German 
language Acta Baltica (1962–1997) and the publication of the Association for 
the Advancement of Baltic Studies, the Journal of Baltic Studies (since 1972). 
The best example for exile historiography on the recent past is Romuald 
Misiuanas’ and Rein Taagepera’s “The Baltic States: Years of Dependence” 
(London: Hurst, 1983)9 – a path breaking book still influential today. Of 
course, the exile did not speak with one voice, but old and new ideological 
differences continued. 
The third narrative was the private one being transmitted in family or 
friendship circles.10 It varied enormously as we can see in Estonian life 
stories written in the late 1980s.11 Very often, this private understanding of 
                                                       
8 Richard Maasing et al. (eds.), Eesti riik ja rahvas Teises maailmasõjas [The Estonian 
State and Nation in World War II], vol. 1-10 (Stockholm: EMP, 1954–1962). 
9  The second edition of 1993 covered also the period until 1990. An Estonian 
translation was published in 1997.  
10 Peeter Tulviste and James V. Wertsch, ‘Official and Unofficial Histories: The Case 
of Estonia’, in: Journal of Narrative and Life History 4 (1994), pp. 311–329. 
11 The Estonian Literary Museum in Tartu is the main collector of Estonian life stories 
today. Several thousand are gathered there and many edited volumes of life stories 
have been published in Estonian, but also in English or Russian. For example Rutt 
Hinrikus and Tiina Kirss, Estonian Life Stories (Budapest: Central European 
University Press, 2009). Life stories were also published together with scholarly 
interpretations: Ene Kõresaar (ed.), Soldiers of Memory: World War II and its 
Aftermath in Estonian Post-Soviet Life Stories (New York-Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2011). 
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history challenged the official way. It greatest success was the publication of 
“Kodu lugu – Home Story” in two volumes by Mart Laar, Lauri Vahtre and 
Heiki Valk in 1989,12 a national minded account of Estonian history, which 
had been prepared years earlier. Approximately 30,000 copies were sold, the 
best result for any history book in Estonian. This publication found its way 
into nearly one tenth of all Estonian speaking households. In 1989, Vahtre 
already held a candidate degree in history; Valk would later receive a 
doctorate in archaeology and Laar in history. All three had studied and 
received their degrees at the University of Tartu. Valk stayed in archeological 
research, while Vahtre and Laar became conservative politicians and among 
other things, popular history writers. The influence of “Home Story” cannot 
be underestimated. It appeared at the right moment, when historians 
debated the recent past in newspapers and the public did not always know 
what to believe about the past. Exile publications were not yet reprinted and 
appeared only slowly from the closed sectors of libraries. The more academic 
“The Estonian Nation and Stalinism” by Kaarel Haav and Rein Ruutsoo13 
was published one year later and a couple of important source collections did 
not reach such a broad audience. In that sense, “Home Story” turned into the 
most influential history book of the late Soviet and the early independence 
period. It is definitely not an academic account of Estonia’s past, partly 
because of the restrictions in libraries. But we deal with a fluent narrative 
written by three history students in their twenties based on what they could 
read and what they have heard of. Under the conditions of the 1980s, this 
was a great accomplishment. 
Academic history writing suffered during the 1990s from the problems 
                                                       
12 Mart Laar, Lauri Vahtre and Heiki Valk, Kodu lugu [Home Story], 2 vls. (Tallinn: 
Perioodika, 1989). A Russian version was published in 1992. See also: Lauri Vahtre, 
‘“Kodu lugu” – zwanzig Jahre später [“Kodu lugu” – Twenty Years later], in: 
Forschungen zur baltischen Geschichte 4 (2009), pp. 229–233; Andrei Hvostov, 
‘Zwanzig Jahre nationale Mobilmachung’ [Twenty Years of National Mobilization], in: 
ibid, pp. 234–237; Linda Kaljundi, ‘“Ein sicherer Halt”: Zum Verhältnis von Geschichte 
und Analogieprinzip in “Kodu lugu”’ [“A Secure Position”: On the Relation of History 
and Principle of Analogy in “Kodu lugu”], in: ibid, pp. 238–248. 
13 Kaarel Haav and Rein Ruutsoo, Eesti rahvas ja stalinlus: Ajalugu ja tänapäev [The 
Estonian Nation and Stalinism: History and Presence], (Tallinn: Olion, 1990). 
 34  
of post-socialist transformation. The universities and the Estonian Academy 
of Science were restructured, research was not well funded and professional 
historians faced serious problems to continue their work. Single important 
publications on Estonian contemporary history appeared,14 but only since the 
late 1990s with the formation of different history commission, especially the 
presidential commission, research took really off. A new generation of 
historians with some international experience started to work through the 
vast amount of material in Estonian and foreign archives. Some older 
historians like Jüri Ant15, Mati Graf16, Toomas Karjahärm and Väino Sirk17 
or Olaf Kuuli18 contributed with valuable research. New series like “Between 
Peace and War”19, “Estonian History”20, single influential edited volumes21 or 
                                                       
14 For example Indrek Jürjo, Pagulus ja Nõukogude Eesti: Vaateid KGB, EKP ja 
VEKSA arhiividokumentide põhjal [The Exile and Soviet Estonia: Perspectives based 
on Archival Documents from KGB, ECP and VEKSA] (Tallinn: UMARA, 1996). 
15 Jüri Ant, Eesti 1939-1941: Rahvast, valitsemisest, saatusest [Estonia 1919-1941: 
About the People, Governing, and Fate], Tallinn, 1999. 
16 Mati Graf, Kalevipoja kojutulek: 1978. aasta poliitilisest pööripäevast 1988. aasta 
suveräänsusdeklaratsioonini [The Return of Kalevipoeg: From the Political Turn in 
1978 until the Declaration of Sovereignty in 1988] (Tallinn: Argo, 2008); idem, 
Impeeriumi lõpp ja Eesti taasiseseisvumine 1988–1991 [The End of the Empire and 
the Reestablishment of Estonian Independence] (Tallinn: Argo, 2012). 
17 Toomas Karjahärm and Väino Sirk, Vaim ja võim: Eesti haritlaskond 1917–1940 
[The Spirit and the Power: Estonian Intellectuals 1917–1940] (Tallinn: Argo, 2001); 
Karjahärm and Sirk, Kohanemine ja vastupanu: Eesti haritlaskond 1940–1987 
[Adaptation and Resistance: Estonian Intellectuals 1940–1987] (Tallinn: Argo, 2007). 
18  Olaf Kuuli, Sotsialistid ja kommunistid Eestis 1917–1991 [Socialists and 
Communists in Estonia 1917–1991], (Tallinn, 1999); idem, Sula ja hallad Eesti NSV-s: 
Kultuuripoliitikast aastail 1953–1969 [Thaw and Frost in the Estonian SSR: On the 
Cultural Policy in 1953–1969] (Tallinn, 2002). 
19 Tõnu Tannberg (ed.), Sõja ja rahu vahel: I, Eesti julgeolekupoliitika 1940. aastani 
[Between War and Peace: I, Estonian Security Policy until 1940] (Tallinn: S-Keskus, 
2004); Meelis Maripuu (ed.), Sõja ja rahu vahel: II,  Esimene punane aasta [Between 
War and Peace: II, The First Red Year] (Tallinn: S-Keskus, 2010). 
20 There will be six volumes in this series covering the entire Estonian history. 
Publication started in 2003. 
21 Olaf Mertelsmann (ed.), The Sovietization of the Baltic States, 1940–1956 (Tartu: 
Kleio, 2003); Tõnu Tannberg (ed.), Eesti NSV aastatel 1940–1953: sovetiseerimise 
mehhanismid ja tagajärjed Nõukogude Liidu ja Ida-Euroopa arengute kontekstis [The 
Estonian SSR 1940–1953: Mechanism of Sovietization and the Results in the Context 
of Developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe] (Tartu: Eesti Ajalooarhiiv, 
2007); John Hiden, Vahur Made and David J. Smith (eds.), The Baltic Question during 
the Cold War (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), Olaf Mertelsmann and Kaarel Piirimäe, The 
Baltic Sea Region and the Cold War (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2012); James S. Corum, 
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the findings of the presidential commissions22 and numerous articles in new 
history journals like “Ajalooline Ajakiri – The Estonian Historical Journal”, 
“Tuna – Past”, “Acta Historica Tallinnensia” and the German language 
“Forschungen zur baltischen Geschichte – Research on Baltic History” 
increased our knowledge enormously. Academic life at the universities 
consolidated also in this period. Libraries started buying book and journals 
from abroad. International contacts intensified and after economic 
consolidation Estonian historians could spend longer periods abroad. In 
addition, academic and popular books on history were increasingly translated 
into Estonian. New methods and approaches began to spread.  
Estonian contemporary history did not remain a field reserved only for 
Estonians, but with Ruth Bettina Birn23, Karsten Brüggemann24, David 
Feest25, myself26, Seppo Zetterberg27 and Elena Zubkova28 four German 
                                                                                                                                    
Olaf Mertelsmann and Kaarel Piirimäe (eds.), The Second World War and the Baltic 
States (Franfurt: Peter Lang, 2014). 
22 Toomas Hiio, Meelis Maripuu and Indrek Paavle (eds.), Estonia 1940–1945: Reports 
of the Estonian International Commission for the Investigation of Crimes Against 
Humanity (Tallinn: Inimsusevastaste Kuritegude Uurimise Eesti Sihtasutus, 2006); 
Hiio, Maripuu and Paavle (eds.): Estonia since 1944: Reports of the Estonian 
International Commission for the Investigation of Crimes Against Humanity (Tallinn: 
Inimsusevastaste Kuritegude Uurimise Eesti Sihtasutus, 2009). 
23 Ruth Bettina Birn, Die Sicherheitspolizei in Estland, 1941–1944: Eine Studie zur 
Kollaboration im Osten [The Security Police in Estonia, 1941–1944: A Study on 
Collaboration in the East] (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2006). 
24 Karsten Brüggemann, Die Gründung der Republik Estland und das Ende des 
“Einen und unteilbaren Russland”: Die Petrograder Front des russischen Bürgerkriegs 
1918–1920 [The Founding of the Republic of Estonia and the End of “One and 
Impartible Russia”:  The Petrograd Front of the Russian Civil War 1918–1920] 
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2002); idem and Ralph Tuchtenhagen, Tallinn: Kleine 
Geschichte der Stadt [Tallinn: A Short History of the City] (Cologne: Böhlau, 2011). 
25  David Feest, Zwangskollektivierung im Baltikum: Die Sowjetisierung des 
estnischen Dorfes, 1944–1953 [Forced Collectivization in the Baltic: The Sovietization 
of the Estonian Village, 1944–1953] (Cologne: Böhlau, 2007). 
26 Olaf Mertelsmann, Der stalinistische Umbau in Estland: Von der Markt- zur 
Kommandowirtschaft [The Stalinist Reconstruction in Estonia: From Market to 
Command Economy] (Hamburg: Kovač, 2006); idem, Everyday Life in Stalinist 
Estonia (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2012); idem, Die Sowjetisierung Estlands und seiner 
Gesellschaft [The Sovietization of Estonia and Her Society] (Hamburg: Kovač, 2012); 
idem and Marju Mertelsmann, Landreform in Estland 1919: Die Reaktion von Esten 
und Deutschbalten [Land Reform in Estonia 1919: The Reaction of Estonians and 
Baltic Germans] (Hamburg: Kovač, 2012). 
27 Seppo Zetterberg, Eesti ajalugu [Estonian History], (Tallinn: Tänapäev, 2009); 
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historians, one Finnish and one Russian historian contributed with important 
works on Estonian contemporary or general history. Actually, Zetterberg’s 
account is the best overview on Estonia’s history written by one author. One 
important factor was and is the openness of Estonian academia. The 
internationalization of universities and research is one of the aims of state 
research policy. This means that foreigners are more easily hired than in 
many other Central Eastern European countries. For example, foreign 
Estonian historian Andres Kasekamp29 became professor of political science 
in Tartu, Brüggemann turned into professor in Tallinn, I am associate 
professor in Tartu, and German historian Ulrike Plath is now professor in 
Tallinn. Estonian historiography internationalized, too, and leading 
contemporary historians like Tõnu Tannberg30, Jaak Valge31 or Aigi Rahi-
Tamm32 published increasingly abroad. In comparison to the situation some 
25 years ago, the development was tremendous, not only concerning the 
increase of knowledge about the recent past but also in relation to the variety 
of methods and views. In addition, while in the 1990s only few persons 
finished a PhD in history, the numbers have increased steadily. Furthermore, 
a couple of young researchers from Estonia obtained a PhD from abroad and 
returned home like Kaarel Piirimäe33, now professor at the Estonian Military 
                                                                                                                                    
idem, Jüri Vilmsi surm: Eesti asepeaministri hukkamine Helsingis 13. aprillil 1918 
[The Death of Jüri Vilms: The Execution of Estonia’s Deputy Prime Minister on 13 
April 1918 in Helsinki] (Tallinn: Tänapäev, 2004) ; idem, Kultuurisillad ja 
revolutsioonituuled: Helsingi eesti kogukond 20. sajandi alguses [Cultural Bridges and 
Revolutionary Winds: The Estonian Community in Helsinki at the Beginning of the 
20th Century] (Tallinn: Tänapäev, 2013). 
28 Елена Зубкова, Прибалтика и Кремль 1940–1953 (Москва: РОССПЭН, 2008).  
29 Andres Kasekamp, The Radical Right in Interwar Estonia (Basingstoke-London: 
Macmillan Press, 1999). 
30 Тыну Таннберг, Политика Москвы в Республиках Балтии в послевоенные годы 
(1944–1956): исследования и документы (Москва: РОССПЭН, 2010). 
31 Jaak Valge, Breaking away from Russia: Economic Stabilization in Estonia 1918–
1924 (Stockholm: Stockholm University, 2006); Anu Mai Kõll and idem, Economic 
Nationalism and Industrial Growth: State and Industry in Estonia 1934–39 
(Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1998). 
32 Rahi-Tamm has published in international journals as Ab Imperio, Cahiers du 
Monde russe, Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung, Journal of Baltic 
Studies, Journal of Genocide Research and Kritika. 
33 Kaarel Piirimäe, Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Baltic Question: Allied Relations 
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Academy, or moved further on like Anton Weiss-Wendt34. Thus, nowadays, 
there is a critical mass of competent researchers on contemporary history. 
Crucial questions of the recent past were Stalinism and World War II. 
This was reflected in the topics of research. The German occupation during 
the war became important somehow later, when Estonia applied for member 
status in the European Union and NATO. One reason for the establishment 
of history commissions in the Baltic states was to demonstrate that those 
countries were “coming to terms with the past”.35 Another important field of 
research is the founding of the independent state and the interwar period.36 
The First World War was discovered only recently in relation to the 100th 
anniversary.37 Those important topics of academic research are also mirrored 
in popular publication. 
Nevertheless, the Estonian public did not always note the 
improvement in scholarly research. Of course, in Estonia, academic historians 
are valued; they appear regularly on television, in newspapers or on the radio, 
but like elsewhere popular historians reach wider audiences. Partly this is 
related to the language of publications of some academic researchers – 
English, Russian or German does not really reach Estonian readers, but this 
is required by the Estonian research funding system. The probability of being 
funded or of finding a job simply increases with publications abroad. But 
mainly, popular history writers are easier understood and fulfill better the 
                                                                                                                                    
during the Second World War (Basingstoke-New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
34  Anton Weiss-Wendt, Murder without Hatred: Estonians and the Holocaust 
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2009). 
35 Eva-Clarita Onken, ‘The Politics of Finding Historical Truth: Reviewing Baltic 
History Commissions and their Work’, Journal of Baltic Studies 38 (2007), pp. 109-116; 
Eva-Clarita Pettai and Vello Pettai, Transitional and Retrospective Justice in the 
Baltic States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
36 For example Mati Graf, Parteid Eesti Vabariigis 1918–1934 [Political Parties in the 
Republic of Estonia 1918–1934] (Tallinn: Tallinna Pedagoogikaülikooli kirjastus, 
2000); Ago Pajur, Eesti riigikaitsepoliitika aastail 1918–1934 [Estonian Defense Policy 
in the Years 1918–1934] (Tartu: Eesti Ajalooarhiiv, 1999). 
37  Aadu Must, Von Privilegierten zu Geächteten: Die Repressalien gegenüber 
deutschbaltischen Honoratioren während des Ersten Weltkrieges [From Privileged to 
Outlawed: The Repressions against Baltic German Dignitaries during World War I] 
(Tartu: Tartu University Press, 2014); Tõnu Tannberg (ed.), Esimene maailmasõda ja 
Eesti [The First World War and Estonia] (Tartu: Eesti Ajalooarhiiv, 2014). 
 38  
requirements of the audience. Of course, even here are exceptions. Magnus 
Ilmjärv’s academic book on Baltic interwar foreign policy sold well and was 
available even in supermarkets, although it is a brickstone with nearly 1,000 
pages and not that easy to read.38 
Exile historiography reached Estonia mainly in the early 1990s, when 
those works were reprinted and the closed parts of libraries were opened. 
Since the old Estonian exile is slowly withering away, this influence was not 
long lasting. Today’s massive work migration includes, of course, also some 
historians, but in this case it is yet hard to see a real difference between 
Estonians living abroad or in their native country. 
Several publishers today are specialized in popular history and 
memoirs, especially from World War II, for example Grenader. There is a 
memory boom39 ongoing, which is visible entering any larger bookstore and 
looking at the shelves for history. Academic accounts are clearly in the 
minority. Popular historians like Laar40, Vahtre41 or economist and journalist 
                                                       
38  Magnus Ilmjärv, Hääletu alistumine: Eesti, Läti ja Leedu välispoliitilise 
orientatsiooni kujunemine ja iseseisvuse kaotus. 1920. aastate keskpaigast 
anneksioonini (Tallinn: Argo, 2004); translated into English and shortened: Silent 
Submission: Formation of Foreign Policy of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania: Period from 
Mid-1920s to Annexation in 1940 (Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell, 2006).   
39 In this essay I do not intend to cover the quickly expanding filed of memory studies 
in Estonia. I just mention some of the important authors from different fields: Terje 
Anepaio, Karsten Brüggemann, Rutt Hinrikus, Siobhan Kattago, Tiina Kirss, Ene 
Kõresaar and Marek Tamm.  
40  Mart Laar, War in the Woods: Estonia’s Struggle for Survival 1944-1956 
(Washington: Compass Press, 1992); idem, Metsavennad [Forest Brothers] (Tallinn, 
1993); idem, Raamat Jakob Hurdast [A Book about Jakob Hurt] (Tartu: Ilmamaa, 
1995); idem, Eesti uus algus [Estonia’s New Beginning] (Tallinn: Tänapäev, 2002); 
idem, Emajõgi 1944: II maailmasõja lahingud Lõuna-Eestis [Emajõgi 1944: World War 
II Battles in South Estonia] (Tallinn: Varrak, 2005); idem, Sinimäed 1944: II 
maailmasõja lahingud Kirde-Eestis [Sinimäed 1944: World War II Battles in 
Northeast Estonia] (Tallinn: Varrak, 2006); idem, September 1944: Otto Tiefi valitsus 
[September 1944: Otto Tief’s Government] (Tallinn: Varrak, 2007); idem, The Estonian 
Legion in Words and Pictures (Tallinn: Grenader, 2008); idem, The Estonian Soldier in 
World War II (Tallinn: Grenader, 2009); idem, 101 Eesti ajaloo sündmust [101 Events 
in Estonian History] (Tallinn : Varrak, 2010); idem, Saaremaa 1944: Eesti 
Laskurkorpuse kannatuste rada [Saaremaa 1944: The Ordeal of the Estonian Riffle 
Corps] (Tallinn: Varrak, 2010); idem, The Power of Freedom: Central and Eastern 
Europe after 1945 (Tallinn: Sihtasutus Unitas, 2010); idem, 20 Eesti tähtsamat 
lahingut [Estonia’s 20 Most Important Battles] (Tallinn: Grenader, 2013); idem, 
Maailma ajaloo tähtsündmused ja Eesti [Important Events in World History and 
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Tiit Made42 have produced dozens of books, while academic writers are much 
slower. This is not to say that Laar and Vahtre did not publish academic texts 
as well. Lovers of brickstones will prefer for example Reigo Rosenthal43 and 
his retelling of archival sources. Military history is served by Mati Õun and 
Hanno Ojalo.44 Some authors stress the victimization of Estonians like Imbi 
Paju.45 The audience is really interested in history, in consumable history, 
and popular writers fulfill the demand. In the worst case, an author might be 
completely unqualified like Lembo Tanning and delivers a very strange 
                                                                                                                                    
Estonia] (Tallinn: Varrak, 2014). This is only a selection and Laar’s numerous booklets 
are not included here. 
41 Lauri Vahtre, Eesti kultuuri ajalugu: Lühiülevaade [Estonian Cultural History: 
Short Overview] (Tallinn: Jaan Tõnissoni Instituut, 1993); idem, Vabanemine: Eesti 
1987–1992 [Liberation: Estonia 1987–1992] (Tallinn: IM Meedia, 1996); idem, Eesti 
rahva lugu [The Story of the Estonian People] (Tallinn: Ilo, 2005); idem, Ajaloo 
pööripäevad [History’s Turning Points] (Tallinn: Tammerraamat, 2006); idem, Ajaloo 
pööripäevad 2 [History’s Turning Points 2] (Tallinn: Tammerraamat, 2007); idem, 
Absurdi impeerium [Empire oft he Absurd] (Tallinn: Tammerraamat, 2007). 
42 Tiit Made, Ükskord niikuinii: 1986–1991 [Once Anyway: 1986–1991] (Tallinn: Argo, 
2006); idem, Alasi ja haamri vahel: Ajaloolise tõe otsingud [Between Anvil and 
Hammer: On the Search for Historical Truth] (Tallinn: Argo, 2007); idem, Eestlased 
sõjapõrgus [Estonians in the Hell of War] (Tallinn: Argo, 2008); idem, Sotsialismileeri 
peied: Ajaloolised tõsiasjad [The Funeral Service of Socialism: Historical Facts] 
(Tallinn: Argo, 2008); idem, Idüllist ahastuseni: 1939–1941 [From Idyll to Threat: 
1939–1941] (Tallinn: Argo, 2009); idem, Kaks korda iseseisvaks: Eestlaste 20. sajandi 
pöördepunktid [Two Times Independent: The 20th Century Turning Points of 
Estonians] (Tallinn: Argo, 2011); idem, Kremlis iseseisvust toomas: Eesti iseseisvuse 
taastamise 20. aastapäevaks [Bringing Independence from the Kremlin: For the 20th 
Anniversary of the Restoration of Estonian Independence] (Tallinn: Argo, 2011); idem, 
Valitsejate vastu: Eesti Vabariigi 95. sünnipäevaks [Against the Rulers: For the 95th 
Birthday of the Republic of Estonia] (Tallinn: Argo, 2013). 
43 Reigo Rosenthal, Loodearmee [The Nortwestern Army] (Tallinn: Argo, 2006); idem, 
Laidoner - väejuht: Johan Laidoner kõrgema operatiivjuhi ja strateegia kujundajana 
Eesti Vabadussõjas [Laidoner – Head of the Forces: Johan Laidoner as Higher 
Operative Leader and Former of Strategy in the Estonian War of Independence] 
(Tallinn: Argo, 2008); idem and Marko Tamming, Sõda pärast rahu: Eesti 
eriteenistuste vastasseis Nõukogude luure ja põrandaaluste kommunistidega 1920–
1924 [War after Peace: Estonian Special Services against Soviet Intelligence and 
Underground Communists 1920–1924] (Tallinn: SE & JS, 2010); idem and Marko 
Tamming, Sõda enne sõda: Nõukogude eriteenistuste tegevusest Eestis kuni 1940. 
aastani [War before the War: On the Activities of Soviet Special Services in Estonia 
until 1940] (Tallinn: SE & JS, 2013). 
44 The first has published more than fifty and the second more than twenty books on 
military history. 
45 Imbi Paju, Memories denied (Helsinki: Like, 2009). This book has been published in 
six languages already. 
 40  
picture of the past. 46  Without doubt, as elsewhere, the perspective of 
Estonian society on the recent past is influenced by popular writers much 
more than by academic authors. 
School textbooks also influence the image of the recent past. In the late 
1980s or early 1990s, history teachers in Estonia did barely have acceptable 
textbooks especially on contemporary history. They worked with newspaper 
cuttings, photocopies and their own notes. When the first post-socialist 
textbooks appeared, one could divide the authors broadly into two groups: 
popular and academic authors. Mart Laar and Lauri Vahtre became, in fact, 
extremely successful textbook authors. Many students confessed to me that 
their impression of history was severely influenced by Laar and Vahtre until 
they studied in university and realized that the interpretation of history was 
far more differentiated. Still many academic authors mentioned here have 
also published successfully school textbooks like Tõnu Tannberg. In general, 
one might state that Estonian history textbooks have improved over the last 
two decades. One unsolvable problem remains; the country is too small and 
has too few potential textbook writers to cover all topics and periods in 
schoolbooks adequately. This is also the reason, why some textbooks on 
general history have been simply translated from other languages. 
Since Estonia has one Estonian language and one Russian language 
school network another question arises. Is it appropriate to use the same 
history textbooks in both systems only in different languages or should the 
Russian speaking pupils should use textbooks, which bear their situation and 
past in mind. At the moment, the same textbooks are used and it seems 
somehow strange to burden Russian students with details of Estonia’s 
peasant history, while Russian history comes often too short. Furthermore it 
is questionable whether for example Mart Laar’s and Lauri Vahtre’s 
textbooks are always adequate.   
Another field creating an image of the recent past is the media. The 
best example of the influence of popular history in the media is the 12-part-
                                                       
46 Lembo Tanning, Euroopa probleem ... Teine maailmasõda [Europe’s Problem … The 
Second World War] (Tallinn: Infotrükk, 2006). 
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TV-series “Tuulepealne maa – Windward Land”. 47  Lauri Vahtre was 
responsible for the historical parts of the scenario. The series is primitive, 
presents a nationalist simplified interpretation of Estonian history of the 
interwar period and I was unable to watch it completely, because I felt it was 
simply too terrible and awful. Nevertheless, it became popular and reached a 
wide audience, which thought – this is the real story of Estonia’s past. One 
has to add that most comments in the press were highly critical. In this case 
we see the difference between intellectuals not accepting this simplified and 
nationalist view on the past and an audience thinking that this was 
“historical truth”. 
There are other films in the same vain. “Detsembri kuumus – The 
Heat of December”48 depicts the Communist uprising in Tallinn in 1924 and 
“Nimed marmortahvlil – Names in Marble”49 the heroic undertakings during 
the Estonian War of Independence. Even a Finnish film, “Puhdistus – 
Purge”50 based on the novel by Finnish writer Sofi Oksanen51 follows a 
similar pattern by looking into Soviet Estonia especially in the postwar period. 
“Risttuules – In the Crosswind”52 on the Soviet mass deportations tries to use 
                                                       
47 This mini series was first aired on Estonian Television in 2008. Creators were Lauri 
Vahtre and Mihkel Ulman, director was Ain Prosa. The program can be viewed at the 
digital archives of Estonian TV at https://arhiiv.err.ee/seeria/tuulepealne-maa	 
/lavastuslik/31. Part 13 covering World War II was broadcasted in 2013 on the 95th 
anniversary of the Estonian declaration of independence. 
48 This film reached the cinemas in 2008. Asko Kase served as director and the 
scenario was written by the same authors as “Windward Land” – Lauri Vahtre and 
Mihkel Ulman.   
49 The movie came to the cinemas in 2002. The senario was written by Elmo Nüganen, 
the director, and Kristian Taska, the producer. The film is based on the patriotic novel 
by Albert Kivikas (1936). It was obviously the most successful Estonian movie after the 
regaining of indepence. 
50 While the novel is a nice piece of literature with certain flaws concerning historical 
accuracy, the movie seems to me to be a failure. It was released in 2012, directed by 
Antti Jokinen and received some positive acclaim. 
51 Sofi Oksanen is an excellent writer and received a couple of literature prizes. As a 
piece of literature her novel “Purge” is of high quality as her other works on Estonian 
topics. One weakness lies in the inaccurate way she deals with history. Together with 
Imbi Paju she has also edited a volume on Soviet Estonian history, Behind Everything 
was Fear, bestselling in Finland and Estonia. The volume contains popular and 
academic articles, sometimes the footnotes have been omitted. 
52 The movie was released in 2014 and directed by Martti Helde. The film promises to 
be of a documentary character, which is supported by being in black and white, but it 
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a more aesthetic and interesting approach, but the historical message 
remains as pathetic as with the above-mentioned movies. A positive example 
of how to deal with the recent past was set by Mati Talvik with his TV-
program “Eesti aja lood – Stories from Estonian Time”. Talvik, who was a 
successful TV-journalist, already under the Soviets interviewed in his 
documentaries about the recent past a variety of historians, eyewitnesses and 
popular historians. He also added a lot of historical film footage. While a 
historian might be critical towards some of the programs, others are really 
well done considering the low budget available. The program was aired at 
prime time and won a large audience and positive acclaim. Several of those 
documetaries have also been published on DVD. 
Of course, nowadays a lot of information on the past is spread through 
the internet. In the Estonian language web serious, popular and rather 
dubious pages can be found as everywhere else. Academic journals like “The 
Estonian Historical Journal” or “Past”, several books and academic articles 
are available free of charge on the web. Institutions like the Estonian 
Institute attempt to present Estonia’s past with short texts written by 
professional historians. However, judging by the contents of webpages some 
of my students have used for their essays, there is a lot of highly dubious 
material online available.  
Up to now my remarks have been basically concerned with the 
Estonian language audience. The Russian-speaking minority of about 30 
percent of the population, which does not only consist of ethnic Russians, is a 
different case. In Russian language schools, as mentioned above, basically the 
same history textbooks are used as in the Estonian schools, only they have 
been translated into Russian. For native speakers and also for Estonians with 
good command of the language Russian television channels and the Russian 
language Internet are extremely attractive, because the choice of programs, 
websites or sources is understandably much larger. A certain share of the 
Russian minority is only living in a Russian media and Internet sphere and 
                                                                                                                                    
is littered with outright mistakes. 
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concerning Estonia’s recent past this might lead to a completely wrong 
understanding according to the Kremlin’s wishes. We should not forget that 
an information and propaganda war against the Baltic states is ongoing since 
more than a decade. The news agency Regnum (http://www.regnum.ru/news 
/estonia/) or the Foundation “Historical Memory” headed by Aleksandr 
Diukov (www.historyfoundation.ru/) offer a very strange and often 
propagandistic view on the history of the Baltic states. In academic life, the 
books published by “Historical Memory” are often ignored or highly criticized 
because of their deficiencies, but they can be downloaded free of charge by 
everyone interested in Baltic contemporary history. Provocatively one might 
interpret those popular accounts in Russian as a counterweight to the 
patriotic works by Laar, Vahtre and others. Of course, on the Russian book 
market there are also very solid publications on Baltic history available. 
Whether a member of the Russian-speaking minority is able to build 
up a decent view on Estonia’s recent past depends also on language 
knowledge. Does she or he is able and willing to read in Estonian about 
history or even to read academic writings or is a person living completely in a 
Russian language sphere of information. The understanding of the past 
seems to be also a test for the successful integration of the so-called minority, 
which is in a couple of towns actually in the majority. The events in Tallinn in 
April 2007, riots related to the removal of a Soviet war memorial,53 would at 
first glance indicate that the popular understanding of the recent past of 
Estonians and Russians is completely different. Nevertheless, on the long run 
over the last two decades the overall tendency is more positive. Differences 
between the two groups in interpreting history became obviously smaller. 
According to a recent opinion poll in November 2014, the support of Russian 
speakers in Estonia for belonging to the European Union did increase due to 
the recent events in Ukraine.54   
                                                       
53 Karsten Brüggemann and Andres Kasekamp, ‘The Politics of History and the War 
of Memories in Estonia’, Nationalies Papers 36 (2008), pp. 425– 448. 
54 See the full report in Estonian ’Elanikkonna suhtumine ja teadlikkus Euroopa Liidu 
küsimustes’ [The Attitude of the Population and the State of Knowledge towards 
European Union Questions], November–December 2014: https://riigikantselei.ee/ 
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To conclude this rather subjective essay, like elsewhere popular history 
is extremely influential in Estonia and shapes the popular understanding of 
the recent past. In addition, we should not forget that there is a Russian 
speaking minority, too. Academic history writing has severely improved over 
the last two decades, but does not reach the masses to such an extent. Exile 
historiography is not important anymore today. The case of Estonia seems to 
be thus very typical for post-socialist countries. The greatest similarities are 
expected to be found with Latvia and Lithuania. 
Popular history is serving both identity constructing and economic 
purposes. Concerning the latter, we should not forget that some authors 
create additional income through their works or could secure their jobs. In 
regards to identity construction Mart Laar and Lauri Vahtre might be called 
quite successful. But we should not ignore one of the rules of popular history; 
the public is consuming what it does expect. Buying a book by one of the well-
known authors, the reader knows that there will be some new and unknown 
facts or details, but also those conclusions she or he is expecting. This is 
evident for Laar and Vahtre, but also for Russian propagandist Aleksandr 
Diukov.      
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 [Comments and Discussions] 
How much should the latest research 
achievements be reflected in history textbook? 
 
Hiromi KOMORI 
 
Introduction 
What type of history should be taught in schools? Since the 19th century, 
this has been a crucial issue for teachers and historians, as well as for 
politicians, at least in Europe. Especially for countries that have experienced 
changes in political regimes more than once, such as Estonia, historiography 
has always been expected to unite society. Thus, history education was and is 
problematic.     
As is the case with many other countries, history education in Estonia 
is sometimes politicized. One of the significant polemical themes has been 
Estonia’s relationship with Russia and the Russians. When Estonia regained 
independence in 1991, numerous Russian-speaking residents lived there. 
Many were not automatically provided with Estonian citizenship of the state, 
where they lived at that time. Their knowledge of Estonian as the state 
language was quite limited or almost nonexistent. Besides, their perceptions 
of Estonian history differed from perceptions of the majority in Estonia. These 
problems are intertwined and inseparable. Therefore Estonian society faces 
the challenge of social integration, and history education is expected to 
function as a medium to promote it. 
However evaluation of history education’s achievements in the 1990s, 
and later, is not the purpose of this short essay. My intention is to consider 
whether the content of history textbooks differs from that of scholarly written 
historiography, and if so, to examine the gap between them.  One has 
observed that current history textbooks are written almost exclusively by a 
handful of historians regarded as popular historians in present days Estonia. 
 In what follows, I examine three descriptions that address 
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“Russification” in the late 19th century in anticipation of further discussion, 
which hopefully, follows this essay in the near future. Since “Russification” 
encompasses very broad phenomena, I focus the narratives on its 
consequences. 
 
1. History textbook: Eesti ajalugu II Gümnaasiumile 1 , 2013 
(authors: Mart Laar and Lauri Vahtre), p. 176.  
 
Mart Laar (1960- ) is a politician and a historian. He has served as the 
prime minister twice and headed the national-conservative party “Isamaa 
(Fatherland)” (since 2003, Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit) for many years. He 
received his doctrate in history in 2005. His dissertation deals with the 
“national awakening” in the 19th century. Laar has published a large number 
of history books, most of them may be classified as popular history. Lauri 
Vahtre (1960- ) is also a politician and a historian, although he is not so 
successful a politician as Laar, he dose belong to the same party. Using 
historical materials, Vahtre has also written novels and scripts for a 
television drama and a film.  
  The effect of Russification became appeared in the national 
organizations and the presses. The Russian authority closed down 
publications that  took too much of an independent or national course, 
such as the newspaper Virulane, the editor of which, Jaak Järve, was 
expelled from the country. In 1881, the Aleksander School opened as a 
Russian-medium town school despite the Estonians’ protests.  Russian 
officials expected Estonians to become Russified and believed that 
Estonian mothers would already be singing their children to sleep with 
Russian lullabies. This expectation was based on the rather favorably 
inclined attitude of Estonians toward the Russian central authority and 
the Russians, who were regarded as supporters in struggles against 
German landowners. 
                                                       
1 Mart Laar, Lauri Vahtre, Eesti ajalugu II Gümnaasiumile, Maurus Kirjastus, 2013. 
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Here, however, the Russification policy arrived late, and the Estonians 
were in the process transforming into a modern nation.  By driving 
away the Germans and the German language from public life, 
Russification made room for Estonians. Thus, at that time, the 
evaluation of Russification was indeed controversial. First, it negatively 
influenced the Estonian educational system: many intellectuals from the 
older generation were removed from public life and national writing was 
strongly suppressed. Second, the ideology of Russification repelled 
Germans, which in turn rebuffed the demand for Germanization, the 
more serious competitor in the formation of national identity. Third, 
however, under Russification a series of refomes implemented during the 
reign of  Aleksander II was introduced to the Baltic provinces. Thus 
various remnants from the medieval times in the administration of 
courts and police disappeared first; then, so did the spheres of governance 
and legislation in towns. (translated by H. K.) 
 
２．General history: Eesti Ajalugu V2, 2010, p. 279 
“Period of Russification: Consequences of the reforms” (author of this section: 
Toomas Karjahärm) 
 
Eesti Ajalugu is a general history series on Estonia whose first, second, 
and third volumes were published before World War II. The chief editor of 
this series was Hans Kruus, the first professional historian of Estonian origin. 
However this publication project was interrupted due to the war. After 
Estonia regained independence, then president, Lennart Meri initiated a 
renewal of the series. In general, Estonians are very interested in their own 
history. In 2013, the rewritten third volume was awarded a prize as the best 
history book in 2013. 
Several historians contributed to the renewed general history series. 
                                                       
2 Tiit Rosenberg and Toomas Karjahärm (acting editors), Eesti Ajalugu V: Pärisõrjuse 
kaotamisest Vabadussõjani, Ilmamaa, 2010.  
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Toomas Karjahärm (1944- ) wrote the chapter translated here. His main 
research interest lies in nationalism and Russification in the 19th century, 
while his scholarly work extends more broadly; for instance, toward the 
history of intellectuals.  As is the case with other historians, he could not 
escape academic criticism by fellow scholars, but no one can deny that 
Karjahärm is one of the best historians dealing with Russification in the 
Baltic provinces.   
In the Baltic provinces as a whole, reforms of Russification made the 
influence and presence of Russia stronger; it diffused Russian culture 
and science, as well as social-political thoughts, including the radical idea 
that would break the existing order. Russification of Estonians proved 
unsuccessful in terms of denationalization, as their ethnic identity based 
on their own culture had been so strengthened through the process of the 
national movement that a large part of Estonians could no longer be 
assimilated. The rise of Estonian nationalism was a more significant 
element than Russification. Indeed, Russian culture and education were 
exploited but people did not want to be Russian. As an ideology, 
Russification did not have an idea or model that would have made 
Russification desirable for Estonians. Since there were no prominent 
Russian society and culture, from which people could find a model, 
cultural Russification was neither prestigious nor attractive for 
Estonians. In this sense, it was different from Germanization. German 
cultural influence, accumulated for a long time in Estonia, could not be 
excluded by short lived Russification, and the Baltic provinces’ German 
appearance remained afterward.  With the Russification policy, the 
government lost support from the national movement in the Baltic 
provinces. At the turn of the century, Estonian and Latvian liberal 
nationalism that looked toward the individual and national rights, was 
directed against both German and Russian oppression. (translated by H. 
K.) 
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3. General history: Estonia and the Estonians3 (author: Toivo U. 
Raun), Hoover Institution Press, 2001 
 
Finally, I examine Estonia and the Estonians, written by Toivo U. 
Raun (1943-), professor at Indiana University since 1990. He was born in 
Tartu, but escaped to Germany in 1944, with his family, and then went to the 
United States of America in 1949. He specializes in Baltic provinces’ national 
movement during the late 19th and beginning of the 20th century. Raun’s 
Estonia and the Estonians is essential literature for people interested in 
Estonia, including history students.    
The cultural level of the Estonian population had already advanced too 
far by the mid-1880s for denationalization to be a serious question any 
longer. (p. 66) 
Among the Estonian intelligentsia in the second half of the 1890s, a new 
generation that had received its secondary and higher education in the 
Russian language began to reach maturity. These intellectuals were no 
more Russified than earlier ones had been Germanized; on the contrary, 
their sense of Estonian identity appears to have been heightened by the 
pressure of cultural Russification, and the changed educational system 
opened up new cultural avenues…. (p. 67) 
 
4. Tentative conclusion 
  Hence, this comparison of three descriptions about Russification 
clarified that there are more commonalities than differences between general 
history and content in history textbooks.4 As we have dealt with textbook and 
general history above, it is unfair to blame simplification of explanation. 
Simplification is sometimes required to make the text understandable for 
readers. In addition, as both history textbooks and general history are a type 
                                                       
3 Toivo U. Raun, Estonia and the Estonians, Hoover Institution Press: Stanford 
University, 2001 (updated second edition. First published in 1987). 
4 You might come to a different conclusion, if you took up a different subject. 
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of narrative, they are usually compelled to choose a certain perspective or a 
specific frame as such.5 This does not necessarily mean distortion of history. 
  In his academic volume, Karjahärm rightly put the question: Had 
every people’s initiative national motivation, whether it was the 
establishment of a temperance society, a voluntary fire brigade or a kind of 
occupational organization, just because that was made by Estonians in the 
era of the national movements and had the name of such an initiative with 
(not always) the word “Estonia”? …Is the membership of such a society or an 
organization enough to be an activist, or is it still well perceived conscious 
positioning and a deed in the name of the nation?6 Through this question, 
Karjahärm obviously thinks that the national identity “Estonians,” in the 19th 
century, was not self-evident as described in general history. As Woodworth 
observes, they were no longer peasants as much as Estonians in the 
beginning of the 20th century.7 However, Estonians could act as peasants as 
well as laborers, if the situation required, as we saw in the events of 1905. 
Karjahärm seems to be inspired by the situational approach of Aleksei 
Miller,8 or he unknowingly shares his research interest with Oliver Zimmer, 
who argues that national identity is a public project, rather than a fixed state 
of mind and claims that the mechanisms social actors use as they reconstruct 
the boundaries of national identity at a particular point in time should be 
elucidated.9  
  It is probably safe to say that, in general, authors adjust their 
                                                       
5 In relation to the other viewpoints, see Karsten Brüggeman, “Venestamine” kui Vene 
impeeriumi ülemvõimu representatsioon Balti provintside näitel, Vikerkaar, 2009, 7-8, 
pp.117-130 and Lõpp venestusele. Ühe vaieldava uurimisparadigma kriitika, Tõnu 
Tannberg and Bradley Woodworth, Vene impeerium ja Baltikum: venestus, rahvuslus 
ja 19. sajandi teisel poolel ja 20. sajandi alguses II, Eesti Ajalooarhiivi Toimetised Acta 
et Commentationes Archivi Historici Estoniae 18(25), Tartu, 2010, pp. 360-372. 
6 Toomas Karjahärm, Vene Impeerium ja rahuvuslus, Tallinn 2012, pp.213-214. 
7 Bradley Davis Woodworth, Civil Society and Nationality in the Multiethnic Russian 
Empire: Tallinn/Reval, 1860-1914, UMI Dissertation Service, 2003, p. 4. 
8 Aleksei Miller, Between Local and Inter-Imperial; Russian Imperial History in 
Search of Scope and Paradigm, Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian 
History5, 1, 2004, pp. 7-26. 
9 Oliver Zimmer, Boundary Mechanisms and Symbolic Resources: Towards a Process-
oriented Approach to National Identity, Nations and Nationalism, 2003, 9 (2), pp.173-
193. 
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content and make it comprehensive to readers. This does not mean that 
authors are allowed to distort history for purposes of readability. Rather, 
scholars must acknowledge the contradiction between academic sincerity and 
plainness of description, which is necessary to influence the people’s historical 
perceptions. 
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Memory and Identity: 
Memory conflicts in Polish-Ukrainian and Polish-Russian 
relations in the opinion of Polish society 
 
Małgorzata Głowacka-Grajper 
 
 
1. The memory of recent history in Polish society 
In the social scientists’ opinion, history and memory are in the opposition to 
each other. One of the researchers on processes of commemoration, Pierre Nora 
said: “History is always problematic and incomplete reconstruction of what had 
passed. Memory is therefore a phenomenon constantly present, the ongoing 
relationship with the past, while history is only its representation” (after: Kończal 
2009: 209). The late twentieth and early twenty-first century is a period of 
“memory boom” in the social sciences. In many countries the processes of 
commemoration gain strength and become the object of scientific reflection. 
Social memory has two basic functions: shaping identity (allows groups and 
individuals define who they are by reference to the events of the past) and 
legitimating the state power (determines who and why should exercise authority 
in the group) (see Szacka 2009). The fall of communism in Poland and other 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe meant that social memory has been 
“unlocked” – people could officially start talking about the events of the past, 
which were suppressed during the communist period. This led to numerous 
disputes about the interpretation of the past, and therefore – about the nature of 
Polish identity in the twenty-first century. 
Piotr Kwiatkowski (2009) identified three main characteristics of Polish 
memory discourse in the times of transition: 
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• return to old topics means revision of fixed image of the past – change of 
interpretation and the rules of discourse (public confrontation of opinions) do 
not serve reconciliation, but fuelling conflicts, 
• discourse memory has a practical nature – it serves gaining advantage in the 
present, 
• bringing back to the fore Polish relationships with other nations – complex 
and emotional discourse. 
The latter discourse is of particular identity importance and refers to the 
most important events of the twentieth century, including primarily World War 
II, which today defines the nature of the Polish relationship with neighbouring 
countries. 
Throughout the period of communist, events of World War II were constant 
points of collective memory (cf. Kwiatkowski 2008). Although after 1989 an 
important place in the canon of everyday national memory took the collapse of 
communism, the war is still alive and important part of social memory in Poland 
(Table 1)1. 
Table 1. 
Which events from the history of Poland of last a hundred years do you 
consider the most important? 
The overthrow of communism in Poland 33 
Events of World War II 30 
The choice of Karol Wojtyla as Pope 21 
Restoration of independence in1918 20 
Joining European Union 15 
August 1980 and rise of „Solidarity” 11 
Marshall law 6 
I don’t know, hard to say 13 
Source: Elaborated by the Author on the base of CBOS Report BS/166/08, November 2008, open 
question, representative random sample of adult Polish inhabitants of 1107 persons, data are given in 
percent. 
The strong position of the war in Polish social memory other researchers 
also highlight: “The memory of World War II is a living history, which is subject 
to family transmission and discussions with witnesses. According to 72% of the 
                                                       
1 In this article empirical data comes from Polish public opinion researches based on 
reports of Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS). Researches on social memory are not 
conducted periodically, but only on the anniversaries of various events. 
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respondents of CBOS survey conducted in 2009, World War II for them is ‘still a 
vital part of the Polish history, which should be constantly reminded.’ (...) The 
Polish-German and Polish-Ukrainian debates directly affects the respondents’ 
declarations, as well as specifies the contents of their memory.” (Nijakowski 2010: 
241). A characteristic feature of Polish social memory is a common belief that 
members of one’s family were participants in the events and processes that are 
important to the history of the entire nation. Most of them are the events of 
World War II – as many as 86% of Poles indicates that members of their families 
took part in it (cf. Kwiatkowski, 2008: 188-189). Therefore, World War II is still 
the element of the past, which contemporary Poles can identify with. It has a 
strong emotional overtones for them as it is closely connected with the history of 
their families. Harms suffered during the war by the Poles are therefore harms of 
the most important people for individual respondents – family or friends. 
The war in Polish social memory has first of all heroic and martyrological 
aspects, which means that the image of an enemy is of great importance in it. 
The image of a hostile state allows, through the opposition, to determine the 
characteristics of one’s own group and thus its collective identity, and the 
memory of sufferings caused by the enemies allow to maintain this identity. The 
memory of World War II is part of a series of traumatic events present in the 
Polish social memory and thus that war becomes another example of “Polish fate”, 
and even is seen as its culmination. 
In Poland in the nineteenth century the Roman Catholic Church became 
the biggest depositary of history, culture and tradition as well as collective 
memory of Poles (Casanova 2005: 165). Territory of Poland was the region of 
ethnic, national and religious borderlands what in the times of the beginnings of 
the modern nation formation had initiated the process of melting the national 
and religious identity. The Polish state form XIV century to the second half of the 
XVIII century embraced many different ethnic groups which later by the 
processes of nationalisation were transformed into national groups endeavouring 
to create their own state with Ukrainians among them. In response to these 
processes Polish national identity were also reinforced by an intelligentsia and 
catholic clergy (see Snyder 2003). In the face of the absence of statehood in the 
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nineteenth century and remaining under the rule of the state foreign not only 
because of national, but also religious aspect, the Roman Catholic Church has 
become a mainstay of Polish-ness, and the concept of “Poland as Christ of nations” 
had fulfilled the process of melting religious and national elements. An important 
role in strengthening this relationship played also a period of communism2. 
The impact of tragic experiences of World War II has a fundamental 
influence on memory and identity of contemporary inhabitants of Poland. These 
events were radically incomprehensible but in the same time required very clear 
interpretation. The reference to the known mechanisms of interpreting reality 
and the values that were present in the traditional society, resulted in identifying 
the tragic events with the persecution that the early Christians met, which was 
particularly easy in times of war and communist regime which consciously and 
openly fought against religion and Church institutions.  
In the modern world we can observed clear shift towards the stories of 
victims and perpetrators (so called, victimhood nationalism). However, we can 
distinguish between two radically different types of victims. In his article 
historian Jie-Hyun Lim shows that on the one hand we have to deal with the 
victim par excellence, senseless, nameless, led to the slaughter, killed during the 
pacification of cities, vanishing in religious and ethnic civil wars (Jie-Hyun Lim 
2010). On the other hand we have a victim actively operating and vanishing in 
the name of higher, often nationwide values. Such kind of victim should be rather 
described by the word “sacrifice” then “victim”. 
Millions of victims who died in a mass killings, because of starvation or 
exhaustion in the Central and Eastern Europe were therefore victims par 
excellence (see Snyder 2010). But the description of their suffering by the scheme 
of nationalist ideologies – these people were dying, because they were members of 
a particular nation – seems insufficient. Their death must be given the status of 
supreme sacrifice, having almost eschatological significance, because only then 
any discussion about the purposefulness of the victims’ sufferings loses its 
                                                       
2 In the 80’s of XX c. in some church parishes were laid plaques commemorating the victims 
of the Katyn massacre and they were the only places where such commemorations could be 
made. 
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meaning. Secular language is not the right words, metaphors and ways of 
constructing a narrative to describe and explain the mass sacrifice of people 
killed without a fight, victims of mass persecutions, purges and mass executions. 
Here a religious language is needed – the language saying that there is no 
unnecessary and incomprehensible suffering – every pain can be part of 
martyrdom and in the sphere of the Christian religion has fundamental 
importance. In this way, the category of “martyrdom” gets a new dimension – 
with national content, but the same time universal significance. What is also 
important, religious language of commemoration of victims of war produces and 
maintains strong emotions. It also facilitates the transmission of the memory of 
them, since the tragic events are entered in the universal scheme of the 
martyrological victims, who make the life of successive generations possible. 
According to such an interpretation, memory becomes a social obligation and an 
important element of collective identity. But remembering victims means also 
remembering perpetrators of their suffering and the religious interpretation 
requires seeing them as the part of evil which Christians should always oppose to. 
When this interpretation is transferred on the relation with the neighbouring 
nations, the memory conflicts are escalated, especially among these social groups 
which fully agree with such an interpretation. 
 
2. Events of the past structuring modern memory conflicts  
“Central Europe in the second half of the twentieth century is thus not 
only Europe of murdered people, but also displaced ones; Europe of lost loved 
ones and lost fellow citizens, but also of lost homes and homelands.” (Wylegała 
2014: 9). Memories of violence that the individuals and societies have in Central 
and Eastern Europe include the displacement on a massive scale – one of the 
largest in history. As a result of World War II, millions of people were forced to 
leave their local homelands. There were also among them people from the 
territory of former Polish Eastern Borderlands (called Kresy3) which after the 
                                                       
3 „Kresy” is the name of pre-war eastern borderlands of the Second Republic of Poland. Its 
meaning was changing in time – it was used earlier to the territories even further in the 
east, but in contemporary Polish culture it is used almost exclusively for territories lost 
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World War II became the part of Lithuanian, Belorussian and Ukrainian Soviet 
Republics (cf. Ciesielski 2004, Piskorski 2010). After the war many Poles from 
these territories have been resettled to new Polish state and nowadays about 5 
millions of their descendant live in Poland.  
Poland suffered a huge loss of life – in time of war more than 5.5 million 
of Polish citizens were killed. The country was ruined, his capital city almost 
completely destroyed, and the borders were changed. Many Poles remained 
outside Polish borders, and because of the difficult political situation could not 
return to the homeland. In this situation, the war and the changes that it had 
caused, have become key elements in the relations with these neighbours, which 
the Poles consider to be the perpetrators of their suffering during the war, that is, 
the Germans, Russians and Ukrainians. However, while the majority of disputes 
about memory in Polish-German relations have been regulated, and the German 
state took on the responsibility for World War II, in Polish-Russian and Polish-
Ukrainian relations many conflicts have been left unresolved. In communist 
times they were frozen, but after the democratic changes become vivid again. 
 
2.1 Polish-Russian relations 
Polish-Russian relations are largely determined by the events of the past. 
This applies to a similar extent to the relationship between the states and to the 
way of looking at the Russians by the Poles. The most important are the conflicts 
of the twentieth century. However, while the Polish-Bolshevik war of 1919-21, 
although brought many casualties and destruction on the Polish side, is seen as a 
victory for the Poles, and therefore does not burden the social memory negatively4, 
                                                                                                                                    
after the World War II. This term covers varied lands and local societies but is the only one 
which allows to talk about their common experiences – being borderland territories and 
being lost.  
4 In the social memory, there is a picture of atrocities committed by the Red Army soldiers 
in 1919-1921. It appears also in Polish literature and cinema. Moreover, it is the memory of 
aggression – the Red Army entered Polish territory to „export the revolution” to the West. 
In the interwar period also strong was the living memory of „social cleansing”, which the 
Bolsheviks made on land that became part of their state but before the partitions belonged 
to the First Republic of Poland. Polish nobility of these sites have been exiled or murdered 
or deported to labour camps, and the mansions have been destroyed (noble mansions 
destroyed by the Bolsheviks on land that became part of the Soviet Union has been party 
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the World War II and the communist era are remembered as a times of harm 
and suffering. One of the perpetrators of these sufferings is Russia (equated with 
the Soviet Union). Past events that give rise to the strongest memory conflicts in 
Polish-Russian relations are mainly the Soviet Union’s aggression against Poland 
on 17 September 1939 and the Katyn massacre of 1940. Conflicts do not concern 
only difference in opinions on these events, but also a range of activities from the 
communist era, which were aimed at blurring the memory of them in Polish 
society and the attitude of the Russian state to these events nowadays. These are 
the same time events that are part of the image of Russia formed back in the 
days of the First Republic as a country threatening the existence of the Polish 
state that is ready to commit any crime to achieve the imperial objectives. It 
should be noted that this is the image of the Russian state and rather not of so 
called “ordinary Russians”, who by some Poles are also seen as the victim of the 
Russian/Soviet state. 
 
2.1.1. Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and the invasion of Poland on 17 
September 1939 – the forgotten memory conflict 
The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact (Treaty of Non-aggression between 
Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) was signed in Moscow on 
23 August 1939. The pact was officially a guarantee of non-belligerence by either 
country towards the other and a commitment that neither country would ally 
itself to or aid an enemy of the other. The treaty included also a secret protocol 
                                                                                                                                    
catalogued in four volumes of work „Memento kresowe” developed by Andrzej Urbański in 
1928-1929, and all lost and destroyed residences in these areas, including the areas being 
lost by Poland after 1939, have been catalogued and described by Roman Aftanazy in 11 
volumes of work „Dzieje rezydencji na dawnych Kresach Rzeczypospolitej” published in 
1991-1997). Then also other layers of society, including peasants, were repressed. The 
repression affected the Polish populations from the Belarusian and Ukrainian Soviet 
Socialist Republic within the framework of the so-called “Great Purge” of 1935, and the so-
called “Polish operation” of the NKVD in the years 1937-1938 (carried out in the Ukrainian 
Soviet Socialist Republic). Some people were killed and the rest were sent into the interior 
of Soviet Union – mainly to Siberia and Kazakhstan. However, after World War II, the 
memory of the Polish victims and losses from the years 1919-1939 has been almost 
completely destroyed, and now the vast majority of Polish society has no knowledge on this 
subject. However, the memory of the Polish-Bolshevik war is still vivid, especially memory 
of the victory in the Battle of Warsaw in 1920. However, it is rather the memory of a 
triumph than the memory of the victims. 
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that divided territories of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland and 
Romania into Nazi and Soviet spheres of influence, anticipating potential 
territorial and political rearrangements of these countries. Thereafter, Germany 
invaded Poland on 1 September 1939 and Soviet Union on 17 September 1939. 
Public opinion polls conducted on the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of 
World War II show that the vast majority of Polish society (76%) believe that the 
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact contributed to the outbreak of World War II (Table 2). 
The Russian state was thus considered to be one of those (along with Nazi 
Germany), which contributed to the greatest suffering that has happened to the 
Poles in the twentieth century. 
Table 2. 
To what extent, in your opinion, had Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact contributed to 
the outbreak of World War II? 
If the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was not written, Germany 
may not decide to attack Poland 
15  
 
76 Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact facilitated Hitler’s decision to 
attack Poland 
61 
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact had no effect on Hitler’s decision 
to attack Poland 
14 
Hard to say 10 
Source: Elaborated by the Author on the base of CBOS Report BS/124/2009, September 2009, 
representative random sample of adult Polish inhabitants of 1086 persons, data are given in percent. 
During the period of communism date of September the 17 did not 
appear in school textbooks and official public discourse. If it was mentioned, it 
was said that this was the entrance of fellow troops in order to protect the local 
population against the Germans. It was, however, present in the consciousness of 
a part of Polish society, and the memory of that date was transmitted mainly in 
families (mostly in families resettled from the former eastern borderlands of the 
Second Republic), and was an important element of memory in the opposition 
circles (was presented in the publications issued in the samizdat, taught about in 
secret lectures of history). However, after the beginning of transition in 1989, 
information about the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939 began to be widely 
disseminated and placed in the school textbooks. In 1990 all the soldiers who died 
in battles with the Red Army were honoured with the plaque on the Tomb of the 
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Unknown Soldier in Warsaw5. However, even though the events of 17 September 
1939 are the part of official discourse in Poland, a large group of Polish society 
(21%) is still not sure how to interpret them (Table 3).  
Table 3. 
On 17 September 1939 the Red Army entered Polish territory. Which of the 
views of this event is closer to your opinion? 
It was the annexation of part of the territory of Poland 
made in accordance with an earlier agreement between 
Germany and the USSR 
60 
It was a measure designed to prevent or delay Hitler’s 
attack on the Soviet Union 
19 
Hard to say 21 
Source: Elaborated by the Author on the base of CBOS Report BS/124/2009, September 2009, 
representative random sample of adult Polish inhabitants of 1086 persons, data are given in per cent. 
Most people think that the invasion of the Red Army on Poland was an 
attack aimed at the seizure of Polish lands. However, almost one fifth of Poles 
(19%) sees in these events Soviet Union’s defensive actions. Interestingly, as the 
authors of these studies noticed, such interpretation share primarily young 
people (33% of those aged 18-24). This may be a result of the perception of the 
war primarily in terms of strategic and not political actions, less pervasive among 
younger generation image of Russia as a country with imperial ambitions and a 
lower sense of connection with areas taken by the USSR, which after the war 
have not returned to Poland. 
In times of Peoples’ Republic of Poland (PRL) date 17 September 1939 
was one of elements of the democratic opposition’s combat for commemorating 
Polish history. Currently, the dispute has expired, because the Soviet Union’s 
attack on Poland is the part of history, about which one can talk openly. In the 
Polish-Russian relations no one disputes that such an attack took place, and the 
differences are in the interpretation of its causes and consequences. In addition, 
since the Soviet Union collapsed, the memory of the consequences of these events 
is less disputed in Polish-Russian relations, and more in the Polish-Belarusian 
                                                       
5 Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Warsaw commemorates all the major battles and wars 
in the history of Poland, starting from the tenth century. 
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and Polish-Ukrainian ones6. However, there is one element of the Soviet attack 
on Poland, that still arouses strong emotions. It is the Katyn massacre. 
 
2.1.2. Katyn massacre – the struggle for repentance 
The Katyn crime was a series of mass executions of Polish officers 
serving in different types of state institutions and members of intelligentsia 
carried out by the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) in April 
and May 1940. The massacre was prompted by NKVD chief Lavrentiy Beria’s 
proposal to execute all captive members of the Polish Officer Corps, dated 5 
March 1940, approved by the Soviet Politburo. 21 857 Poles were killed (among 
them about 8 000 army officers taken prisoner during the 1939 Soviet invasion of 
Poland and about 6 000 police officers). The victims from prisoner camps of 
Ostashkov, Kozel’sk and Starobil’s’k were murdered and buried in the Katyn 
Forest and Mednoe in Russia, Kharkiv and Bykivnia in Ukraine and probably in 
Belarus, in Kuropaty. The government of Nazi Germany announced the 
discovery of mass graves in the Katyn Forest in 1943 (see Etkind, Finnin et al. 
2012). The Soviet Union claimed the victims had been murdered by the Nazis, 
and continued to deny responsibility for the massacres until 1990, when it 
officially acknowledged and condemned the perpetration of the killings by the 
NKVD, as well as the subsequent cover-up by the Soviet government. 
Investigation conducted by the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Soviet Union 
(1990–1991) and the Russian Federation (1991–2004), confirmed Soviet 
responsibility for the massacres, but refused to classify this action as a war crime 
or an act of genocide. On 26 November 2010, 7 months after the crash of 
President Lech Kaczyński’s plane near Smoleńsk, the Russian State Duma 
approved a declaration blaming Stalin and other Soviet officials for having 
personally ordered the massacre. 
                                                       
6 The date of 17 September 1939 is especially important in Belorussia because the Soviet 
Union’s attack on Polish state is interpreted as act of consolidation of two parts of 
Belorussia – Western Belorussia that was in the Polish state and Eastern Belorussia that 
was in the Soviet Union. From that day Belorussia is united – first as the Soviet Republic 
and then as an independent state. That is why it is the one of important days in the 
national calendar of contemporary Belorussia and the field of conflict with Poland which 
interprets it as the beginning of the tragedy and not the happy and successful event. 
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During communist time, the Katyn massacre was the most important 
part of the memory guarded by the opposition, and one can even say that it was 
part of a sacred memory. A special role was played by families of officers killed in 
Katyn and other places. The determinant of the idea of remembering the crimes 
have become the words of the poem “Dziady” by Adam Mickiewicz, written at the 
time of partition of Poland: “If I forget about them, You, God in heaven, forget 
about me.” In 1992, these people established a nationwide organization 
“Federation of Katyn Families”, which activity has played a key role in the 
dissemination of knowledge about the Katyn massacre. At the end of the PRL 
almost one fifth of Poles never heard of this crime, and after 10 years only 7%, 
with twice the percentage of people who claim to have heard a lot about this 
crime (Table 4). 
Table 4. 
Have you heard about the crime committed during the Second World War on 
Polish prisoners of war in Katyn? 
 1987 2008 
Yes, I’ve heard a lot about it 24 49 
Yes, I’ve heard about it 58 44 
I know nothing about it 18 7 
Source: Elaborated by the Author on the base of CBOS Report BS/70/2008, May 2008, representative 
random sample of adult Polish inhabitants of 1101 persons, data are given in per cent. 
However, very important event for the memory of Katyn in Polish 
society was the crash of President Lech Kaczynski’s plane on 10 April 2010 near 
Smolensk, on the way to the ceremony commemorating the 70th anniversary of 
the Katyn massacre. While in 2008, 67% of the Polish population felt that the 
crime is an obstacle to Polish-Russian relations, and 14% had no opinion on the 
matter, after the plane crash near Smolensk, 80% of respondents thought the 
Katyn massacre to be an obstacle in Polish-Russian relations, and only 6% had 
no opinion on the matter (Table 5 and 6). 
View of the Katyn massacre in Poland and Russia is well illustrated by 
the official nomenclature used in both countries. In Poland, people speak of “mord 
katyński” (Katyn massacre) or “zbrodnia katyńska” (Katyn crime), and the name 
used in Russia is “Катынский расстрел” (Katyn shooting). Although the State 
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Table 5. 
Do you think that the Katyn crime still burdens contemporary Polish-
Russian relations or currently is not significant to them? (2008) 
Definitely does 22 67 
Rather does 45 
Rather does not 17 19 
Definitely does not 2 
Hard to say 14 
Source: Elaborated by the Author on the base of CBOS Report BS/70/2008, May 2008, representative 
random sample of adult Polish inhabitants of 1101 persons, data are given in percent. 
Table 6. 
Do you think that the Katyn crime still burden contemporary Polish-
Russian relations or currently is not significant to them? (2010) 
Definitely does 30 80 
Rather does 50 
Rather does not 12 14 
Definitely does not 2 
Hard to say 6 
Source: Elaborated by the Author on the base of CBOS Report BS/67/2010, May 2010, representative 
random sample of adult Polish inhabitants of 1000 persons, data are given in percent. 
Duma officially admitted that Stalin is responsible for ordering the murder of 
Polish officers at Katyn, according to the Polish society Russia still has not done 
much to redress this crime. According to a study from 2010, 66% of Poles think 
that the Russian authorities should disclose the documents from the Russian 
archives, 58% demands official recognition of the murdered officers as the victims 
of the crime of genocide, and 46% believe that Russia should officially apologize 
for the committed crimes. 
In Poland the memory of Katyn is clear – the Polish society knows 
exactly who is the innocent victim and who is the executioner and how to 
evaluate the whole event. The authors of „Remembering Katyn” state: „In Poland, 
Katyn has long been read metonymically, as the part of the country’s history 
meant to stand for the whole. (…) In the words of Donald Tusk, ‘in a sense, we 
Poles are one, big Katyn family’” (see Etkind, Finnin et al. 2012: 8). For Poles, it 
is therefore not only an important part of their past, but also part of their identity 
– the identity of a nation that has experienced a lot of suffering and persecution, 
but never forgot about the victims and is not afraid to remind others about them. 
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The name “Katyn” has become a symbol of the atrocities of the totalitarian 
system also for other nations – the victims of the Soviet regime – such as the 
Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Belarusians and Ukrainians7. The Russian 
state acknowledged its responsibility for the crime in Katyn, but from the point of 
view of the Polish people it is not enough. Poland has not obtained an apology. 
There was not also disclosure of all documents on the crime8. In this context, in 
Poland often the words inspired by Catholic theology are cited: “First we need a 
repentance, confession and telling the whole truth, and only then forgiveness is 
possible.” Therefore, the Katyn massacre is still a field of conflict of memory, 
which exists on one hand in the sphere of knowledge (information disclosure), 
and on the other hand in the sphere of moral obligation (repentance). 
 
2.2. Polish-Ukrainian relations 
2.2.1. The ambiguous legacy of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 
and the Second Republic of Poland in relations with Ukraine – the 
memory of the Kresy 
The territories, which are now part of western Ukraine, were under the 
control of the Polish state from the tenth century and since then has been a 
subject of rivalry between Poland and Rus’. In the following centuries, the Poles 
settled farther in the east, until over ¾ areas of modern Ukrainian state were 
part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. After the partition of the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth, the current western part of Ukraine (Eastern 
Galicia) was taken by Austria-Hungary, and the areas in the east – by Russian 
Empire. The differentiations of these territories which started to develop after 
the partition, had its consequences for the Ukrainians and the Polish-Ukrainian 
relations in the next years and has them to this day. In Eastern Galicia both 
Polish and Ukrainian modern national movement was shaped and they were 
remaining in constant conflict. In the eastern part of these territories the Russian 
authorities suppressed aspirations for independence, which particularly affected 
                                                       
7 For example, Vinnytsia is called „Ukrainian Katyn”. 
8 The most important is „the Belarusian Katyn list” containing the names of 3870 Poles 
carried on the territory of Belorussia, whose place of burial is not known. 
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the Poles after subsequent uprisings. They were subjected to oppression, and 
their property were confiscated. 
World War I brought hope of the independence to both Poles and 
Ukrainians. Immediately, however, conflict on the border line in Eastern Galicia 
broke out. In the Treaty of Riga in 1923, signed after the Polish-Bolshevik War, 
the border has been established on the river Zbrucz – Poland returned in the east 
to the same border as before the third partition with a small correction to the east 
(fragments of Volyn and Polesie). During the Second Republic of Poland local 
Polish-Ukrainian conflict had deepened. Ukrainian national movement had 
become stronger and more radical and a Polish policy towards national 
minorities had been tightening. The tragic climax of Polish-Ukrainian conflict 
occurred during World War II. There were Volyn massacre and ethnic cleansing 
in the province of Lviv, Tarnopol and Stanisławów (Eastern Małopolska) made 
by the troops of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, other Ukrainian organizations 
and the local population. When in 1944 Poland signed an agreement with the 
USSR on the evacuation of the Polish population, the vast majority decided to 
leave9. Remembering recent events they have not seen the possibilities of living 
in the USSR. Areas that before World War II were in the Polish state and after 
the war became a part of Lithuania, Belarusian and Ukrainian Soviet Republic, 
are named in contemporary Poland with the common term of “Kresy”. The 
problem of Kresy in contemporary memory of Polish society and in Polish-
Ukrainian relations brings together several aspects, which become ground for 
memory conflicts. Firstly, it is a problem of lost Polish lands, the second – the 
problem of an attitude to the Ukrainians inhabited these areas (sometimes 
referred to as the problem of “postcolonialism” – see Kudela-Świątek, Świątek 
2012) and arousing the strongest emotions topic of massacre of Poles living in the 
area during World War II. 
Over a period of communism, the memory of Kresy was successfully 
pushed to the margins of social life but after the beginning of democratic changes 
                                                       
9 During the first wave of repatriation, until 1947 the Polish attracted 784 524 people, and 
during the second (until 1959) – 76 059 Poles and Jews have come to Poland (Misztal, 1997: 
64). 
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in Poland we have witnessed the “explosion” of memory of Kresy (cf. Handke 
1997, Kasperski 2007, Kolbuszewski 1996, Szaruga 2001). It was manifesting 
itself mainly in the large number of published memoirs, novels, documentaries, 
albums, and the emergence of many organizations of persons displaced from 
Kresy and their descendants 10. However, the memory of the Kresy was 
considered an obstacle in Polish relations with the newly established countries on 
its eastern border, and therefore very quickly (even before the creation of 
independent states in the east – see Snyder 2003) has been marginalized in 
political and public life (cf. Kolbuszewski 1996, Kasperski 2007). 
In this situation, the transmission of the memory of Kresy takes place 
under specific conditions. State support for this message is ambiguous (cf. 
Szpociński 2006). On the one hand, it supported the exploration and rectifying of 
the Polish history, especially in relation to the Second Republic of Poland, which 
in PRL were evaluated critically, and after 1989 became a kind of „ideological 
reservoir”. It also tried to help the Poles, who still live in areas of the former 
Kresy and aware the public opinion in Poland of their existence. On the other 
hand, the memory of the Kresy has been marginalized, fragmented and reduced 
to a set of ethnographic curiosities or the general framework of „multiculturalism” 
(cf. Kasperski 2007, Szaruga 2001).  
Loss of memory of the Kresy among Polish society is not associated 
exclusively with the historical policy of the state. Very important is the aspect of 
resettlement. Community based on ties with the local territory and people living 
there has little chance to survive in case of detachment from their own territory 
and moving in a different social context. As Jan Assmann wrote: „Forgetting is 
conditioned by the change the framework, the total metamorphosis of living 
conditions and social relations” (Assmann 2008: 237).  
From the Polish point of view, Kresy are of fundamental importance for 
the history, culture and identity of Polish society. They are part of a vast number 
                                                       
10 It should be noted that although there are many organizations in Poland grouping people 
from different parts of the former Kresy, there is no one strong organization of the people 
from Kresy. It would have to bond various types of locality, which would be possible only if 
the state willed to play a unifying role and arbitrarily defined Kresy as a separated whole 
based on one identity and one kind of interest. 
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of cultural production – from literature, painting and film to the folk and national 
tradition. Some places, such as Lviv, were even considered to be the centre of 
Poland, and not a frontier, not only because of the location of the city, but also of a 
significant Polish majority in these areas, and the importance of Lviv to the 
Polish culture and science. In contemporary society, Polish memory of these 
lands is slowly disappearing. The only exceptions are those who have in their 
families people form Kresy and local communities, where people evacuated from 
these territories form particularly high percent (e.g. in western Poland). From 
time to time this subject comes to the fore again upon subsequent anniversaries, 
disputes about the destruction and rebuilding of Polish cemeteries in Kresy11, 
recalling the problems of Poles living in the former Soviet Union or publicized by 
the media actions of the Ukrainian national movement12. From the Ukrainian 
point of view, these areas are the cradle of an independent Ukrainian state, and 
Poland is seen as a former colonial empire. Disputes about the memory of Polish-
Ukrainian relations, Ukrainian identity and place of the Polish minority in 
contemporary Ukrainian society are therefore sometimes interpreted as 
postcolonial discourse13. The Kresy associations from Poland disagree with such 
an interpretation, because for them Kresy are not areas of colonial expansion, but 
the indigenous Polish lands. 
  
2.2.2 The memory of the massacre Volyn – hot but limited conflict  
The massacres of Poles in Volyn and Eastern Galicia were part of an 
ethnic cleansing operation carried out in Nazi German-occupied Poland by the 
                                                       
11 The memory of the dead is crucial in Polish culture. 1 November, which is in Poland the 
day of memory of the dead is the most celebrated holiday – even more popular then 
Christmas. Taking care of the graves is a duty, no matter how far these graves are located. 
In Poland, every year a lot of action are taken to help restore and protect Polish cemeteries 
in the East. 1 November is also always the day of collection of funds for such actions, and 
they meet with a huge social response. 
12 Recently Polish media informed about the Ukrainian political party „Svoboda” which 
leaders demand the return of the city of Przemyśl to the Ukrainian state. 
13 The term “Kresy” itself is also disputed. Some people think that its use in a contemporary 
Polish discourse is an expression of Polish imperial aspirations. The dispute concerns also 
other names. For example, the eastern part of Galicia can be determined from the Polish 
point of view as “Eastern Małopolska” or from the Ukrainian point of view as “Western 
Ukraine”. The use of specific names is another instalment of the memory conflict. 
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Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)’s North Command in the regions of Volyn and 
their South Command in Eastern Galicia. Killings started in March 1943 and 
lasting until the end of 1944 with the peak in July and August 1943. The 
massacres, performed in an atrocious way on men, women and children, were 
directly linked with the policies of the Bandera fraction of the Organization of 
Ukrainian Nationalists and its military arm – UPA, whose goal was to purge all 
non-Ukrainians from the future Ukrainian state. UPA also wanted to erase all 
traces of sustained Polish presence in these areas. 
Historians estimate that during the massacres from 50 to 60 thousand 
Poles were killed in Volyn and from 20 to 70 thousand in Eastern Galicia. 
Moreover, over 300 thousand people of Polish nationality fled from this last area 
(Motyka 2011; Siemaszko, Siemaszko 2000). In Poland, these events are called 
“rzeź wołyńska” (Volyn slaughter), while in the Ukrainian discourse they are 
referred to as “Волинська трагедія” (Volyn tragedy). The tragic events of World 
War II in Polish relations with Russia and especially Germany were said out loud, 
and efforts at the state level to their explanation and remembrance have been 
made. However, there were almost no such efforts concerning tragic events in 
Polish relations with its eastern neighbours, especially Ukraine, because of the 
fear of damaging the relations with them, which is seen as very dangerous for 
Polish state. 
Associations of people from Kresy, with the support of other social 
organizations are demanding an official recognition of the day of 11 July as the 
Remembrance of Kresy Martyrdom Day. 11 July 1943 was “bloody Sunday”, 
during which the UPA invaded the 99 Polish villages, killing more than 3000 
people, in many places in the churches during mass. Although each year on 11 
July is celebrated as Memorial Day dedicated to these events, also with the 
participation of local and national authorities, the Parliament has not adopted a 
law establishing formally that date as Remembrance Day of murders in Volyn 
and Eastern Galicia, but also in other places of the Kresy. In communist times 
remembrance of these events was forbidden, as they were in conflict with the 
thesis of “the brotherhood of nations” in the communist bloc and after a 
democratic transformation Polish authorities were anxious about recalling these 
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events, because Poland’s raison d’etat was an establishing good relations with 
independent Ukraine. In this situation, knowledge of the events in Volyn was not 
widespread in Polish society (Table 7 and 8). 
Table 7. 
Who was the victim of 
crimes committed in 
1943 in Volyn? 
 
2003 
 
2013 
Poles 41 52 
Association with Katyn 9 9 
Poles and Ukrainians 5 9 
Ukrainians 1 2 
Other nationalities 1 0,5 
Other answers 2 3 
I don’t know, hard to say 44 26 
Source: Elaborated by the Author on the base of CBOS Reports: BS/117/2003, July 2003, representative 
random sample of adult Polish inhabitants of 952 persons, BS/93/2013, July 2013, representative 
random sample of adult Polish inhabitants of 1010 persons, data are given in percent. 
Table 8. 
Who was the perpetrator 
of the crimes committed 
in 1943 in Volyn? 
 
2003 
 
2013 
Ukrainians 29 52 
Ukrainians and Poles 3 3 
The occupants: Germans, the 
Soviets 
25 12 
Other answers 1 2 
I don’t know, hard to say 45 31 
Source: Elaborated by the Author on the base of CBOS Reports: BS/117/2003, July 2003, representative 
random sample of adult Polish inhabitants of 952 persons, BS/93/2013, July 2013, representative 
random sample of adult Polish inhabitants of 1010 persons, data are given in percent. 
In 2003, on the 60th anniversary of the Volyn massacre, almost half of 
Poles did not know anything about these events, and 9% confuse them with the 
murder at Katyn. One can see, however, that information campaigns conducted 
by social organizations and the Institute of National Remembrance after some 
years began to bring effects. 10 years later, the percentage of people who do not 
know anything about these events decreased significantly, more people also 
deepened their knowledge about the victims and the perpetrators of these 
massacres. Still, a very high percentage of Polish population (about 30%) have 
very little knowledge on the subject, and the others confuse the Volyn massacre 
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with other tragic events of World War II. In comparison, for example, to the case 
of the massacre in Katyn, this is a significant difference in the level of knowledge. 
We can observe, moreover, similar situation in the Ukrainian society. Jaroslaw 
Hrycak states that in the period of communism “the Soviet regime imposed the 
radical national amnesia upon the Ukrainians” (2009: 118), which meant that 
the memory of the Volyn massacre simply did not exist. Public opinion polls in 
2003, which Hrycak cites, show that 48,9% of the Ukrainian society knew 
nothing about Volyn massacre, and 28,4% “heard something, but cannot say 
anything about it” (ibid.). 
Although not whole Polish society remembers the events in Volyn, there 
are “memory groups” in Poland, for which it is a key event of the World War II. 
They consider struggling for the memory of the Volyn massacre their duty for 
three reasons – because of the enormous scale of the genocide, which happened 
there, and secondly – because of the lack of indication of the guilty persons and 
condemnation of them by the Ukrainian state and, the third – due to the still 
insufficient commemoration the victims. Activities in the field of commemoration 
of the victims of the Volyn massacre in recent years in Poland have increased, 
especially on the celebration of the 70th anniversary of these events in 2013. 
Public opinion polls in Poland show that the majority of the population 
(54%) believe that the past divides Polish and Ukrainian nations, and only one 
quarter (24%) believe that it unites them (CBOS Report 2013). Most Poles believe, 
however, that the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation is possible (Table 9). 
Table 9. 
Do you think that 
reconciliation between 
Poles and Ukrainians is: 
 
2003 
 
2013 
Possible 63 63 
Impossible 37 21 
Hard to say 0 16 
Source: Elaborated by the Author on the base of CBOS Reports: BS/117/2003, July 2003, representative 
random sample of adult Polish inhabitants of 952 persons, BS/93/2013, July 2013, representative 
random sample of adult Polish inhabitants of 1010 persons, data are given in percent. 
While the percentage of people who say that the Polish-Ukrainian 
reconciliation is possible remains at the same level, the number of people who 
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think that it is impossible decreased. And a new group of respondents has 
appeared – persons who do not have specified opinion on the subject. In 2003, the 
opinions were very clearly polarized. In addition, the view in this case also 
depends on the age. The oldest persons, including those remembering the times 
of war from personal experiences, believe that such a reconciliation is not possible. 
The opposite view are mostly represented by younger people, especially pupils 
and students. 
At the level of state institutions attempts were made to gain official 
Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation, but none of them has brought lasting results. In 
May 1997, Polish and Ukrainian Presidents signed the “Joint Declaration on 
peace and reconciliation”, which commemorated the victims of Polish-Ukrainian 
conflict, and on 10 July 2003 the Polish and Ukrainian parliaments adopted a 
mutual statement condemning the murders in Volyn, however, during the 
central ceremony in Poryce (Pawliwka) President Leonid Kuczma has not 
expressed contrition on behalf of the Ukrainian people. Although after the 
“Orange Revolution”, Polish and Ukraine relations have got closer, the issue of 
Volyn massacre was still open. In 2006 there was another solemn reconciliation 
act with the participation of the presidents of both countries in Pawłokoma on 
Polish territory, where the Ukrainian population was murdered by Polish Home 
Army troops. This ceremony passed almost unnoticed by Polish public opinion 
and was quickly forgotten (cf. Wigura 2011: 93-104), and another ceremony, 
which took place in 2009 on the territory of Ukraine in Huta Pieniacka, not only 
did not lead to the reconciliation, but has ignited another conflict of memory. In 
Huta Pieniacka, where the SS-Galicia troops in cooperation with the UPA 
murdered 1100 persons on 28 February 1944, a monument commemorating the 
massacre was unveiled in 2005, but there was no inscription on it saying who is 
the perpetrator of this crime. In 2009 there was even a ceremony attended by the 
presidents of Poland and Ukraine, however, the Ukrainian president has been 
criticized for taking part in it, and every year the ceremony at the monument is 
disrupted by the members of the party “Svoboda”. Another element of 
reconciliation is an action on commemorating the “Ukrainian Righteous”, that is, 
Ukrainians, who saved Poles during the massacres carried out by the UPA (cf. 
 
 
75 
Niedzielko 2007). Non-governmental organizations, together with the Institute of 
National Remembrance honour the persons trying to save the Poles in a similar 
way in which Israel commemorates the “Righteous Among the Nations”, but in 
the Polish society it is very little known initiative. 
The events that took place in Volyn and Eastern Galicia in 1943 and 
1944 are not widely known both in Polish society, as well as in Ukrainian. In 
both societies, however, there are groups that are fighting with each other for the 
memory of those events. In Poland they also struggle for a transmission of 
knowledge on the subject in the country and beyond its borders. This conflict is 
very hot, because it touches the foundations of national identity of both nations. 
For Ukraine, the memory of the UPA is an important part of the memory of the 
struggle for independence, and the Poles are seen as one of the danger for 
Ukrainian independence. In turn, for Poland it is essential that all crimes 
committed against the Poles in the twentieth century would been explained in 
details, and guilty persons indicated and condemned. Of particular importance is 
also the fact that the massacre of the Polish population were made on the 
territories belonging for hundreds of years to the Polish state, and lost after 
World War II, making it impossible to commemorate all the places by the Poles alone.  
 
3. The consequences of the war for the Polish-Ukrainian and Polish-
Russian relations in the opinion of Polish society 
The memory of World War II is still alive in the Polish society and 
perceived as one element of the past, which constantly affects the present, 
including in particular the relationship with neighbouring countries (Table 10). 
Table 10. 
Do you think the events of World War 
II now have an impact on relations 
between Poles and: 
Russians Ukrainians 
Definitely negative impact 24,0 59,5 11,2 33,7 
Rather negative impact 35,5 22,5 
Have no impact 25,5 45,0 
Rather positive impact 6,7 8,3 8,8 9,9 
Definitely positive impact 1,6 1,1 
Hard to say 6,8 11,4 
Source: Elaborated by the Author on the base of Nijakowski 2010: 284, data are given in percent. 
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Very few people point to the positive impact of war on relations both with 
Russians and with the Ukrainians. However, the evaluation of relations with the 
Russians are more unequivocal. The vast majority (59,5%) believe that World 
War II has a bad influence on contemporary Polish-Russian relations, and 7% 
had no opinion on the matter. However Polish-Ukrainian relations and the 
impact of war on them are more difficult for respondents to assess. Over 11% of 
Polish society does not know how to assess this impact, and almost half (45%) 
believe that World War II had no effect on the Polish-Ukrainian relations. An 
important element in attitude to the Russians and Ukrainians is an assessment 
of the sufferings during the war (Table 11). 
Table 11. 
How do you scale sufferings 
and sacrifices during the 
World War II of: 
Poles Russians Ukrainians 
No sufferings 0,3 1,3 1,6 
Small sufferings 1,3 8,2 16,1 
Average sufferings 2,7 15,3 29,8 
Big sufferings 25,0 93,4 38,5 69,9 29,8 38,9 
Great sufferings 68,4 31,4 9,1 
Hard to say 2,4 5,3 13,8 
Source: Elaborated by the Author on the base of Nijakowski 2010: 251-252, data are given in per cent. 
According to the Poles, it is they who suffered most during the war. The 
sufferings of Russians they evaluate as much smaller (although most believe that 
they suffered a lot). In contrast, Ukrainians are not generally seen as a 
significant casualties of war. Only less than 40% believe that they suffered a lot. 
Once again, it appears that Ukrainians are a nation that is for Poles relatively 
difficult to assess – almost 14% of respondents did not know how to comment on 
them. Nijakowski summarizing his research states: “In the collective memory of 
Polish society, some nations fill the positive role of allies, others of “villains” – 
enemies who caused suffering of Polish people. According to the declarations of 
the respondents in the memory of their families survived bad memories mainly of 
three nations: Ukrainians, Germans and Russians.” (2010: 285). 
In the Polish public discourse often appear two issues: of differences in 
the interpretation of history in different countries and of lack of knowledge of 
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Polish history, as well in Polish society as among others. Joint historical 
commissions to study the common history of Polish and Germany, Russia and 
Ukraine have been established, however, the opinions of Poles on how to agree on 
a common version of the history with the neighbouring countries are deeply 
divided (Table 12). 
Table 12. 
Do you think that it is possible to agree on a common opinion on the most 
important events in recent history, and for example create a common 
version of the history textbook for schools in both countries: 
Poland and Russia 
Definitely possible 12 48 
Rather possible 36 
Rather impossible 30 40 
Definitely impossible 10 
Hard to say 11 
Poland and Ukraine 
Definitely possible 10 45 
Rather possible 35 
Rather impossible 30 39 
Definitely impossible 9 
Hard to say 16 
Poland and Germany 
Definitely possible 11 52 
Rather possible 41 
Rather impossible 28 36 
Definitely impossible 8 
Hard to say 12 
Source: CBOS Report BS/67/2010 May 2010, representative random sample of adult Polish inhabitants 
of 1000 persons, data are given in per cent. 
Establishing a common vision of the past in the Polish-Ukrainian 
relations is relatively least likely according to the respondents (45% say that this 
is possible), and the most likely is agreement with the Germans (52%). However, 
most people say that such arrangements are not possible in the case of Polish-
Russian mutual history (40%). In terms of developing a common opinion relating 
to the events of a recent history, however, the Poles are very divided – almost the 
same number of people say that this is possible and that this is unlikely to 
happen. Perhaps such an approach is also due to the age of the respondent and 
his or her individual experience. These studies, however, show that for a large 
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group of Poles public memory of the events of the last century still rather 
separate Poland and its largest neighbours than unite them. 
 
Summary 
The memory of the events of World War II in Poland is still part of living 
memory, because there are still people who remember the war from their own 
experience or from eyewitnesses with whom they were strongly emotionally 
connected. The memory of the war is a memory of conflicts with neighbours and 
memory of immense suffering and the struggle for survival of individuals and of 
nation. It was a struggle not only for biological survival, but also for saving the 
identity. In addition, the war was of fundamental importance for the fate of 
Poland – it has changed its boundaries, ethnic composition, social structure and 
handed it over for more than 40 years to the communist regime based on Soviet 
patterns. Communism was also period of “frozen” social memory, when a lot of 
things were not allowed to talk about. After the changes initiated in 1989 in 
Poland there has been “an explosion of memory” – actions to commemorate all of 
this, what was hushed up in the communist era. In time, it was considered that 
the state should conduct specific “historical policy” in response to the historical 
policy of neighbours, which also had an impact on the attitude of Polish society to 
the past. 
Return to the past, which takes place in the process of remembering, is 
essential for collective identity. As Leszek Szaruga puts it: “It is indeed a paradox 
that we return to the places where there is no return to. But this is an apparent 
paradox. In fact Brody, Radziwiłłów, Krzemieniec, Wilno (...) everything of it still 
exists. It exists in a collective memory, in a collective experience, in a culture (...) 
Our ‘returns’ are not in fact any returns, but reaching out to the different sources 
of our identity. The problem occurs when these existing outside of time spaces 
begin to be recognized in terms of the historical and political categories. When – 
in other words – we force a contemporaneity to move to the past.” (2001: 66). 
Memory of the war affect the Polish collective identity in two ways. First, by 
recalling the atrocities of war, and the figure of an innocent victim, often 
immersed in the Roman Catholic patterns of thinking, and the perpetrator, who 
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has not expressed remorse for his guilt. Second, by recalling the image of the 
world, which was lost forever. Therefore, the memory of war still burdens the 
Polish-Russian and Polish-Ukrainian relations. The importance of wartime 
memory may be decreased with the diminishing interest in the past in Polish 
society and the emergence of successive generations who will not have such a 
strong emotional attitude to World War II. However, it is also possible that 
events in the international arena again will recall those emotions. 
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Trialog: the Experience of Cooperation of 
the Universities in Kaliningrad, Torun and 
Frankfurt (Oder) in the humanities 
 
Yury Kostyashov 
 
All the last years researchers in different countries pay more and more 
attention to the content, features, mechanisms of formation and functioning of 
historical memory, which is one of the basic elements of collective and individual 
identity. In this context, unique situation in the Russian-Polish-German space 
from the Oder to the Neman provides rich and fruitful material for 
understanding of the problems of collective historical consciousness in general 
and in its regional component. 
One of the main problems of the historical memory of the population of the 
region is the attitude to the historical and cultural heritage. How was it formed 
under the influence of politics of memory in the past and now? How was the alien 
pre-war past (mainly German) included to the collective consciousness of new 
inhabitants (Polish and Russian) in the postwar period? What kind of barriers on 
this path were raised up by the official policy of the states (the USSR and the 
Polish People's Republic) and how they had been overcome? What factors 
determine the content of the cultural memory of the inhabitants of the region 
today? Participants of the international project Trialog tried to give the answers 
to these questions. 
“Trialog” is an international research project created in cooperation of the 
three universities: European University Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder), 
(Germany), Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun (Poland) and Immanuel 
Kant Baltic Federal University in Kaliningrad (Russia). The purpose of the 
project is to strengthen inter-university cooperation in the field of humanities 
through the establishment of common communication networks aiming to 
contribute to a better mutual understanding of Poles, Russians and Germans. 
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This project was initiated in 2010 by the EUV and got the financial support from 
the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). Coordinator and Project 
Manager is Dr Olga Kurilo from EUV. The author of this publication was the 
coordinator from the Russian side. Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Germany, 
Poland and Russia promote and support Trialog. The project organizers hold 
conferences and summer schools for undergraduate and graduate students every 
year; the results of the activities are reflected in the books, collections of articles 
and other publications. The project has an interdisciplinary nature: it involved 
historians, linguists, sociologists, political scientists, lawyers, geographers and 
historians of architecture1. 
The main object of studying is historical space of coast of Southern Baltic, 
the vast region between the Oder and the Neman rivers which was exposed to 
the Polish, German and Russian influences at various times. 
The first Trialog conference was held in Frankfurt, in November 2010 and 
was devoted to various aspects of mobility in the region between the Oder and 
the Neman in different historical periods. At the same time mobility and regional 
relations in the past and now were examined during the conference as a 
historical heritage, left in that space by representatives of the three cultures: 
German, Polish and Russian. The participants of conference visited several 
towns and fortresses in the Polish-German border which are still actual places of 
memory for people of the three countries. Since the first conference the Baltic 
multinational cultural heritage and its influence on regional identity were one of 
the leading topics among the participants of the Trialog2. 
This tendency was represented more widely at the second conference 
entitled “Borders and border crossings in the history and contemporary culture”, 
which was held in September 2011 in Torun (Poland). Speakers from the three 
countries discussed a wide range of problems, considering the concept of “border” 
                                                       
1  See: Deutsch-polnisch-russisches wissenschaftliches Kooperationsprojekt, URL: 
http://www.europa-uni.de/de/struktur/unileitung/projekte/trialog/das-projekt/index.html. 
2 Olga Kurilo (Hrsg.), Mobilität und regionale Vernetzung zwischen Oder und Memel: Eine 
europäische Landschaft neu zusammensetzen, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, Berlin 2011, 
255 S. 
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in the philosophical, historical and cultural sense. The following issues were in 
the spotlight: the establishment, opening and disappearance of borders, openness 
of cognition and borders, borders and people, culture and borders, boundaries 
between people, between “ours” and “alien”. One of the conclusions of the 
discussion was that in the contemporary world borders continue to be an 
important paradigm of thinking and, despite the disappearance of borders in 
Europe, problem of borders still exists, but it is moved from policy to the sphere of 
social, cultural and individual life. Some speeches of the participants were 
directly related to the problems of historical memory and regional identity3. 
Finally, the third conference of the Trialog held in Kaliningrad (Russia) in 
April 2012, was devoted entirely to the historical memory and the politics of 
memory of inhabitants of the region between the Oder and the Neman. 
During the preparation for the conference, the following concerns and field 
of studies were identified: 
1. Historical memory of local communities from the Oder to the Neman and 
the politics of memory: content, features and mechanisms of functioning 
Formation of the local/regional historical (cultural) memory – ideas about 
the past recorded in the collective memory. Historical myths and stereotypes of 
mass consciousness. Historical memory and national/regional identity. Church, 
religion and historical memory. 
2.  Politics of memory: national and regional aspects 
The politics of memory as a means of power legitimization or means to 
change an established order. National versions of regional history in school 
education. The problem of overcoming historical traumas: scientific and moral 
aspects. Interaction of history and historical memory. The role of literature, art, 
mass media, communities of fans of history, regional specialists and 
“reconstructors” in the formation of historical memory. History in cyberspace. 
                                                       
3 Jurij Kostjašov, Olga Kurilo, Piotr Zariczny (Hrsg.), Grenzen und ihre Überwindung im 
deutsch-polnisch-russischem Raum, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń  2012, 212 S. 
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3. Monuments, symbols, rituals as factors of historical memory shaping and 
nurturing of civil identity 
Factors of formation of historical memory: monuments and memorials, 
symbolic rituals, formal and informal celebrations, museum exhibitions, heritage 
education. Government policies and public initiatives. Places of memory (P. Nora) 
and cemeteries of the past wars. The phenomenon of the “war of monuments”. 
4. Sources of memory: memories, diaries, interviews 
Ego-documents as a source for the study of collective historical memory. 
Travelling as an experience of intercultural interaction. Ideas about “ours” and 
“alien”, ethnic stereotypes, creation of cultural boundaries, ethno-cultural and 
regional identity. Neighbors by each other's eyes in the past and present. 
Memoirs about the great wars of XIX – XX centuries. Oral history in the study of 
the past of the region. 
In the context of these directions there were presented papers on the 
results of three years researches of the Trialog participants. There is no 
possibility to name all themes and retell the contents of 32 papers, so I would like 
to identify briefly priorities and illustrate them a few examples4. 
The majority of the papers were devoted to various aspects of regional 
historical memory as one of the main structural elements of individual and 
collective identity. Valery Galtsov (Kaliningrad) first systematized and analyzed 
the Russian Internet sites devoted to the history of East Prussia and the 
Kaliningrad region. These materials are the most representative picture of the 
“chaotic” state of the historical memory of Kaliningradians. According to the 
author, digital resources on the Web are very far from scientific bases of 
professional historical science, they often bear false ideas or dangerous 
stereotypes that first effect on younger generation. 
Dr Olga Kurilo (Frankfurt (Oder)) has put the issue of historical and 
contemporary “landscapes of memory” on the example of Samland spas through 
                                                       
4  Юрий Костяшов, Ольга Курило (ред), Между Одером и Неманом: проблемы 
исторической памяти, Издательство Балтийского федерального университета им. И. 
Канта, Калининград 2012, 211 с. 
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out the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. She revealed that although the 
Baltic coast of Sambia Peninsula after World War II lost the previous value of the 
European cultural landscape, but the continuity of the Sambia cultural traditions 
has been keeping in some degree in the Kaliningrad region, and this has been 
reflected on the identity of Kaliningradians. 
Dr Ilya Dementiev (Kaliningrad), analyzing the historical memory of the 
inhabitants of the Kaliningrad region, used the category of “places of memory” by 
Pierre Nora and offered his own list of such places of memory in the region. The 
ratio of historical memory and the Kaliningrad toponymy was investigated in the 
Pavel Polch’s paper (Kaliningrad). 
Dr Hans-Christian Pust (Stuttgart) set the tone in the discussion of 
politics of memory, he told about a forgotten German tradition since the First 
World War, when wooden monuments were installed, intended for nailing 
(“Nagelungsdenkmäler”). Wooden figure of a warrior or a military leader, for 
example, Field Marshal Hindenburg, were exhibited in the central square, then 
everyone could score a nail into the wood. Thus, a wooden sculpture gradually 
covered by iron shell. Thousands of people were involved in this action, which 
had a very strong emotional impact. By the way, nails were sold out to all comers, 
and the “Hammering nails” was accompanied by collecting donations, so 
Germans felt their involvement in the nationwide affair because thus they 
contributed victory. 
Dr Piotr Zariczny (Torun) analyzed the German press to show how it 
forms the historical and contemporary image of Poland and how the media 
involved in the instrumentalization of collective memory in the context of 
German-Polish relations after Poland's accession to the European Union. Dr 
Patryk Wawrzyński (Torun) presented his study “Politics of memory in the 
foreign policy of Poland in XXI century”. He drew attention to rivalry of the 
concepts of the policy of historical memory of brothers Kaczynski with the 
“paradigm of oblivion”of Adam Michnik and “Gazeta Wyborcza” in present-day 
Poland.  
Within the framework of the next direction “Monuments, rituals, symbol” 
Konrad Tschäpe  (Frankfurt (Oder)) studied artistic and mental images of the 
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enemy on the example of German and Soviet propaganda during the Second 
World War and identified opportunities of the comparative analysis of 
stereotypes of the enemies. Dr Gennady Kretinin (Kaliningrad) examined the 
conditions of military memorials and cemeteries in the Kaliningrad region. He 
followed changes in attitudes towards the German military places of memory on 
the part of the Russian population and underlined the importance of this factor 
in the constitution of the collective historical memory. Dominika Czarnecka 
(Torun) touched the sensitive topic of the “War of monuments” in Poland in the 
first years after the fall of communism (1989-1993). She showed how decisions 
were made about the fate of the monuments to the Red Army after 1989 and 
what variants their using or liquidation were implemented in the post-Soviet 
period. Dr Irina Belintseva (Moscow) investigated how the perception of the 
architectural heritage of East Prussia was changed in the Kaliningrad region – 
from total negation to recognition it as “native”. The conference participants 
perceived with the great interest the presentation of the research project of 
several students of the historical faculty of the Kaliningrad University under the 
title of “Historical signs and symbols in the urban space of Kaliningrad”. 
The last section of the conference was dedicated to the memory sources 
(memoirs, diaries, interviews, music). Dr Beata Lakeberg (Bad Zwischenahn) 
analyzed the content of the “Silesian local history calendars”, published in the 
FRG for settlers from Silesia. The purpose of her study was to define the ratio 
between regional and national identities. Dr Larisa Gavrilina (Moscow) reviewed 
a number of literary texts, focused on the creating a kind of the “portrait” of 
Kaliningrad. Dr Yury Kostyashov (Kaliningrad) examined the diaries and 
memoirs of Russian travelers to East Prussia as a source for study of the 
historical stereotypes and intercultural experience. Methods of study of historical 
memory through music became the research topic “Epitaph and a funeral march. 
German-Polish military musical culture” by organist and musicologist Michael F. 
Runowski (Berlin). 
So-called “summer schools” (i.e., education projects for Russian, Polish and 
German students) were the second and, as it was represented, the most 
interesting component of the Trialog project. During 2011-2012 three such 
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schools took place lasting approximately 10 days. They were held by turns in the 
three countries on the following subjects: “Tourism and the seaside resorts of 
Sambia”, Kaliningrad, April 2011; “The border areas and historical experience”, 
Torun, September – October 2011; “The boundaries of memories. Places of 
memory in the area of the Oder River”, Frankfurt (Oder), September 2012. 
Participants of the schools were 10 students and 2–3 teachers in a role of 
curators from each of the universities. The peculiarity of the Trialog summer 
schools is that one way or another they simulate the research community and 
use the method of case study as the basis of the educational program. At the 
beginning of the work, the students are divided into four international research 
groups of 7-8 people with equal representation from the each university. Each 
group is given a separate creative task in the certain direction for the whole 
period of the work. During the week, students work out their own program under 
the supervision of the curator, define research methods, and collect information 
by studying the literature, press, Internet resources. In addition, they perform a 
visual observation, make photo and video, interview respondents, consult to 
experts, conduct experiments, etc. Then the raw data are studied 
comprehensively and structured. During collective discussion students formulate 
several points of view on the studied problem using creativity techniques 
(Brainstorming). In conclusion, the results of the group research are reported in 
the form of the presentations at the final plenary session, as well as presented in 
the form of essays, travel guides, exhibitions and publications in mass media. 
Thus, during the Kaliningrad summer school a group of students was 
given the task to develop practical recommendations for local authorities to 
conserve and use the architectural heritage of resort towns Zelenogradsk, 
Svetlogorsk and  Otradnoe (German names: Kranz, Raushen, Georgenswalde). 
In the process, they studied: maps and plans of towns, urban planning ideas and 
their implementation; historical and modern buildings, architectural styles, a 
combination of natural landscape and architecture, functioning of recreational 
areas, local tourist attractions, historical and cultural objects (buildings and 
structures, temples, museums, monuments and memorials, commemorative 
plaques, park sculpture, etc.). The task was to make a comparative analysis of 
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the spatial and landscape development of the seaside resorts in Sambia before 
and after 1945, as well as to make an examination of use of built heritage with 
concrete examples, to evaluate the practice and the quality of the restoration 
works. Part of the task was to find traces of German architectural competition 
(1911), which was devoted to the creation of the project on the best construction 
of a country house in Sambia. On the basis the archival documents of more than 
100 architectural projects, students had to find real objects on the terrain, to fix 
and describe the buildings constructed on the projects of this contest. 
The final result of the work of this group was “The guidebook to the 
architectural, historical and cultural sights of the seaside resorts of the 
Kaliningrad seashore”, as well as recommendations to the local authorities for 
the conservation and use of the architectural heritage, proposals for development 
of the landscape and urban design, renovation of old and creation of new 
recreational areas, ideas on installation of original monuments and creation of 
other cultural objects5. 
Creating the concept of the use of the railway station building in the small 
town Aleksandrów Kujawski was one of the tasks for the students of the summer 
school in Torun. Aleksandrów was the final point on the border of Prussia and 
Russia at the time when Poland was a part of the Russian Empire. Tsar 
Alexander II built a huge and luxurious station on the eve of the opening of the 
railway between St. Petersburg and Berlin in 1862. It carries the name “The 
station of two monarchs” in memory of the meeting of the Tsar with German 
Emperor Wilhelm I in 1879. After boundary changes as a result of the First 
World War Aleksandrów appeared very far from frontiers of Poland, and the 
station turned into a provincial railway station. Today the well-preserved huge 
building is almost never used; meanwhile it is potentially a major tourist 
attraction and the greatest value of the town. This station is one of the elements 
of the cultural heritage and it weighs on the formation of historical townspeople 
memory. During the conducted research, students not only examined the 
                                                       
5 Olga Kurilo (Hrsg.), Tourismus und die Seebäder Samlands, no 1, Avinus-Verlag, Berlin 
2011, 52 S. 
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building in detail and studied its history, but also developed some variants of the 
concept of using the object as a tourist and cultural center6. 
During the summer school in Frankfurt, it was offered to one of the groups 
to explore “the landscape of memory”. This term refers to the specific symbolic 
system which records traces of historical events and causes certain emotions. 
Among other objects, the students visited a few old cemeteries preserved traces of 
the turbulent events of the XX century, during which there were massive 
population displacements, accompanied by violent rupture of cultural tradition. 
They found a number of tombstones and monuments that were used repeatedly 
by the new settlers after the deportation of Germans. The previous “landscape of 
memory” was not recognized by the new inhabitants after the Second World War, 
the old “symbols of memory” were reused, often by new, aggressive and 
sometimes barbarous way7. 
A series of the photo exhibitions based on their research assignments were 
prepared by the students. It was another practical result of the summer schools. 
The exhibitions demonstrated in turn at three universities and attracted a large 
public attention. For reviews of the students the Trialog summer schools became 
the most interesting and memorable events in their university life.  
Summing up the results of Trialog in 2010-2012 we should recognize that 
this scientific and educational project proved very effective interaction between 
the scientists and the students of the three countries. Trialog allowed not only to 
exchange knowledge and experience of researches of the past in the region from 
the Oder to the Neman, but also contributed to overcome interdisciplinary, 
methodological, national and mental barriers, and thus enriched all the sides 
with valuable scientific experience. 
 
                                                       
6 Olga Kurilo (Hrsg.), Grenzmarken und historische Erfahrung in der Region Toruń/Thorn, 
no 2, Avinus-Verlag, Berlin 2012, 63 S. 
7 Olga Kurilo (Hrsg.), Erinnerungslandschaften und Identitäten im Oderraum, no 3, 
Avinus-Verlag, Berlin 2013,  64 S. 
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Триалог: опыт сотрудничества в области гуманитарных 
наук университетов в Калининграде, Торуни и 
Франкфурте на Одере 
 
Юрий Костяшов 
 
В последние годы внимание исследователей всё больше привлекают вопросы 
содержания, особенностей, механизмов формирования и функционирования 
исторической памяти, которая  относится к числу основных формообразующих 
элементов коллективной и индивидуальной идентичности. При этом уникальность 
ситуации, сложившейся на российско-польско-немецком пространстве от Одера до 
Немана, представляет богатый материал для осмысления проблемы коллективного 
исторического сознания вообще и его региональной составляющей. 
Одной из главных проблем исторической памяти жителей этого региона 
является отношение к историко-культурному наследию. Как складывалось это 
отношение под влиянием политики памяти в прошлом и настоящем? Как 
происходило включение чужого (немецкого по преимуществу) довоенного прошлого в 
массовое сознание новых жителей (русских, поляков и литовцев) в послевоенные 
годы? Какие барьеры были установлены на этом пути официальной политикой 
государств (СССР и Польской Народной Республики) и как они преодолевались? 
Какие факторы сегодня определяют содержание культурной памяти жителей 
региона? Ответы на эти вопросы попытались дать участники международного проекта 
Триалог. 
«Триалог» – это исследовательский проект, который объединил  три 
университета: Европейский Университет Виадрина во Франкфурте на Одере 
(Германия), Университет им. Николая Коперника в Торуни (Польша) и Балтийский 
федеральный университет им. Иммануила Канта в Калининграде (Россия). Цель 
данного проекта – развить и улучшить кооперацию между тремя университетами в 
области гуманитарных дисциплин посредством создания общих коммуникационных 
сетей и тем самым внести весомый вклад во взаимопонимание между тремя странами. 
Этот проект был инициирован в 2010 году университетом Виадрина и финансово 
поддержан Немецкой службой академических обменов (DAAD). Содействие проекту 
оказывают министерства иностранных дел России,  Германии и Польши. 
Координатор и главный менеджер проекта – д-р Ольга Курило (Университет 
Виадрина). Автор настоящей публикации был координатором с российской стороны. 
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В рамках проекта проходят ежегодные конференции ученых и летние школы 
для студентов и аспирантов; результаты каждого из мероприятий отражаются в 
публикациях. Проект имеет междисциплинарный характер: в нем принимают 
участие историки, филологи, социологи, политологи, юристы, географы и историки 
архитектуры1.   
Объектом изучения является историческое пространство Южной Балтии – 
обширный регион между реками  Одер и Неман, который в разные эпохи подвергался 
польскому, немецкому и русскому влияниям. Первая научная конференция Триалога 
состоялась во Франкфурте на Одере в ноябре 2010 г. и была посвящена 
разнообразным аспектам мобильности в регионе между Одером и Неманом в 
различные исторические периоды.  
При этом мобильность и региональные связи прошлого и настоящего 
рассматривались в рамках данной конференции в качестве исторического наследия, 
оставленного в этом пространстве тремя культурами: немецкой, польской и русской. 
Участники конференции посетили несколько городов и крепостей в польско-немецком 
пограничье, которые до сих пор являются актуальными местами памяти для 
представителей трех культур. Уже с первой конференции тема отношения к 
многонациональному культурному наследию Южной Балтии и его влияние на 
региональную идентичность стала одной из ведущих в исследованиях участников 
Триалога2.  
Еще более эта тенденция проявилась на второй конференции под названием 
«Границы и пересечение границ в истории и современной культуре», которая 
состоялась в сентябре 2011 г. в Торуни (Польша). Докладчики из трех стран 
обсуждали очень широкий круг проблем, рассматривая понятие границы в 
философском, историческом и культурологическом значении. В центре внимания 
оказались такие вопросы, как установление, открытие и исчезновение границ, 
открытость познания и границы, границы и человек, границы и культура, границы 
между людьми, между «своим» и «чужим». Один из выводов дискуссии состоял в том, 
что в современном мире границы продолжают быть важной парадигмой мышления и, 
несмотря на исчезновение границ в Европе, проблема границ остается, только 
перемещается из области политики в сферу общественной, культурной и 
                                                       
1  See: Deutsch-polnisch-russisches wissenschaftliches Kooperationsprojekt. URL: 
http://www.europa-uni.de/de/struktur/unileitung/projekte/trialog/das-projekt/index.html. 
2 Olga Kurilo (Hrsg.), Mobilität und regionale Vernetzung zwischen Oder und Memel: Eine 
europäische Landschaft neu zusammensetzen, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, Berlin 2011, 
255 S. 
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индивидуальной жизни. Некоторые выступления участников были прямо связаны с 
проблемами исторической памяти и региональной идентичности3.  
Наконец, третья конференция Триалога, которая состоялась в Калининграде 
(Россия) в апреле 2012 г., была полностью посвящена политике памяти и 
исторической памяти жителей региона между Вислой и Неманом. 
При подготовке конференции были выделены следующие проблемные вопросы 
и поля исследования: 
1. Историческая память локальных сообществ от Одера до Немана и политика 
памяти: содержание, особенности и механизмы функционирования 
Формирование локальной/региональной исторической (культурной) памяти – 
представлений о прошлом, зафиксированных в коллективной памяти. Исторические 
мифы и стереотипы массового сознания. Историческая память и национальная 
/региональная идентичность. Церковь, религия и историческая память 
2. Политика памяти: общенациональные и региональные аспекты  
Политика памяти как средство легитимации власти или средство изменения 
существующего порядка. Национальные версии региональной истории в школьном 
образовании. Проблема преодоления исторических травм: научный и моральный 
аспекты. Взаимодействие исторической науки и исторической памяти. Роль 
литературы, искусства, средств массовой информации, сообществ любителей истории, 
краеведов и «реконструкторов» в формировании исторической памяти. История в 
киберпространстве. 
3. Памятники, символы, ритуалы как фактор формирования исторической 
памяти и воспитания гражданской идентичности 
Факторы формирования исторической памяти: памятники и памятные места, 
символические ритуалы, праздничные дни, музейные экспозиции, через которые 
осуществляется образование наследием (heritage education). Государственная 
политика и общественные инициативы. Памятные места и кладбища прошедших 
войн. Феномен «войны памятников». 
4. Источники памяти: воспоминания, дневники, интервью  
Эго-документы как источник для исследования проблем исторической памяти. 
Путешествия как опыт межкультурного взаимодействия. Представления о своем и 
чужом, этнические стереотипы, построение культурных границ, этнокультурная и 
региональная идентичность. Соседи глазами друг друга в прошлом и настоящем. 
                                                       
3 Jurij Kostjašov, Olga Kurilo, Piotr Zariczny (Hrsg.), Grenzen und ihre Überwindung im 
deutsch-polnisch-russischem Raum, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń  2012, 212 S. 
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Мемуарная литература о великих войнах XIX – XX веков. Метод устной истории (oral 
history) в изучении прошлого региона. 
В русле этих направлений были представлены доклады по результатам 
трехлетних исследований участников Триалога. Не имея возможности назвать все 
темы и пересказать содержание докладов всех 32 участников конференции, хотел бы 
лишь кратко обозначить приоритетные темы и проиллюстрировать их несколькими 
примерами4. 
Наибольшее количество докладов было посвящено различным аспектам 
региональной исторической памяти как основных элементов индивидуальной и 
коллективной идентичности. Валерий Гальцов (Калининград) впервые 
систематизировал и проанализировал сайты русского сегмента Интернета, 
посвященные истории Восточной Пруссии и Калининградской области, которые 
являются наиболее репрезентативной картиной «хаотического» состояния 
исторической памяти калининградцев. По его мнению, размещенные в Интернете 
ресурсы очень далеки от научных основ профессиональной исторической науки и 
часто становятся проводником  ложных представлений и опасных стереотипов, 
которые в первую очередь воздействуют на молодое поколение. 
Д-р Ольга Курило (Берлин) на примере курортов Замланда (современного 
Калининградского полуострова) поставила проблему  исторических и современных 
ландшафтов памяти на протяжении ХIХ и ХХ веков. Она показала, что хотя 
Балтийское побережье Самбии после Второй мировой войны потеряло прежнее 
значение европейского культурного ландшафта, но преемственность культурных 
традиций Самбии сохранилась в какой-то степени в Калининградской области, и это 
отражается на идентичности калининградцев. 
Д-р Илья Дементьев (Калининград) при анализе исторической памяти 
жителей Калининградской области использовал категорию места памяти Пьера Нора 
и предложил свой список мест памяти в регионе. Соотношение исторической памяти и 
калининградской топонимики было исследовано в докладе Павла Полха 
(Калининград) 
Тон в обсуждении политики памяти был задан докладом д-ра Ганс-Христиана 
Пуста (Штутгарт), который рассказал о забытой сегодня немецкой традиции с времен 
Первой мировой войны по установке деревянных памятников, предназначавшихся 
для забивания в них гвоздей ("Nagelungsdenkmäler"). Деревянные фигуры воина или 
полководца, например, Гинденбурга, выставлялись на центральных площадях 
                                                       
4  Юрий Костяшов, Ольга Курило (ред), Между Одером и Неманом: проблемы 
исторической памяти, Издательство Балтийского федерального университета им. И. 
Канта, Калининград 2012, 211 с. 
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городов и всем желающим предлагалось забить в дерево гвоздь со шляпкой. Таким 
образом, деревянная скульптура постепенно покрывалась железной оболочкой. 
Тысячи людей были привлечены к этой акции, которая имела очень сильное 
эмоциональное воздействие. Кстати, гвозди для вбивания продавались всем 
желающим, а кампания сопровождалось сбором пожертвований, так что немцы 
чувствовали и свою причастность к общенациональному делу: тем самым они вносили 
свой вклад в победу.  
 Д-р Петр Заричны (Торунь) проанализировал немецкую прессу, чтобы 
показать как в ней формируется исторический и современной образ Польши, и как 
СМИ участвуют в инструментализации коллективной памяти в контексте германо-
польских отношений после вступления Польши в Европейский союз. Патрик 
Вовжиньский (Торунь) в докладе «Присутствие политики памяти во внешней 
политике Польши в ХХI веке» обратил внимание на то, что в современной Польше 
наблюдается соперничество концепций политики исторической памяти братьев 
Качиньских с «парадигмой забвения» Адама Михника и круга интеллектуалов, 
связанных с «Газетой Выборчей». 
В рамках следующего направления «Памятники, ритуалы, символы» Конрад 
Чепе (Франкфурт-на-Одере) исследовал художественные и ментальные образы врага 
на примере немецкой и советской пропаганды времен Второй мировой войны и 
определил возможности сравнительного анализа стереотипов врагов. Д-р Геннадий 
Кретинин (Калининград) рассмотрел состояние воинских мемориалов и кладбищ в 
Калининградской области, проследил изменения отношения современных жителей к 
немецким военным местам памяти и подчеркнул значение этого фактора в 
конституировании коллективной исторической памяти.  Доминика Чарнецка 
(Франкфурт на Одере) затронула болезненную тему «войны памятников» в Польше в 
первые годы после крушения коммунизма (1989–1993 гг.). Она показала, как 
принимались решения о судьбе памятников Красной Армии после 1989 г. и какие 
варианты их применения или ликвидации  были  осуществлены  в  постсоветский 
период. Д-р Ирина Белинцева (Москва) проследила, как менялось в 
Калининградской области восприятие архитектурного наследия Восточной Пруссии – 
от тотального отрицания до признание его «своим». С большим интересом участники 
конференции встретили презентацию исследовательского проекта группы студентов-
историков Университета им. И. Канта «Исторические знаки и символы в городском 
пространстве Калининграда». 
Последний раздел конференции был посвящен источникам памяти 
(воспоминания, дневники, интервью, музыка). Д-р Беата Лакеберг (Ольденбург) 
проанализировала содержание «Силезских краеведческих календарей», выходивших 
в ФРГ для переселенцев из Силезии, с целью установления соотношения между 
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региональной и национальной идентичностями. Д-р Лариса Гаврилина (Москва) 
проанализировала группу литературных текстов, ориентированных на создание 
своеобразного   «портрета»   Калининграда.   Д-р Юрий Костяшов (Калининград) 
рассмотрел дневники и воспоминания русских путешественников по Восточной 
Пруссии в качестве источника по изучению исторических стереотипов и опыта 
межкультурного взаимодействия. Методика изучения исторической памяти 
посредством музыки стала темой доклада «Эпитафия и траурный марш. Немецко-
польская музыкальная военная культура» органиста и музыковеда Михаэля 
Руновски (Берлин). 
Второй и, как представляется, наиболее интересной составной частью проекта 
Триалог были так называемые «летние школы» – образовательные проекты для 
русских, польских и немецких студентов. В течение 2011–2012 годов состоялось три 
таких школы продолжительностью около 10 дней, которые проводились по очереди в 
трех странах по следующей тематике: 
"Туризм и морские курорты Самбии", Калининград,  апрель 2011 г. 
 "Пограничные области и исторический опыт", Торунь, сент. – окт. 2011 г. 
"Границы воспоминаний. Места памяти в районе реки Одер", Франкфурт на 
Одере, сентябрь 2012 г. 
Участниками школ были по 10 студентов и по 2–3 преподавателя в роли 
кураторов от каждого из университетов. Особенность летних школ Триалога состоит в 
том, что они в той или иной мере моделируют научное сообщество и используют метод 
конкретного исследования в качестве основы образовательной программы. В начале 
работы студенты разбиваются на четыре интернациональные исследовательские 
группы по 7–8 человек с паритетным представительством от каждого университета. 
Каждая группа получает отдельное  творческое задание по определенному 
направлению на весь период работы школы. В течение недели студенты под 
руководством куратора самостоятельно разрабатывали программу, определяли 
методы исследования, занимались сбором информации с помощью изучения 
литературы, прессы, Интернет-ресурсов, осуществляли визуальное наблюдение, 
производили фото- и кинофиксацию, интервьюировали респондентов, 
консультировались со специалистами, устраивали эксперименты и т. д. Затем 
исходные данные всесторонне изучались и структурировались и во время 
коллективного обсуждения с использованием методик креативности (creativity 
techniques) формулировались несколько точек зрения на изучаемую проблему. В 
завершении результаты групповых исследований представлялись в качестве 
презентаций на заключительном пленарном заседании участников школы, а также 
представлялись в виде эссе, путеводителей, выставок, публикаций в СМИ. 
Так, во время Калининградской школы группа студентов получила задание 
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разработать практические рекомендации местным властям по сохранению и 
использованию архитектурного наследия курортных городов Зеленоградск, 
Светлогорск и Отрадное (нем. Кранц, Раушен и Георгенсвальде). В процессе работы 
они изучали карты и планировку этих городов, градостроительные идеи и их 
реализацию; историческую и современную застройку, архитектурные стили, сочетание 
природного ландшафта и архитектуры, функционирование рекреационных зон, 
местные туристические достопримечательности и историко-культурные объекты 
(здания и сооружения, храмы, музеи, памятники и памятные места, мемориальные 
доски, парковая скульптура и пр.). Задание состояло в том, чтобы сделать 
сравнительный анализ  пространственного и ландшафтного развития морских 
курортов Самбии до и после 1945 года, а также провести экспертизу использования 
объектов архитектурного наследия на конкретных примерах, оценить практику и 
качество реставрационных работ.  
Составной частью задания был поиск следов проведенного в Германии 
архитектурного конкурса 1911 года по созданию проекта на лучшую постройку 
дачного домика на Самбии. На основании сохранившихся архивных документов более 
100 участвовавших в конкурсе архитектурных проектов студенты должны были 
обнаружить на местности, зафиксировать и описать построенные по конкурсным 
проектам здания. 
Конечным результатом работы этой группы стал «Путеводитель по 
архитектурным и историко-культурным достопримечательностям морских курортов 
Калининградского взморья», а также рекомендации местным властям по сохранению 
и использованию архитектурного наследия, предложения по развитию ландшафта и 
градостроительства, реконструкции старых и созданию новых рекреационных зон, 
идеи о строительстве оригинальных памятников и других культурных объектов5.    
Одним из заданий для участников школы в Торуни было создание концепции 
использования здания железнодорожного вокзала в небольшом городке Александров 
Куявски (Aleksandrów Kujawski). Во времена вхождения Польши в состав Российской 
империи это был конечный пункт на границе Пруссии и России. Царь Александр II  
построил здесь огромный и роскошный вокзал к открытию в 1862 году железной 
дороги между Петербургом и Берлином.  Он носит название «Вокзал двух монархов» в 
память  о встрече здесь царя с германским императором Вильгельмом I в 1879 г. 
После изменения границ в результате Первой мировой войны и воссоздания 
польского государства город Александров оказался очень далеко от государственных 
границ Польши, а вокзал превратился в малозначимую провинциальную 
                                                       
5 Olga Kurilo (Hrsg.), Tourismus und die Seebäder Samlands, no 1, Avinus-Verlag, Berlin 
2011, 52 S. 
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железнодорожную станцию. Сегодня великолепно сохранившееся огромное здание 
почти не используется, а между тем потенциально это главная достопримечательность 
и самая большая ценность города. Он  является одним из элементов культурного 
наследия, формирования исторической памяти жителей города. В результате 
проведенного исследования студенты не только детально обследовали здание и 
изучили его историю, но и разработали несколько вариантов концепции 
использования этого объекта как туристического и культурного центра6. 
Во время школы во Франкфурте одной из групп было предложено изучить 
ландшафт памяти. Данный термин обозначает определенную символическую систему, 
которая хранит следы исторических событий и вызывает определенные эмоции.  В 
числе других объектов студенты посетили несколько старых кладбищ, которые 
сохранили следы бурных событий XX века, во время которых имели место массовые 
перемещения населения, сопровождаемые насильственным разрывом культурной 
традиции. Они обнаружили надгробные плиты и памятники, которые использовались 
повторно новыми поселенцами после депортации немцев. Прежний сложившийся 
ландшафт памяти не был распознан новыми жителями после Второй мировой войны, 
старые символы памяти были использованы повторно, часто новым, агрессивным и 
иногда варварским способом7.  
Еще одним практическим результатом летних школ была серия фотовыставок, 
которые были подготовлены силами студентов по мотивам своих исследовательских 
заданий, которые по очереди демонстрировались в трех университетах и привлекли 
большое внимание публики. По отзывам студентов, летние школы Триалога стали 
самыми интересными и запоминающимися событиями для них за всё время обучения.  
Подводя итоги работы Триалога за 2010–2012 гг. следует признать, что он 
оказался очень эффективным средством взаимодействия ученых и студентов трех 
стран, что позволило не только обменяться знаниями и опытом исследований 
прошлого в регионе от Одера до Немана, но способствовало преодолению 
междисциплинарных, методологических, национальных и ментальных барьеров, а 
значит обогатило все стороны ценным научным опытом. 
 
                                                       
6 Olga Kurilo (Hrsg.), Grenzmarken und historische Erfahrung in der Region Toruń/Thorn, 
no 2, Avinus-Verlag, Berlin 2012, 63 S. 
7 Olga Kurilo (Hrsg.), Erinnerungslandschaften und Identitäten im Oderraum, no 3, 
Avinus-Verlag, Berlin 2013,  64 S. 
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[Comments and Discussions] 
 
What Type of Historical Narrative Will Gain 
Ground in the Former Soviet-Bloc Countries? 
 
Jun Yoshioka 
 
I read Dr. Głowacka-Grajper’s paper by analogy with capitalistic 
consumption society. Under the free market economy, anyone can put goods on 
the market and people can freely choose and buy goods in accordance with their 
preference. Then a question as to what item gains popularity and how it can 
achieve sales is an object of seller’s concern. In the analogy between memory 
conflicts and consumption society, historical views, perception of history, or 
package of memories correspond to commodities provided to consumers. How 
should memories be packaged in order to be hot items? Dr. Głowacka-Grajper 
shows that in Poland, where memories of the Second World War still functions as 
a burden, a memory package of antagonism against her neighbors appeals to 
more people than a memory package of reconciliation does. 
During the communist era, in Central and Eastern European countries, 
including Poland, where people had much fewer choices of goods than the 
contemporary western consumers did, the only one package of goods as to 
historical narrative or the perception of history could be sold, so to speak, in state-
managed stores. That is the Soviet type of historical narrative or the Soviet 
standard. It can also be called Great Patriotic War-centered historiography. 
The Soviet type of historical narrative consists of such elements as World 
War II as an anti-fascist war of liberation, the Soviet Union as a liberator, and 
Germany as categorical loser. In this narrative, the following two processes of 
liberation were emphasized as a Soviet achievement: liberation from the fascist 
rule (national liberation) and one from old evils of the prewar regime (people’s 
liberation). According to this view, while the prewar regime was branded as a 
wartime collaborator, communists were described as the true liberator. On the 
other hand, however, this narrative overlooked such facts as injustices to the 
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Germans, participation of local population in the Holocaust, or communist 
oppression of people. 
After the collapse of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern 
European countries, this Soviet standard lost its appeal. Parallel to the process of 
opening a market and of economic liberalization, perception of history too opened 
a market and liberalizing. In Poland, as building relations with neighboring and 
new independent countries became a difficult task, concealed past or memories 
flew out and market was full of “histories”.  
 Nowadays, the wide and global spread of internet and social network 
services (SNS) like Facebook or Twitter has accelerated this process. Today 
anyone can write a history in his version and can easily upload it. It is no 
exaggeration to say that everyone can be a historian. It is true, however, that 
these ordinary “historians” do not always present their view on the basis of 
documents or archival works which professional historians do. In many cases, 
they choose and imitate any of narrative package suitable for them from affluent 
of “histories”.  
So, it is important for us to analyze media which provide ordinary 
“historians” with the narrative or cognitive package. We can list as such media 
family, church, SNS, historical novels, popular history, TV programs, films, new 
type of historical museum like Warsaw Uprising Museum in Poland and so on. 
Here, to consider influence on relationship between states, I would like to focus 
the argument on the types of historical narrative that is introduced as some sort 
of state policy. 
In the former Soviet-bloc countries, roughly two types of narrative package 
could replace the Soviet type of historical narrative. The first was an ethno-
centric type of historical narrative or the national standard. It consists of such 
elements as revaluation of old regimes denied by the Soviet standard, emphasis 
on injustices committed by the Soviet, and silence about injustices to the 
Germans. The second type of narrative package was an EU type of historical 
narrative or the EU standard. Its contents include emphasis on universal values, 
evaluation of the EU as a community of reconciliation, relativization of state 
borders, and acceleration of reconciliation between nations. The EU standard 
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faces up to such inconvenient facts as participation of local population in the 
Holocaust, injustices to the Germans, or wartime collaboration and so on. 
Did people in the former Soviet-bloc countries accept these packages of 
historical narrative? To what degree have these packages become widespread? I 
would like to examine the case of Poland, Ukraine, and Russia, which Dr. 
Głowacka-Grajper mentioned in her paper. The following diagram show the 
pattern of that each country has traced since the Soviet type of historical 
narrative ceased to function (“S” means the Soviet standard, “E” the EU standard, 
and “N” the national standard). 
 
Poland:  S → E ≧ N 
Western Ukraine： S → N ＞ E 
Eastern Ukraine： S → [absence of both N and E] 
Russia:  S → S and/or N? [at least, categorical absence of E] 
   
Poland accepted the EU standard for herself as a state policy (as a kind of 
political correctness) in the process of the accession to the EU. It is true that the 
national standard of historical narrative has never been weak in Poland, but it 
could be said that there has been a tendency for the EU standard to deter an 
explosion of ethno-centric behavior. The EU standard that facilitates 
reconciliation between nations, however, has not reached either Ukraine with a 
few exceptions of pro-European intellectuals, or Russia. This seems to 
demonstrate Dr. Głowacka-Grajper’s assumption about non-optimistic vision of 
future relations between Poland and Ukraine or Russia from a different angle. 
Dr. Głowacka-Grajper also reports an interesting fact that opinion in the 
Polish society is divided on the matter whether Poland should foster the policy of 
reconciliation with conflicting neighbors. Now I would like to question whether 
this division of opinion reflects any social background. In this globalizing world, 
critical fault-line exists not only between nations, but also within the nation. This 
fault-line divides and is more and more dividing a nation into two groups, the one 
is the winner, the educated who understand global or European standard and 
can get access to the global or European market, and the other is the loser, left 
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behind the former. This problem seems to have an importance because it is 
related to possibility and provability of division of historical consciousness within 
a nation. In this sense, estrangement between professional historiography and 
mass historical consciousness can become a critical issue. Will deepening the gap 
of historical consciousness within a nation mean an increase the number of those 
who would be susceptible to populist identity politics? Will the former Soviet-bloc 
countries like Poland, Ukraine and Russia develop identity politics of memory, or 
will they continue or begin to develop the policy of reconciliation? 
It is true that a reconciliation between states is one thing, and a 
reconciliation between nations another. But it is worth considering how and to 
what degree can the reconciliation of states as a policy have an influence on a 
reconciliation of nations. Furthermore, it deserves greater attention to consider 
mutual influence between state policies of reconciliation and local, rather niche, 
but very important attempts from below like Kaliningrad-Toruń-Frankfurt 
(Oder) trialog as Professor Kostyashov presented.  
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A Comparative Framework of History and Memory
Conflicts between Eastern Europe and Eastern Asia  
 
Nobuya Hashimoto 
 
Introduction 
The aim of this presentation is to explore a comparative framework for 
inquiry into history and memory conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
and Eastern and South-eastern Asia, and to show a way to cultivate a unified 
and consistent understanding of history and memory politics in both areas in the 
post-Cold War period. Since the 1990s, histories and memories have been more 
and more mobilized by national states and other political agencies in order to 
claim their legitimacy in domestic politics and international relationships: to 
demand recognition of ‘historical truth’, restoration of ‘justice’, apology, and 
compensation, for several reasons; to rationalize territorial claims to regions or 
islands that the states concerned consider they have the right to possess, and to 
raise and strengthen ‘national’ aggregation against a backdrop of economic 
globalisation and the weakening of state sovereignty. National states and 
agencies sometimes try to rewrite and re-comprehend their official histories and 
reorganize national memories of ordinary people. Such political manipulation 
(falsification in some cases) of histories and memories often provokes repulsion 
from neighbouring nations and may lead to the development of regional conflicts.  
In fact, claims for the historical legitimacy of possession of very tiny 
(seemingly meaningless1) islands and reefs have caused severe antagonism 
among several nations in East and Southeast Asia. The ‘disputable’ topics of the 
Nanjing Massacre, Comfort Women, Colonisation of the Korean Peninsula, and 
so on have repeatedly caused and accelerated not only political and diplomatic 
strains between governments, but also mutual hatred and disgust among 
                                                       
1 In practice, one of the ex-Prime Ministers of Japan once asserted that they should have 
been blown up to remove possibilities of territorial conflict in future. 
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‘ordinary’ people. We usually observe racist hate-speech against Korean 
minorities and counter demonstrations by opponents to racism in Japan in these 
days. These are new phenomena that we had never experienced prior to ten 
years ago. The situation seems to have become more and more acute in these ten 
years, as hawkish and nationalistic political forces have gained more and more 
power and repeated coercive behaviour in Eastern Asia.  
One influential myth of history and memory conflicts has prevailed in 
Japan since the 1980s: Europeans have struggled to develop a dialogue on 
disputable historical events and antagonistic memories for getting over the 
distrust and hostility that had long been the cause of successive wars since the 
creation of the modern sovereign states system, while hostile perceptions of 
histories and memories have multiplied among Asian nations and are 
aggravating international distrust and uncomfortable relationships, especially 
with Japan. Willy Brandt’s begging for forgiveness on bended knee in a Warsaw 
Ghetto and Richard von Weizsäcker’s famous speech at Bundestag have been 
repeatedly admired and referred to as instructive models for politicians by liberal 
and left wing activists and academics in Japan. In contrast, some of the Prime 
Ministers and a lot of right wing politicians in Japan officially (or unofficially) 
visit and worship at Yasukuni Shrine, in which dead combatants and officers 
including such class-A War Criminals as Hideki Tojo (the General and Prime 
Minister who started the Pacific War with the USA, Britain, and the 
Netherlands in 1941) were deified and applauded as fallen national heroes2. 
Lasting and stubborn prosecution of Nazi criminals in West Germany was 
settled against the inauguration of the Prime Minister’s office by one of the 
former class-A War Criminals (Nobusuke Kishi, a grandfather of the present 
PM) in Japan. Experiences of the ‘Remembrance, Responsibility and Future’ 
                                                       
2 A few decades ago, a Christian woman appealed to the Justice Court of Japan to delete 
the ‘soul’ of her dead husband, who was a member of the Self-Defense Force of Japan and 
died in the procedure of an official mission, from Yasukuni Shrine on the ground of her own 
(not her husband’s) religious belief. Yasukuni Shrine refused her claim on the basis of its 
doctrine that a dead soul once unified and merged into the Body of Gods of the Shrine is 
never detached. The Supreme Court of Japan dismissed her claim in 1988. Some Christian 
groups raised the problem of deifying Christian soldiers who had died in WWII and other 
wars in Yasukuni Shrine.     
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Foundation in Germany were introduced to the Japanese public sphere against a 
backdrop of Japanese Courts’ rejection of claims by Chinese and Korean forced 
labourers for apologies and compensation from Japanese enterprises and the 
government. 
These contrasts between two defeated Axis Powers of WWII are very 
symbolic. Some dissidents and intellectuals in Japan have consistently thought 
that ‘unrepenrant’ attitudes of their government manifest as political 
backwardness and immature democracy in Japan. Right-wing politicians’ acts 
have been often criticized and condemned by neighbouring states and the US 
government, too. According to their statements, these imprudent deeds show that 
leading Japanese politicians never reflect Japan’s taking responsibility for war 
and colonisation; furthermore, they might disturb regional cooperation and 
destabilise international relationships in Eastern Asia. The contrast itself seems 
to remain valid and useful for recognising the political culture in contemporary 
Japan, and such a situation promotes the mythicisation of European experiences 
of the shared history and memory of its tragic past, and reconciliation through 
dialogue and mutual understanding.  
We can discern one example of the mythicisation and idealisation of 
European experiences in the general preface for a authentic series on the Modern 
and Contemporary History of Eastern Asia. 
Unlike Europe, where the collapse of Soviet Union and dismantlement of the 
Cold War regime had accelerated the integration and unification of the 
region, Eastern Asia, in which even divided nations still exist, has never 
succeeded in healing the scars of colonialism, wars, and the Cold War, and 
has rather provoked the conflicts of historical perception and territorial 
possession, stirring up antagonistic feelings [among ordinary people – N.H.]. 
We can discern a situation in which the development of globalisation, 
ironically enough, functions ‘to increase [national] closedness’ and inspires 
nationalism. 3             
                                                       
3 Ken’ichi Goto et al. (eds.), Iwanami Koza: Higashi Azia Kingendai Tsushi (Iwanami 
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When they seek dialogue and reconciliation among Asian nations, 
historians and intellectuals usually refer to German-Polish dialogue on history 
textbooks, compilation of common textbooks by German and French specialists, 
and international commissions of historians, in order to facilitate a mutual 
understanding and mutual adjustment of histories. Of course, these European 
experiences were very significant for building a peaceful and integrated Europe, 
but they also brought important instructions and suggestions to Japan and 
Eastern Asia4. However, the scheme of ‘dialogue and reconciliation in Europe / 
hostility and confrontation in Asia’ is, in my opinion, very superficial and fails to 
grasp the real situations in Europe, since Japanese historians and intellectual 
who oppose to increasing tendencies of nationalistic historical revisionism in 
Japan do not acknowledge the confused and antagonistic situation of histories 
and memories among European nations. However, in practice, as many authors 
and researchers (including our colleagues on this project) point out, ‘contested’ or 
‘conflicted’ histories and memories of WWII and other critical issues have widely 
arisen and prevailed in Europe, too. The alleged ‘European space of common 
history and memory’ is actually diverged into some history and memory regimes 
that have been difficult to arbitrate after the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. History policies developed by some European 
governments (especially CEE countries) often induce domestic and international 
disputes, and challenge the authentic representation of WWII as a ‘War of 
Democracy against Fascism’, which was the official western slogan in wartime 
and during the Cold War. Conflict of histories and memories is not ‘a patented 
article’ of Eastern Asia, but a more widely prevailed symptom of these decades. 
Therefore, this phenomenon demands a more globalised investigation. This is the 
reason why I have developed a comparative framework of CEE and Eastern 
Asia.   
                                                                                                                                    
Lecture Series: Modern and Contemporary History of Eastern Asia), 10 vols., Iwanami 
Shoten Publishing, 2011, p.v. in every volume. 
4 In fact, some professional commissions of historians were organized between China, 
South Korea, and Japan, and collaborative studies of the common past were promoted 
under governmental support or as voluntary projects. 
 
 
 
   109 
To advance and deepen the discussion, I will adopt two areas of 
consideration. The first part of this presentation addresses the historiographical 
thinking about post-WWII Japan’s comparison between Germany and Japan, 
and takes an old and savant historian with whom I am very familiar as an 
example. This will provide us with a prerequisite for a comparison between CEE 
and Eastern Asia. The second part addresses the contemporary contexts in which 
history and memory conflicts rise and grow more intense in both CEE and East 
Asia.    
 
II. Comparative history of Germany and Japan: The case of 
Professor Yukio Mochida  
II-1. Comparing Germany and Japan: A historiographical discussion    
Comparing Germany and Japan has been customary in Japanese 
historiography. Germany had been a model of modernisation for Japan since the 
Meiji Ishin (Restoration), and there have been many topics and subjects that 
deserved comparison between the two nations. Herein, I will present one good 
example from the introductory chapter of a small book that was written by 
Professor Yukio Mochida (1931-) nearly half a century ago. 
There is an opinion that Japan is Germany in Asia. It addresses not only the 
common partial features of both countries’ history, but also the recognition 
that the whole way of their historical progress in the modern era had a 
common framework, and that they followed a common fatal path. It is 
common criminal acts against human beings by Nazism of [Germany] and 
militaristic Fascism [of Japan] in World War II that brought this recognition 
most recently. 5       
Herein, prerequisites and key criterions for an effective comparison are 
settled in the common criminal acts of World War II. As similarity and 
commonness are indispensable for a meaningful comparison, the commonness of 
                                                       
5 Yukio Mochida, Hikaku Kindaishi no Ronri: Nihon to Doitsu (A Logic of Comparative 
Modern History: Japan and Germany, Minerva Shobo Publishing, 1970), p.3.  
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German Nazism and the Japanese model of Fascism should have been the 
prerequisite to make the comparison significant for Professor Mochida.   
Another viewpoint from which to draw a comparison is 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung (Coming to terms with the Past). Professor Yuji 
Ishida (1957-) of the University of Tokyo writes in his noteworthy monograph:  
It is possible to say that Vergangenheitsbewältigung of post-war Germany 
has contributed to the recovery of its international reliability and 
improvement of status, and made the German nation regain self-confidence. 
In contrast to it, Japan has never come to terms with the ‘negative legacies’ 
of its aggressive wars and illegal acts of the past, which remain a ‘stumbling 
block’ in Japan’s relationships with East-Asian countries, although Japan 
carried out World War II in combination with Germany and together with it 
became the defeated states. 6   
‘(West) Germany’s Vergangenheitsbewältigung as remorse for tragic 
events in the recent past and Japan’s lack of repentance for its own responsibility 
and guilt for colonisation and wars’ is the basic tone of his comparison, and it 
composes the key element of the above-mentioned scheme of ‘dialogue and 
reconciliation in Europe / hostility and confrontation in Asia’.  
This type of comparison between Germany and Japan has provoked 
various disputes. On the one hand, right-wing historical revisionists in Japan, 
who are severely opposed to this scheme, have often tried to distinguish Japan’s 
‘honourable’ (in their distorted opinion) war for the liberation of Asian nations out 
of European colonialism from Germany’s shameful and barbarous war and 
Holocaust. According to their way of thinking, the comparison between Germany 
and Japan in itself is misleading and nonsensical, and left-wing historians who 
insist on treating them as equal are possessed by ‘masochistic historical views’. 
On the other hand, Ian Buruma elaborated upon the comparison on the grounds 
of his own observation of both societies, narrating them in a more miscellaneous 
                                                       
6 Yuji Ishida, Kako no Kokufuku: Hitora Go no Doitsu (Vergangenheitsbewältigung: 
Germany after Hitler), Hakusuisha Publishing, 2002, p.10. 
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and impressive fashion7. His discussion seems to be more nuanced and distanced 
from the idealisation of German politics. In any way, the comparison between 
Germany and Japan has been a hot topic of contemporary history in our 
historiography and public opinion on WWII8.   
 
II-2. Yukio Mochida and post-war historiography in Japan       
Dr Yukio Mochida, Professor Emeritus of Doshisha University in Kyoto is 
famous for two fields of his historical studies. One is the social history of elite 
education and the formation of ‘qualification/certification society’ in modern 
Germany. He is a pioneering historian of this field in Japan and many historians 
and pedagogues of younger generations, including me, have developed 
socio-historical research on education and schools and produced abundant works 
under his instruction and supervision. Another field in which Professor Mochida 
has engaged is comparative modern and contemporary history of Germany and 
Japan, whose scope ranges from the formation of modern statehood in the 
nineteenth century to the war and post-war responsibilities of both states in 
WWII. He has published or contributed articles to more than 80 books within 
both fields, and translated significant foreign (English and German) books on 
German history and the Holocaust into Japanese: a controversial monograph on 
the Holocaust written by Daniel Goldhagen (Hitler's willing executioners: 
ordinary Germans and the Holocaust, Knopf, 1996.), The Destruction of the 
European Jews by Raul Hilberg, The Holocaust Encyclopedia edited by Walter 
Laqueur, and so on. The co-existence of these two research subjects, which do not 
have anything in common at first glance, or rather seem to be contrary in 
character to one another, is the essence of my consideration.  
                                                       
7 Ian Buruma, The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan, Jonathan 
Cape, 1994 (Japanese Translation, TBS Britannica 1994 and Chikuma Shobo 2003).  
8 Among memories of ordinary people on WWII in Japan, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and air 
bombing in major cities had long been focal points of their narratives as well as the 
difficulty of obtaining food in evacuation, dangerous repatriation of colonists from the 
Korean Peninsula and Manchuria, and forced labour of POWs in Siberia. All of these 
experiences composed the core of victimhood nationalism in Japan, and it is only after the 
1980s or 90s that the Japanese public began to talk openly and concretely about their own 
infliction and perpetration on Asian nations in the first half of 20th century.  
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Yukio Mochida was born in Kofu of Yamanashi Province in Central Japan 
in 1931. Though he had been a militaristic-minded boy (‘Gunkoku Shonen’ in 
Japanese) who had been eager to enter a military preparatory school (Cadet 
Corps) in wartime, he grew up in the prevailing ‘democratic’ atmosphere of Japan 
following its defeat in 1945, and was influenced by Koza-ha Marxist9 theory in 
his secondary school days.  Soon he entered Kyoto University. He depicted its 
intellectual milieu, which surrounded him in his student days, in his 
autobiographical book: 
In 1951, I entered the Department of History in the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto 
University. Here public lectures by Shima Yasuhiko, Eiichi Horie, Tatsuya 
Naramoto, and so on were successively held. All these scholars were Koza-ha 
Marxists. They advocated that Meiji Ishin (Restoration) was not a bourgeois 
revolution, but the establishment of the autocratic Ten’no-sei (Emperor 
System in Japan) regime and absolutism, which had opened the way to 
subsequent militant dictatorship, wars, and invasions into neighbouring 
countries. At the same time, they regarded Germany having allowed Nazi 
rule as equivalent to Japan. Thus, the modernity of darkness in Germany 
and Japan rose up on one side, and, on the opposite side, British, American, 
and French modernity was referred to as ‘brilliant hope’ in their 
understanding of history.10          
Under the drastic turn of political and intellectual milieus in post-war 
Japan, Yukio Mochida became a radical leftist activist, left the university before 
graduation, and directly joined political activities at the beginning of the 1950s. It 
                                                       
9  There were two major schools of Marxism in pre-WWII Japan. Koza-ha School, which 
was under the influence of the illegal underground Japan Communist Party and 
Comintern, emphasised that the Meiji Restoration was not a bourgeois revolution, and it 
established an absolutist monarchy with capitalistic development in Japan. It thought of 
this way of development as Japanese Sonderweg. Another school, Rono-ha, had 
relationships with other socialist-labour parties and grasped the Meiji Restoration as a 
typical bourgeois revolution. These two schools had great influence on social sciences and 
historiography in post-war Japan.     
10 Yukio Mochida, Futatsu no Sengo, Futatsu no Kindai: Nihon to Doitsu (Two Post-War 
Ages, Two Modernities: Japan and Germany), Minerva Shobo Publishing, 2009, p.3.  
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was the spring of 1956 when young Mochida came back to lecture rooms and 
began to engage with the preparation for his graduation thesis on the ‘Formation 
of Gutsherrshaft in Germany’. We should take into consideration the fact that 
the political situation and party system in Japan changed drastically in 1955: the 
Liberal Democratic Party was organised, uniting some conservative parties and 
hoisting ‘the establishment of self-made Constitution’ as its urgent (though 
unfulfilled until now) political agenda; Left and Right Socialist Parties were 
reunited into one socialist party (Social Democratic Party of Japan); the Japan 
Communist Party abandoned its extremist adventurous program of violent 
revolution after Khrushchev’s criticism against Stalin at the Twentieth Congress 
of Communist Party of Soviet Union in February 1956, escaped from Soviet and 
Communist China’s influences, and turned into a (permanent opposition) party of 
parliamentary democracy. Recently, one social historian of modern and 
contemporary Japan pointed out that this political reorganisation coincided with 
the turning point of post-war historiography in Japan from the Marxist paradigm 
of ‘general law of development in World History’ to a methodological revision and 
reflection of this paradigm 11 . Since then, Japanese historiography has 
endeavoured to change its viewpoints and methodologies through the acceptance 
of mass society theory and other social scientific ways of thinking, conflicts 
between the old and new left in the student riots in the 1960s, the global regime 
of the Cold War and Vietnam War, and the reception of social history and theory 
of world systems and so on. Y. Mochida’s theoretical departure from Koza-ha 
Marxism was one of these historical turns. 
 
II-3. Professor Mochida’s method of comparative history of Germany 
and Japan   
Professor Mochida claims that he has long been confronted with the dual 
‘position warfare’ against both right and left wings since he returned to historical 
                                                       
11 Masakatsu Okado, ‘Kaidai: Rekisgigaku Kenhyukai no Shogen wo Yamu tameni’, 
Rekishigaku Kenkyukai (ed.) ‘Shogen: Sengo Rekishigaku eno Michi’ (The Historical 
Science Society of Japan (ed.), Testimony: A Way to Post-War Historiography), Aoki Shoten 
Publishing, 2012, p.36. 
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studies: one front criticizes historically both Japan and Germany’s dark pasts, 
which were enfolded with successive wars and anti-democratic regimes until 
1945; the other criticizes the dominant historical thinking about German and 
Japanese modernity that left-liberals including Koza-ha Marxists insisted upon. 
The ultimate goal of his research activities has consistently been configured and 
fixed at the realisation of a ‘peaceful and democratic’ world and Japan. He has 
been motivated to engage with this goal through his own experience of WWII and 
the memory of Fascism and Nazism since his young days. As a former post-war 
left-wing activist, he has shared the sentiments of the ‘Community of Remorse’ 
(Masao Maruyama12) among Japanese intellectuals who reflect upon and regret 
their recent past of militarism and colonialism.  
On the other hand, Professor Mochida has severely criticized the Koza-ha 
Marxist theory of modern history as well as Rono-ha Marxist historians and 
other modernist historians, including the New Kyoto School13. Though he called 
the dominant attitude among post-war Japanese historians ‘Modern History of 
Remorse’, naming it after Maruyama’s formulation, and confessed his own 
emotional sympathy to it, he struggled to escape from its scholarly influence. The 
critical point, according to him, was that all these schools of historians shared the 
idea that revolutionary events in Western Europe (England and France), 
typically the French revolution in 1789, should be regarded as models for, and 
yardsticks by which to measure the normal path of historical development and 
modernity. He emphasised  that historical developments in modern Japan had 
been measured in the light of the standard scales of the Western European model 
by Marxists and modernists, just as German history had been compared and 
judged with the Western model of development (cf. German Sonderweg thesis). 
He argued, however, that both Fascism in Japan and Nazism in Germany should 
not be interpreted and explained by reduction of their political, economic, and 
social backwardness, which were represented on the basis of ‘Western Europe as 
                                                       
12 Masao Maruyama (1914-1996) was the most influential political scientist and liberal 
intellectual in post-war Japan, and a professor at the University of Tokyo.    
13 New Kyoto School: a liberal and modernist school of humanities. The Institute for 
Research in Humanities, Kyoto University, was its centre.  
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a model’. He set up his agenda as a historian in establishing an alternative 
framework for historical thinking of modernity in Germany and Japan against 
the ‘Modern History of Remorse’.  
In the 1960s, Y. Mochida was engaged with the political history of modern 
Germany; his early works addressed disputes on the constitutional regime 
between the Parliament and Bismarck in Prussia. In these works, he established 
his own approaches to political history, in which he rejected the reductionism of 
political processes on economic bases, recognized the former’s comparative 
independence from the latter, and grasped political processes as results or 
functions of struggles between different political powers (groups) and their 
choices at each critical moment. These pragmatic approaches were, of course, a 
novelty for a former Marxist and a challenge against the prevailing dogmatism 
among left wing historians and activists. Concretely, he tried to re-examine the 
thesis that modern Germany was politically and economically backward because 
of the rule by Junkers as a semi-feudal landowning class in Prussia, and he 
demanded to revise the formula that the rise of Nazism was ultimately 
attributable to this backwardness and immature democracy in Germany. The 
cause of Nazism in Germany (and Fascism in Japan), in his opinion, should have 
been investigated not in the backwardness but in the more concrete phases of 
political and social struggles in both states.  
Taking these approaches, Professor Mochida’s academic career proceeded 
from political history to the social history of German militarism (1970s), and to 
the social history of elite education (Gümnasium) and the formation of a 
‘certification / qualification society’ in Germany (1980-90s). His later works 
focused on the history of Gümnasium, university professors, liberal professions, 
and intellectual civil society. Thus, the Junker-centred description of history was 
substituted by the cultural hegemony of citizens who received classical education 
in Gümnasium and professional training in university. This type of elite 
formation was a phenomenon similar to those observed in the public schools of 
England and lycées and grandes écoles of France. The transformation of German 
society was parallel to that of Western Europe, according to this new paradigm. 
He established a new formula of his theoretical framework for investigation: 
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‘From Junkers’ Germany to Bildungsbürgertum’s Germany’. In short, he found 
the social history of education to be a method to overcome the reductionist theory 
on the social structure and dominant ruling classes by Marxists.  
Parallel to these advancements in his research actitvities, Professor 
Mochida continuously published many works (including popular ones) and 
translations on the Holocaust, Nazism, the Neo-Nazi movement, war crimes, and 
war responsibility, and inquired into the methodologies of comparative modern 
and contemporary history of Japan and Germany. His ‘position warfare’ against 
right and left wing political stances was consistently maintained in these works. 
One of his contributions as a historian consists of the popular works for ordinary 
readers in which he discusses these heavy and troublesome topics using the 
vocabulary of everyday language. Though he never wrote a monograph on the 
Holocaust and WWII itself, he directed the investigations of his younger 
colleagues through these translations and popular works.     
We witness a very interesting scene therein, as, on the one hand, the 
formula of ‘the political and economic backwardness of Germany as a cause of 
Nazism’, which was criticized by Y. Mochiada, is at the very core of the Deutsche 
Sonderweg thesis developed by the German School of Social History led by 
Hans-Ulrich Wehler, and, on the other hand, Y. Mochida depended on 
investigations into modern secondary and university education, which historians 
of this School developed. It means that Y. Mochida criticised and tried to 
overcome the German School of Social History by means of the same School’s 
accomplishments on the social history of education.  The key to understanding 
this question is, in his opinion, located in the theoretical similarity and functional 
equivalence between post-war historiography in Japan and the Deutsche 
Sonderweg thesis in Germany. He believes that the authentic post-war 
historiography in Germany easily recurred to the pre-Hitler (Rankean) tradition 
of historical studies and did not take Germany’s responsibility for the war and 
Holocaust into consideration seriously. It was only after the emergence of the 
School of Social History that German historians of new generations began to talk 
about these serious problems, at the end of the 1960s. This means that the 
German School of Social History advocating Deutsche Sonderweg played the 
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same function of self-criticism as the ‘Modern History of Remorse’ had done in 
Japan in the 1950s, prior to the Germans. But, at the same time, some branches 
of the German School of Social History developed another thesis on relationships 
between the educational system and class structure, especially 
Bildungsbürgertum, in Germany. This is the very reason why Y. Mochida could 
rely on the social history of education to overcome the ‘Modern History of 
Remorse’ in Japan (hence the Sonderweg thesis in Germany).   
 
II-4 Limitations of a comparison between Germany and Japan 
Professor Mochida’s approaches include some difficulties as well as 
possibilities. These approaches have already brought many important insights 
and contributions not only to the history of education but also to educational 
sciences, resonating with sociological studies of education (e.g. Pierre Bourdieu 
and his successors). They may imply the theoretical potential to criticise 
Euro-Centrism based on English-French modernisation models (hence the 
admiration of western liberal democracy). On the other hand, his scope of views 
has been inevitably framed and confined by the Cold War regime because of his 
time of apprentice as a historian, and limited to the scope of historiography in 
West Germany. He has failed or avoided to settle the experiences of dictatorship 
in East Germany and socialism in his conceptualisation of German history as a 
whole. His comparative history of Germany and Japan has been based on the 
national history of both countries, and constructed apart from CEE (Timothy 
Snyder’s ‘Bloodlands’) and East Asian contexts, into which these two nations 
were respectively embedded. Therefore, in spite of his acute insights on the 
comparison between modern Germany and Japan, his discussion inclines to get 
involved in the norm of ‘(West) Germany’s Vergangenheitsbewältigung as 
remorse for tragic events in the recent past and Japan’s lack of repentance for its 
own responsibility and guilt’ scheme. The scheme itself, as I referred to above, 
has never lost its moral significance for the Japanese political situation, and so 
we cannot merge it into the background. But as a historical perception, it seems 
to become antiquated and lose its appropriateness in the post-Cold War period. 
As a historian of Russia and Baltic countries, I am aware of the recent tendency 
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of CEE and Baltic countries to refuse to accept the ‘myth’ of German 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung based on the thesis of Nazi and Holocaust crimes as 
the sole and incomparable evil against humanity. They are challenging the 
dominant historical narratives of WWII in Western Europe and demanding they 
be reorganised, pointing out Soviet and communist crimes as the bigger evil. 
Their challenge is to sway the fundamental prerequisite on which the 
comparison between Japan and Germany was established. Therefore, the 
comparison between Japan and Germany should be, in my opinion, consciously 
re-examined and reconfirmed, taking their geopolitical and historical contexts 
and preconditions of East Asia and East-Central Europe into consideration. Thus 
in the next part, I will pick up some topics in East Asia that deserve comparison 
with experiences in CEE countries.    
 
III Perspectives for comparison: CEE and East Asian contexts 
III-1 Differences as prerequisites for comparison  
If we try to enlarge the scope of comparison, from between Germany and 
Japan to between CEE and Eastern Asia, we need to discern some common 
features between these two regions. If there were no common situations and 
characters between them, the comparison itself would be meaningless. In fact, we 
can find the similarities in two phases: the history of World War II and 
occupation, and the regime transition from dictatorship to democracy as the 
prerequisites for history and memory politics since the 1990s. 
Of course, there are some fundamental differences between the historical 
contexts of eastern parts of Europe and those of East Asia. At first, most of East 
and Southeast Asian nations (except for China, Mongolia, and Thailand) 
remained under colonial rule by great European and American imperialistic 
(though liberal-democratic!) powers and the ‘Empire of Japan’ in the interbellum 
period. In China, some rival military cliques established local governmental 
authorities, and the dominant influence of the National Government over all its 
territory could not prevail. The north-eastern part of China (Manchuria) was 
occupied by the Japanese army, and a puppet (semi-colonial) government was 
founded in 1932 by Japanese occupiers with the last emperor of the Qing dynasty 
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as its state head (then emperor). In contrast to this, CEE countries had gained 
independence from Russian, Habsburg, and Ottoman imperial rule under the 
Versailles regime and their independence was maintained until German and 
Soviet annexation and occupation. These are fundamental differences that 
should be taken into consideration, comparing CEE and Asia. But, at the same 
time, German invasion into CEE countries and the Japanese occupation and 
colonisation of East Asia shared common logic for their legitimacy, that is, the 
direct relationship between German occupational policies and the Japanese 
concept of ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Dai Toa Kyoeiken in 
Japanese)’ in the period of WWII. According to the recent work on this concept, 
the latter was not only stimulated by the Nazi-German ideology of Lebensraum, 
it originated with Japanese bureaucrats through their negotiations with 
Germany and Italy on the Tripartite Pact in order to exclude the possibility that 
a victorious Nazi-Germany might reorganise European colonies in Southeast 
Asia14. Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan were mutually facilitating and 
restraining each other’s imperialistic strategies.  
Another difference between these two regions was how the Cold War 
regime was constructed and experienced in Europe and in East Asia. As is well 
known, the Cold War regime in Asia was never confined to a ‘Cold’ one, but 
turned into ‘Hot Wars’ on the Korean Peninsula, Vietnam, and so on. 
International relationships and cross-national structures completely differed 
between Europe and Asia; regional integration on the basis of liberal democracy 
and market economy was pursued and progressed in the western part of Europe 
soon after the war, and, on the opposite side, the eastern part constituted the 
communist block under Soviet intervention and coercion. On the contrary, 
colonial rule by great Western powers was restored and maintained in Southeast 
Asia for a while after the defeat of Japan, and it was only after the successive 
liberation movements and wars against colonial powers that these Southeast 
                                                       
14 Kosuke Kawanishi, “‘Dokuritsu’ Koku to yu ‘Shikkoku’ (A ‘yoke’ to be an ‘independent’ 
nation)”, in Goto et al., ibid., p.349-350. Kosuke Kawanishi, Teikoku Nihon no Kakucho to 
Hokai: ‘Dai Toa Kyoeiken’ heno Rekishiteki Tenkai’ (Expansion and Collapse of Imperial 
Japan: Historical Perspective to ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’), Hosei 
University Press, 2012, chap.5.  
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Asian nations gained independence. Most of these newly independent states 
became authoritarian and militant developmental dictatorships under the 
auspices of the liberal-democratic United States of America. Meanwhile, Chinese, 
Vietnamese, and Korean nations that came out from under Japanese 
colonisation and occupation were divided into two hostile parallel states, 
communist states on one side, and developmental dictatorships on the other. 
Though some of these new states concluded friendship pacts with the USSR and 
were supported by the latter economically and politically, Asian socialist states 
had a different character form Eastern European ones. It is noteworthy that they 
have kept their outward socialist regime even after the collapse of the USSR, 
having transited to a market economy system under the dictatorial rule of a 
communist party15. It is very suggestive that not only Asian socialist states but 
also capitalist states under the auspices of the USA adopted an authoritarian 
dictatorship as their political regime after gaining independence. This means 
that the structure of the Cold War in Asia never coincided with the axis of 
confrontation between illiberal non-democratic socialism and liberal democracy. 
It is worthwhile recalling that Hungarian exile thinkers of critical Marxism such 
as F. Fehér, A. Heller, and G. Márkus called North Korea an identical twin 
brother of its Southern counterpart on the Peninsula because of its explicit 
disregard of human rights and very solid hierarchy16 at the beginning of the 
1980s. South Korea had not yet accomplished its democratising revolution at that 
time.       
Finally, the different ways of constructing the Cold War regime brought 
about dissimilar ways of its closure in eastern and western parts of the Eurasian 
Continent. As mentioned above, Asian socialist states have retained their 
existence with many capitalist adjustments and reforms, while Soviet and East 
European socialist states have fully vanished and turned into capitalist ones. 
                                                       
15 It is a very difficult question if we can call the regime of North Korea a communist or 
socialist one. Dictatorship in North Korea has its own background theory/ideology (Juche), 
which is officially likened to Marxism-Leninism originally developed by Kim Il-sung but 
seems to have its own Asian or Korean origin.       
16 Cf., Fehér, A. Heller and G. Márkus, Dictatorship over Needs, Basil Blackwell, 1983.  
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Some of the parallel states divided under the Cold War in Asia are surviving and 
causing regional strains even in the twenty first century, while East Germany 
was incorporated into its western counterpart, and a united Germany has come 
into a position of leadership in an integrated Europe. Although various schemes 
of regional integration in East Asia (East Asian Community) had often been 
proposed and discussed under the influence of a successful European integration 
until some years ago, they lacked concrete perspectives, and today there seems to 
be no possibility of their realisation in the near future. Rather, political conflicts 
are actualised and hampering economic integration. The post-Cold War regimes 
in Asia and Europe seem to differ from each other fundamentally. 
In spite of these differences, we can discern common or similar events and 
historical developments between CEE and East Asia. In this section, I will pick 
up some remarkable topics on East Asia that indicate any similarities or 
commonness with CEE nations, and will show the possibility of comparison.   
        
III-2 Experience of war, occupation, and colonisation 
a. Forced labour and exploitation    
Forced labour in German enterprises, commandeering for military service, 
and collaboration with the Nazi regime in territories occupied by Nazi Germany 
have been topics of heated argument in Europe since the 1990s. The German 
government and companies that had profited from forced labour established the 
‘Remembrance, Responsibility and Future’ Foundation and began to compensate 
individual victims who had been obliged to migrate from occupied CEE countries 
and engage in forced labour in Germany and other places. The Nazi 
administration in occupied territories utilised local inhabitants for Hilfspolizei 
(auxiliary police) and other security forces, and not a few citizens of occupied 
countries voluntarily or compulsorily joined the Waffen SS and other German 
military units. War crimes and crimes against humanity of these collaborators 
have been acutely argued in these years. 
As Małgorzata Pakier and Bo Stråth  have accurately pointed out, the 
question of collaboration could ‘be posed for the experiences of Nazism and the 
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Second World War and for the experiences of colonialism and imperialism’.17 As 
their discussion focused just on European experiences of WWII, the Holocaust, 
communism, and colonialism, they did not refer to East Asian experiences of war, 
colonialism, and imperialism. Asian experiences, nevertheless, are appropriate to 
their points. Many Korean and Chinese labourers were compelled to come to 
Japan, including Sakhalin and other northern Islands, and work at factories and 
mines. According to my elderly mother’s memory, Korean women workers 
laboured at my grandfather’s small textile factory in the northern part of Kyoto 
Province in the 1930s and 1940s. The Oeyama Nickel Mine functioned nearby his 
factory, and it was famous for using forced labour of not only Chinese and Korean 
workers, who had been deported from the Continent and Korean Peninsula18, but 
also POWs captured in Southeast Asia19.  
As this example of my family’s factory and the mine in Kyoto Province 
distinctly show us, forced labourers who had been deported from colonial Korea, 
Taiwan, and occupied regions in China were widely observed and became the 
norm in the interbellum and wartime Japan, as was also the case of 
Ost-Arbieters in Germany. The usage of forced labour aimed at complementing 
the shortage of Japanese labour forces that resulted from excessive military 
mobilisation and commandeering in the Japanese homeland. The number of 
Chinese deportees who were brought to Japan was estimated at about 40,000 
persons, of which more than 6,000 died from cruel treatment.  
In occupied Southeast Asia (the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, Indonesia, 
and so on) also, the Japanese military government utilised local labour forces and 
POWs for military constructions and the production of food and dairy necessities. 
                                                       
17 Małgorzata Pakier and Bo Stråth (eds.), A European Memory: Contested Histories and 
Politics of Remembrance, Berghahn Books, 2010, p.11. 
18 Some former Chinese labourers demanded from the Japanese government and Nippon 
Yakin Industrial Company an apology and compensation through the Japanese Court in 
1998. Plaintiffs reconciled with the company in 2005, obeying the court’s recommendation, 
but the Japanese government refused this and the Supreme Court rejected the accusation 
against the government at the end of 2007. 
19 Cf. Frank Evans, Roll Call at Oeyama: P.O.W. Remembers, J.D. Lewis and Sons, 1985. It 
is said that most POWs in Oeyama were survivors from the well-known Bataan Death 
March.    
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According to the ‘The Procedure of Administration in Occupied Regions in the 
South’ decided by the Imperial Headquarters and the Cabinet of Japan in 1941, 
occupied regions should have been utilised for ‘the acquisition of military 
resources and the achievement of self-support by occupation troops’, and the 
military government should have ‘let [inhabitants] endure the inevitable heavy 
pressure of civil life and welfare’20. Colonial and occupational administrators of 
Japan exercised coercive powers for procuring labour forces in the regions under 
the Japanese military government. The experiences in Vietnam were noteworthy, 
because Indochina under French colonial rule was governed jointly by France 
and Japan after the Vichy government was established in France. The reason 
why Japan did not directly occupy Vietnam was because of the expectation of 
support from the pro-German Vichy government for Japanese military actions 
and the acquisition of natural resources. Under the joint governance, Vietnam 
was exploited thoroughly of its food and natural resources, which provoked the 
tragic great famine in 1944 and 1945 through the coercive forage of rice and the 
decrease of food production resulting from the demand for the military usages. 
The number of victims was estimated at over one million21.  
b. Commandeering for military service 
As Nazi-Germany mobilised the inhabitants of occupied territories for 
security and military actions and organised them into Nazi ethnic/national 
military units (foreign legions of Waffen SS, Police Battalions, and so on), 
Japanese colonial and occupational administrations utilised local inhabitants for 
the same purposes in various ways.  
     At first, the Japanese colonial administration was negative towards the 
utilisation of Koreans and inhabitants of Taiwan for military aims. It was only in 
1943 in the midst of the Pacific War that compulsory conscription of Koreans to 
the Japanese army and navy was introduced. In Taiwan, conscription was 
established at the last stage of the war in January 1945. This meant that Japan 
                                                       
20 JACAR. Ref.B02032867900 (A-7-0-291) // http://www.jacar.go.jp/DAS/meta/listPhoto 
21 Motoo Furuta, Betonamu no Sekai Shi: Chuka Sekai kara Tonan Azia Shi he (World 
History of Vietnam: From Sinocentric World to Southeast Asia), University of Tokyo Press, 
1995, pp.121-126.  
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was obliged to change its strategy in terms of the conditions of ‘total war’ and 
general mobilisation, especially because of the worsening situation of war and the 
deficit of military personnel. The reason for the initial cautious attitudes to 
compulsory conscription in colonial territories was the Japanese establishment’s 
anxiety about the armament of colonised nations, especially the possibility of an 
armed insurgency against the colonial government and Japan. Incidentally, it is 
very interesting that Okinawa (islands in Southwest Japan), which had been 
incorporated into the Empire of Japan soon after Meiji Ishin, was the only 
province in which the Japanese army never stationed any fortress nor 
permanent army troops until the beginning of the Pacific War in December 
194122. This indicates Okinawa’s peculiar position as an inner colony of the 
Empire, which remains as such into the twenty first century. As is well known, a 
great number of bases of American military forces and their massive troops are 
located in Okinawa, and local inhabitants’ burdens and sufferings because of 
them are infinitely greater than in other provinces.     
One of the most tragic stories of military mobilisation in colonies and 
occupied territories was the fate of Korean criminals of war of class-B and C, who 
were sentenced to the death penalty23. Many Korean soldiers that were 
conscripted to the Japanese army and assigned to its POW camps as prison 
guards were often accused of alleged violent and cruel treatment of POWs in 
Southeast Asia after the end of the war. They did not receive any training on 
international law for the treatment of POWs, and they themselves were violated 
and abused in their troops, as Koreans were situated at the lowest layer of the 
Japanese army24. Therefore, they had no knowledge of any of the necessary 
                                                       
22 Takaoka Hiroyuki and N. Hashimoto, Tokushu ni Atatte: Kenihisuberuku kara 
Kariningurado e (Introduction to a Speicl Edition ‘From Königsberg to Kaliningrad’), 
Russian Eurasian Economy & Society, No.948, 2011, p.4.  
23 148 Koreans were judged as class-B and C war criminals, and 23 of them were sentenced 
to the death penalty. Aiko Utsumi, Kimu wa Naze Sabakareta noka: Chosen Jin B C Kyu 
Senpan no Kiseki (Why Kim was Judged: the Locus of Korean War Criminals of Class-B 
and C), Asahi Shinbun Publishing, 2008, pp.6-9. The numbers of criminals sentenced to the 
death penalty were different in various materials.   
24 Discrimination against Korean soldiers of the Japanese army remained in the post-war 
era. While former Japanese soldiers including war criminals of class- B and C were 
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concepts concerning the treatment of POWs and, in fact, sometimes violated the 
international norm, just as their Japanese counterparts did. This was the reason 
why they were executed by the tribunal. The very complex and delicate problem 
here is whether they were victims of colonial rule by Japan, or collaborators with 
Japanese war criminals In 2004, a governmental commission of South Korea 
recognised all the former Korean criminals of war of class-B and C as ‘victims of 
coercive mobilisation’ and restored their honours nearly 60 years after their 
executions. In spite of the rehabilitation of these war criminals, some Koreans 
who fought as soldiers for the Japanese army are still met with severe disgust 
and criticism. When some Japanese erected a monument for mourning and 
praising Korean soldiers of ‘Kamikaze Tokko Tai’, who had died in suicide 
attacks to American floats, and tried to hold an unveiling ceremony in 2008, local 
inhabitants protested it and the monument was removed. Though they 
recognized the soldiers of suicide attack units as ‘victims of war’, leaders of the 
local opposition campaign pointed out, ‘We cannot accept the memorial for 
persons who pledged and exerted absolute loyalty to Tenno (Emperor of Japan)’. 
Though their criticism was mainly directed toward the imprudent (apparently 
post-colonial) behaviour behind the goal to ‘re-establish Japanese soul and spirit 
in South Korea’ through the monument, local attitudes against their 
compatriots-collaborators seem very sensitive and include both hatred and 
compunction. 
c. Collaboration and nationalist liberation movements 
As was the case in territories occupied by Nazi Germany in Europe, 
collaboration with the colonial and occupational administration of Japan 
prevailed all over territories where Japan established colonial and occupational 
rule. As the colonial administration and business activities of Japanese 
                                                                                                                                    
financially compensated and supported by the government for their sufferings in the war, 
Koreans jailed in Sugamo Prison in Tokyo as war criminals of the Japanese army were 
refused the same support. The reason was that they lost their citizenship of Japan 
automatically when Japan recovered its independence and recognized the independence of 
Korea at the effectuation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. This means that persons who 
were accused as Japanese citizens were deprived of their legal rights because they were not 
actually Japanese citizens. Cf., Utsumi, op. cit. chapter 7.    
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enterprises offered occasions for bureaucratic promotion and economic profits for 
local elites in Korea and Taiwan, not a few people voluntarily and positively tried 
to collaborate with colonial rulers, sharing the imperialistic ambition of Japan. 
Others, including the above-mentioned war criminals, were obliged to obey 
oppressive colonialist policies, and were unwillingly involved in the general 
mobilisation for wars25.  
Collaboration with the imperialistic strategies and military operations of 
Japan in East and Southeast Asia brought very troublesome questions not only 
to the pro-Japanese ‘puppet’ local government in China (Ex. Wang Jingwei 
regime in Nanjing), but also to national liberation movements in Southeast Asia 
under Western colonial rule. This is because Japan heralded the liberation of 
Asian nations from Western imperialism and colonialism, unification of Asia 
under Japanese leadership (Hakko Ichiu in Japanese, which means literally ‘the 
whole world under one roof’), and the formation of the Greater East Asia 
Co-Prosperity Sphere (Dai Toa Kyoeiken) as the general cause for its military 
actions. In fact, the Japanese government that was proud of its mission as 
liberator and leader of Asian nations sometimes promised and promoted the 
‘independence’ of some Asian nations (José Paciano Laurel’s Republic of the 
Philippines, Ba Maw’s State of Burma, Chandra Bose’s Free India, and so on) 
under its military auspices and patronage. In fact, some leaders of nationalist 
liberation movements shared or outwardly accepted the Ideology of (Pan-) 
Asianism26 that was raised and developed in pre-war Japan, and they supported 
                                                       
25 According to Prof. Takeshi Fujinaga, a neoconservative and historical revisionist trend of 
New Rights in South Korea exaggerates that all Koreans (except for a small number of 
anti-Japanese fighters) that inhabited the colonial Korean Peninsula supported Japanese 
colonial rule and justified it, obeying it even though passively. According to their opinion, 
the very fact that he/she was a citizen (more precisely, a subject) of the Empire of Japan 
was a pro-Japan act, and, therefore, it is meaningless to question the responsibility of 
pro-Japan collaborators. Takeshi Fujinaga, Kankoku ni okeru ‘Shinnichi’ Seisan Mondai no 
Iso (Phases of problems of coming to terms with ‘pro-Japanese actions’ in South Korea), 
Rekishigaku Kenkyu (Journal of Historical Studies), No.872, 2010, p.17.  
26 This ideology had been elaborated in modern Japan since the Meiji era, and it influenced 
the expansionist and hegemonist project of Dai Toa Kyoeiken, which was based on the 
principle that it denied the absoluteness and equality of the sovereignty of independent 
states, and that international relationships in East Asia should be composed of Japan as a 
leading state and other subordinate states disposed hierarchically. It is pointed out that 
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Japan’s military actions in their lands in anticipation of the regression of 
Western colonial powers and realisation of their own independence. In 1943, for 
example, Japan proclaimed a decree on the organisation of the volunteer corps of 
Indonesians, and more than 40,000 persons applied to it. The Indonesians found 
a way to achieve national independence from Dutch colonial rule through 
collaboration with Japan, and responded positively to the decree. The Japanese 
army trained them and taught them the usage of weapons. These volunteers 
became the main force for the Independent War in Indonesia against the 
Netherlands after the end of WWII. The joint front of Japanese imperialist and 
Indonesian nationalist movements against western powers was established. 
These instances remind us of ‘independent’ Slovakia and Croatia under Nazi’s 
patronage, or the state projects of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists. 
On the other hand, nationalist movements in Asia diverged into some 
confrontational tendencies, and they were never unified to the pro-Japanese 
coalition. Anti-Japan campaigns and battles by Asian communist groups were 
organized not only in China and the Korean Peninsula27, but also in Southeast 
Asia. Some groups chose to struggle together with colonialist suzerain states 
against Japan and organise guerilla operations. Pro-Japan nationalists also 
turned anti-Japanese as soon as the violent, cruel nature of Japanese 
occupational rule was exposed to them and the strategic situations of the 
Japanese army worsened. Their military activities turned into an armed struggle 
for national liberation against colonial rulers, even while accompanied by their 
internal conflicts and battles among nationalists, as soon as Japan was defeated 
                                                                                                                                    
though this project was influenced by the imperialistic block economy of Western states 
and Lebensraum of Nazi-Germany, it coincided with the tributary state system in 
pre-modern East Asia. Cf. Shn’ichi Yamamuro, Shisou Kadai to shite no Azia: Kijiku, 
Rensa, Toki (Asia as a Project of Thoughts/Ideology: Axis, Links and Projections), Iwanami 
Shoten Publishing, 2001, p.611.             
27 The Far eastern region of Russia was one of the important bases for the anti-Japanese 
movements of Koreans since the Russo-Japanese war and the incorporation of Korea into 
the Empire of Japan (1910), and many Koreans who disliked Japanese colonial rule 
emigrated there. It is noteworthy that Koreans in the Russian Far East including Korean 
communists were deported to Central Asia in 1937, prior to the deportation of other 
national groups including Baltic peoples. About the deportation of Koreans, see, for 
example, Анатолий Тимофеевич Кузин Дальневосточные корейцы: Жизни и трагедия 
судьбы. 1993.            
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by the Allied Powers. The implications of collaboration and resistance were very 
complicated and variable according to the situations, as Professor Ken’ichi Goto 
has pointed out: 
It is not easy to generalise the various attitudes and responses of nationalist 
leaders in Southeast Asia toward the idea of the ‘liberation of Asia’ 
proclaimed by Japan, as they were differentiated and diverged into some 
paths according to previous policies of the nationalist movements in each 
region, colonial policies of their suzerain states, past relationships with 
Japan, and so on. Nevertheless, some nationalist leaders of Eastern Asia 
found an agenda in terms of how they should utilise the energies of Japan in 
a southward advance as tools to drive wedges in the solid colonial rule [of 
western powers]. Speaking in a simplified manner, their political and 
psychological distances from Japan proclaiming the ‘liberation of Asia’ were 
dependent on whether they 1) kept ‘independence’ as the greatest goal of 
nationalist movements (in the case of Thailand), 2) acquired promises on 
‘independence’ or ‘autonomy’ from suzerain states (in the case of the 
Philippines and Burma), or whether 3) national independence or autonomy 
was a faraway dream. On the contrary, their distances from Japan 
influenced the measures of Japan toward the regions of Southeast Asia. 
They were bidirectional and interactive. 28                    
These considerations have made dubious the simplified binary formula of 
WWII as ‘the war of the anti-fascist coalition (the Allied Powers) against the 
Fascist Axis’ that was prescribed in the Atlantic Charter and proclaimed in 
Western Europe and Russia (Soviet Union). We need the more prudent way of 
thinking that enables a revision of the formula, and a disclosure of the 
contradictory complex features of WWII. At least in an Asian context, the binary 
scheme should be replaced by a multiple scheme consisting of Fascist Japan as a 
colonial and occupational power, anti-fascist Allied Powers, in which dichotomous 
                                                       
28 Ken’ichi Goto et al. (eds.), Iwanami Koza: Higashi Azia Kingendai Tsushi (Iwanami 
Lecture Series: Modern and Contemporary History of Eastern Asia), vol.6, Iwanami Shoten 
Publishing, 2011, p.25.  
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features of colonialist-imperialist powers equivalent to Japan and liberal 
democratic ones coexisted, and several (sometimes hostile to each other) 
tendencies of nationalist liberation movements. This complexity of the Asian 
context of WWII is one of the reasons why history and memory conflicts occurred 
and accelerated in East Asia. If we refer to experiences of CEE nations and the 
existence of the Soviet Union as well as Asian experiences, the scheme should be 
more complicated and elaborated upon further and further: the composition and 
character of WWII in the ‘Bloodlands’ was as entangled as in Asia.      
      
III-3 Regime transition in CEE states and the democratisation of 
authoritarian dictatorships in Asia 
Another dimension of comparison between CEE and East Asia is their 
tremendous political and economic transformations in these decades. If we agree 
with the following statement by Tony Judt on the discontinuation and 
transformation in Europe between the periods before and after 1989 as 
prerequisites for changing representations of the recent past, we should look for 
the parallel process of transformation in Asia, equivalent to the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, to understand the causes of aggravated history and memory conflicts: 
The revolutions of 1989 have forced open the east European past, just as the 
historiographical transformations in the West have removed decades-long 
taboos on parts of wartime memory. There will be infinite revisions and 
re-interpretations, but the recent past will never look the same again, 
anywhere. 29 
Just as historical perception and memories frozen under the Cold War 
were defrosted in CEE countries after the Eastern European revolution in 1989 
and the collapse of the USSR, the history and memory landscape in Asia also has 
been transformed on a large scale against a backdrop of political democratisation 
and/or economic growth in various countries of this region.       
                                                       
29 Tony Judt, The past is another country: myth and memory on post-war Europe, 
Jan-Werner Müller (ed.), Memory & Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of 
the Past, Cambridge University Pree, 2002, p.179. 
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The democratisation and breakaway from the developmental dictatorship 
of Asian countries began in the second half of the 1980s, prior to democratic 
revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989: in the Philippines, the revolution broke 
out at the moment of the Presidential election in 1986, when Corazón Aquino 
superseded Ferdinand Marcos, the dictatorial President who had proclaimed 
Marshal Law and suspended the Constitution with support from officers of the 
National Force. The revolution in the Philippines soon stimulated the 
democratisation of South Korea. Korean civil society organised a large-scale 
demonstration against prolonged military governments30 with the participation 
of a million citizens in June 1987, which made Chun Doo-hwan resign from the 
presidency; in Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui, who succeeded the Presidency of the 
Republic of China (Taiwan) from Chiang Ching-kuo, a son of Chiang Kai-shek, 
commenced a democratisation and ‘Taiwanisation’ movement. Though political 
democratisation, which should have been parallel to economic reform in the 
Peoples’ Republic of China, was at a standstill after the Tiananmen Square 
protests of 1989, and such dictatorial states as North Korea and Burma retained 
their authoritarian rule, the political situation in East and Southeast Asia 
changed completely. The United States changed its strategic attitude from 
supporting military dictatorships toward admitting and rather facilitating 
democratisation in Asia. The most remarkable change was the striking growth of 
the Chinese economy; it became the second largest economic power in the world 
in 2010. The splendid growth of the Chinese economy marginalised the Japanese 
economy among global markets, and it has provoked the inward attitudes and 
loss of self-confidence among Japanese politicians and ordinary people that 
became the basic elements for the escalation of hollow nationalistic bravado.        
The synchronicity of revolutionary upheaval both in East Europe and East 
Asia is noteworthy for a comparative analysis between these two regions. Even 
though Eastern European revolutions and the collapse of the Soviet Union were 
definitely significant for European viewpoints of historical inquiry, this very 
                                                       
30  The fact that many dictatorial rulers of these governments were trained for officership in 
the Japanese Cadet Corps or military schools before WWII and hold pro-Japanese 
sentiments is noteworthy. 
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synchronicity deserves our attention from the viewpoint of comparison, and 
moreover, from the perspective of global history31.                 
     Just as the democratic revolution in 1989 defrosted and liberated 
contemporary histories and memories in CEE countries, hidden histories and 
repressed memories in East Asia burst out from the storehouse of past events 
that had been sealed by dictatorial regimes, and they swayed the representation 
of the past and ‘historical truth’ that had been stabilised under the Cold War. The 
most symbolic event that impressed upon us the changing situation in East Asia 
was the revelation by Kim Hak-sun of her own experiences and sufferings as a 
former Korean ‘comfort woman’ in 1991. Growing civil societies and especially 
feminist movements in South Korea and Japan have supported former ‘comfort 
women’ and organised activities to protest and condemn the Japanese 
government, and have continued until now. As mentioned above, compensation 
for individual (personal) sufferings from colonial rule and military actions began 
to be demanded by victims and their descendants in Korea and China. Japanese 
detainees in Siberia who had been exploited for forced labour under the Stalinist 
regime also began to publicly demand the Japanese government for 
compensations for their tragic fate in post-war Siberia. Though the Japanese 
government has insistently refused all of their demands, administrative 
litigations for official apologies and compensation have been repeatedly 
submitted to the Courts in Japan and China. We should pay attention to the fact 
that demands for official compensation for forced labourers from colonies and 
occupied regions began to be brought forward almost simultaneously in the 1990s 
in both CEE countries and East Asia, though the fact is often overlooked in 
Japan because of the idealisation of German experiences of 
‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung’. Since the end of the twentieth century, the 
existence of hidden victims became known, and their earnest voices for apology, 
compensation, and restoration of human dignity came to echo loudly not only in 
                                                       
31 Although a series of democratisations in South America and South Africa should most 
likely have been included in the list of this synchronicity, it is beyond the scope of this 
presentation and my competence to detail them. Such topics as transitional justice and 
Truth-reconciliation Commissions in these regions and countries seem very important for 
our theme.       
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CEE countries but also in East Asia. This tendency coincided with similar 
movements for apologies and compensation in other areas all over the world32.    
In democratised Korea, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and 
other governmental commissions investigating historical events and memories of 
the recent past have been established, and its government legislated laws for the 
interrogation of crimes and compensation for victims. Notably enough, these 
commissions dealt with not only events of injustice and collaborators under 
Japanese colonial rule, but also events of the Korean War and political crimes by 
the post-war dictatorial regime in South Korea. These commissions’ activities, 
especially the examinations of pro-Japanese collaborators’ crimes and 
responsibilities, have provoked domestic disputes and conflicts in South Korea, 
and they were over-politicised and turned into an issue of factional struggles 
between opposite political parties, as pro-Japan politicians and bureaucrats had 
been dominant in the post-war dictatorship of South Korea, and right-wing 
politicians disliked clarifying the truth of the past dictatorship. History and 
memory conflicts and disputes are international and, at the same time, domestic 
in Korea (and Japan), too.  
The Japanese governments of the 1990s seemed to grope for adequate 
ways to respond to these trends. They tried to hand Prime Ministers’ letters and 
‘gifts of money’ in order to produce moral apologies for ‘comfort women’ in the 
Philippines, Indonesia, the Netherlands, Taiwan, and South Korea, 
endeavouring to cautiously avoid contradictions to the fundamental political 
(bureaucratic?) principle that Japan as a state was not burdened with any legal 
obligation to officially compensate any individual victims of war and other 
political crimes of the state except former Japanese officers and soldiers33. In 
                                                       
32 Cf., John Torpey, Making Whole What Has Been Smashed: On Reparations Politics, 
Harvard University Press, 2006.    
33 The Japanese government insists on its official standpoint that the individual (personal) 
rights of citizens of China and South Korea to demand official compensation from the 
Japanese government vanished, when interstate treaties on diplomatic relations were 
concluded between these states. Because of this attitude of the Japanese government, the 
majority of former ‘comfort women’ in South Korea rejected receiving ‘gifts of money for 
moral apology’. In fact, the governments of China and Korea abandoned their rights to 
claim interstate compensation from Japan in these treaties. The disputable point is 
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1995, Tomiichi Murayama, Prime Minister of a short-lived coalition cabinet of 
Social Democrats and Liberal Democrats, published a statement of apology on 
colonial rule, military aggression, and occupation of neighbouring nations at the 
50th anniversary of the end of the Pacific War. These acts provoked fierce 
criticism from rightist political forces, and it seems that these events have 
accelerated an aggressive rightist turn in Japanese politics. Since then, the 
influence of historical revisionists who demand a withdrawal of the apology to 
‘comfort women’ and neighbouring nations, and try to justify past colonisation 
and wars by the Empire of Japan, seems to have become stronger and stronger. 
In fact, the Japanese governments of the first half of 1990s also acknowledged 
the changes in history and memory politics that democratisation in East Asia 
and the end of the Cold War had brought to international relationships, and tried 
to more or less engage in new global trends of ‘politics of apology, compensation, 
and reconciliation’. However, they failed to accomplish their aim of improving 
relationships with neighbouring countries and forming domestic agreements on 
the responsibility of the state and the public for past events of wars and violation 
of human rights, because of the national political culture and increasing inward 
attitudes among ordinary people. Civil society in Japan seems to be split into 
segments concerning the histories and memories of recent past events; the 
comparative majority of aggressive nationalists who supported the present 
government with rightist inclinations, minority groups that face up to crimes in 
the recent past and hope for good relationship with neighbouring nations, and 
the overwhelmingly majority of indifferent or passive supporters of nationalist 
sentiments who are interested only in the economic growth of Japan and hope to 
recover the pride of global economic power. 
    
Conclusion 
The majority of professional historians and critical intellectuals who are 
                                                                                                                                    
whether or not the abandonment of right for claims by states at the same time includes the 
abandonment of individual rights of their citizens. Besides this, as mentioned above, 
soldiers from colonial Korea and Taiwan were excluded from the objects of compensation 
given to former Japanese soldiers and officers, as they had lost Japanese citizenship at the 
moment of its recovery of independence.       
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engaged in the contemporary history of Asia and Japan has tried to investigate 
and clarify the historical facts of our recent past on the basis of the academic 
procedure of identifying documental materials and testimonies of perpetrators, 
victims, and witnesses. Nevertheless, their works have been of little account in 
politics or, in worse cases, attacked violently by rightist politicians, and these 
historians and intellectuals have had a very weak influence among public 
spheres in mass society. In this context, historians, intellectuals, and activists 
have often referred to German experiences of ‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung’ and 
tried to throw contrasts between Germany and Japan into relief. It is along with 
this context that the representation of Germany as a model for Japanese politics 
and the (misleading) formula of ‘dialogue and reconciliation in Europe / hostility 
and confrontation in Asia’ have been constructed. Professor Mochida’s historical 
works, to which I referred in this presentation, have tried to correct and elaborate 
upon this contrast, rejecting the oversimplified mythicisation of German 
experiences. 
Professor Mochida has tried to discuss the problem of war and post-war 
responsibilities in a comparative way through a historical analysis between 
Germany and Japan on the basis of the West German framework of thinking 
since the 1970s, cautiously avoiding the reductionist temptation to find the 
origins of evils in the fatal backwardness and immaturity of each nation. He has 
tried to settle the focus of his comparison on historical conditions and the concrete 
developments at each critical moment from the standpoint of the perpetrating 
(German and Japanese) nations in WWII. His works have brought valuable 
(although less influential) knowledge to the Japanese public and inspired 
younger generations of historians. However, his scope and style of thinking were 
confined by the historiography of West Germany under the Cold War, and, 
therefore, is less adequate when applied to the renewed circumstances of the 
post-Cold War period.        
Opposite to this, our comparative framework of CEE and East Asian 
countries aims to consider how people in both areas, including German and 
Japanese people, who were either coercively or voluntarily involved in 
colonisation and warfare by Hitler’s Germany, Stalin’s Soviet Union, Imperial 
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Japan, and the Western Powers, responded to the situation before, in the midst 
of, and after WWII. We also try to grasp how they are reorganising and rewriting 
their histories and memories of the recent past in the renewed circumstances 
after the process of democratisation and regime transitions. In other words, we 
try to write a comparative history of lands and peoples that experienced 
colonisation, occupation, and war. From this perspective, perpetrator-hood 
(accopmplice-hood) and victimhood overlap and are interchangeable. Simplified 
binary formulas such as evil and good, Axis and Allied, Fascist and Democrat are 
challenged and replaced by more complicated and puzzling compositions of 
several forces. It is noteworthy that a simplified binary formula is often 
politicised, and utilised as the medium to distinguish ‘we’ and ‘they’, ‘friends’ and 
‘enemy’, and to exclude ‘them’.    
These two approaches are most likely not exclusive of each other, but 
rather complementary. They should be articulated to each other and 
incorporated into one greater paradigm of inquiry of contemporary history, in 
which we are able to re-examine and re-evaluate the complex composition of 
meanings of WWII. Then, it is important to cautiously reject any deterioration 
into a historical revisionist way of thinking and wrong value relativism, which 
might become indulgent of past evils. Our consideration is only a first step in 
establishing a new framework and approach for investigating experiences of 
WWII and post-WWII world history from the viewpoint of historiography in 
Japan. 
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[Comments and Discussions] 
 
History and Memory Conflicts : 
 A Comparison of Germany and Japan to the 
Regions of Eastern Europe and East Asia 
 
Mari Nomura 
 
To begin with, let us look at an example demonstrating the level of 
historical awareness amongst contemporary Japanese youth regarding the war 
of aggression that Japan conducted against China. If I were to ask a class in 
university, ‘What happened on 7 July 1937?’, just how many students would be 
able to reply correctly? They might answer that July 7th is the date of ‘Tanabata’ 
(the Star Festival), but most would be unaware that the 7th of July, 1937 was the 
date of the Lugou Bridge Incident. It is also doubtful how much students might 
know about the Nanjing Massacre perpetrated by the Imperial Japanese Army 
in December of that year.  
In China, the Lugou Bridge Incident is called the July 7th Incident. On 
that day, the Japanese Imperial Army and the Republic of China’s National 
Revolutionary Army clashed on the Lugou Bridge, located in the south-west of 
Beijing, setting off the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). The history of the 
era of Japanese colonial rule is taught in detail in Chinese schools, and in China, 
there are probably no university students ignorant of the July 7th Incident and 
the Nanjing Massacre. This does not indicate conflicting historical memories or 
awareness, but the vast difference between the emphasis these historical events 
are given in schools in China and how they are taught in Japan.  
In the 1990s, when the existence of the comfort women came to light, the 
absence or belatedness of post-war Japan’s ‘struggle to come to terms with the 
past’ (Vergangenheitsbewältigung) began to attract the attention of the Japanese 
people. Consequently, Japanese scholars of both Japanese and German 
contemporary history naturally focused on post-war West German historical 
policies as a model for Japanese historical policies. 
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Through its wars of aggression, Germany inflicted immense human and 
material destruction on the countries to its east and west, and slaughtered an 
estimated six million Jews in the Holocaust. For these reasons, Germany was 
convicted for crimes against peace and against humanity at the Nuremburg 
trials. Expressing remorse and apologies for these crimes, as well as making 
amends through practical war reparations and compensation, were the absolute 
conditions for Germany’s resumption of its place in the international community. 
Germany’s struggle to come to terms with its past is comprised of the following 
four points: Compensation for victims of Nazi persecution; continuing 
prosecutions of Nazi crimes; policing of neo-Nazis; and the teaching of history 
with an emphasis on the twentieth century. 
However, this struggle to come to terms with the past was not met with 
enthusiasm by the German people. According to a public opinion survey 
conducted in 1949 by the Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research, in 
response to the question ‘Has anti-Semitism become stronger or weaker since 
1945?’, 19 per cent answered that it had ‘become stronger’, while 13 per cent 
replied that it ‘remains strong’, a total of 32 per cent. On the other hand, the 
percentage of people who replied that it had ‘weakened’ was 32 per cent, showing 
that anti-Semitism still remained strongly rooted in German society. Similarly, 
another survey conducted by the Allensbach Institute in the same year found 
that 58 per cent of the respondents agreed with the statement ‘Nazism was good 
in principle, but was carried out badly’1. 
Because the policy of compensating victims of Nazi persecution created a 
huge financial burden for Germany, it was strongly opposed by the general public 
and within the Bundestag. Konrad Adenauer, West Germany’s first post-war 
Chancellor, sidestepped this opposition and resolutely implemented the 
compensations policy. Under Adenauer’s government, the Reparations 
Agreement between Israel and West Germany (the Luxemburger Abkommen, or 
Luxembourg Agreement), was signed with Israel in 1952, and the German 
Restitution Laws (Bundesentschädigungsgesetz) were passed in 1953 and 1956. 
                                                       
1 Yuji Ishida, Kako no Kokufuku: Hitora Go no Doitsu (Vergangenheitsbewältigung: 
Germany after Hitler), Hakusuisha Publishing, 2002, p.83. 
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However, it must be noted that prior to enforcing the compensations policy, 
Adenauer implemented a large number of policies granting amnesty to those 
found guilty of Nazi crimes and war crimes in German courts under the Allied 
occupation, as well as policies reappointing civil servants dismissed from their 
posts during the occupation. In order to obtain a national consensus for 
compensations, it was necessary to restore a national spirit wounded by 
Germany’s war of aggression and subsequent defeat. 
Despite these complications, as Germany’s post-war recovery progressed 
and the lives of its people stabilised, its struggle to come to terms with the past 
did achieve national consensus as well as international recognition. In Germany, 
surely no university student would now be unable to answer correctly when 
asked, ‘What happened on 1 September 1939?’ or ‘What occurred at Bełżec and 
Treblinka?’  
As Professor Hashimoto points out, Germany’s struggle to come to terms 
with its past has at times been overly idealised by Japanese scholars and liberal 
intellectuals, who continue to struggle with conflicting emotions regarding 
Japan’s own recent history. Unlike the Nuremburg trials, the Tokyo Trials only 
dealt with crimes against peace and war crimes, and there is no comparable 
example of prosecution for crimes against humanity in a Japanese context. The 
Nanjing incident was denounced as a war crime, and accordingly Japan was not 
forced to implement compensation policies comparable to Germany’s 
Luxembourg Agreement or restitution laws; by taking care of the issue of war 
reparations to former enemy countries, Japan resumed its place in international 
community. This of course does not mean that Japan should not express regrets 
or apologise, particularly to the people of Asia, after having inflicted vast damage 
and suffering on many countries through colonial rule and invasion. However, 
while on one hand the Japanese people were intensely conscious of being the 
world’s first victims of atomic bombs, on the other their awareness of Japan’s 
responsibility as a perpetrator of colonial rule and a war of aggression remained 
shallow. The Japanese government’s humble acceptance of the historical fact of 
aggression, their painful expressions of feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt 
apologies, all came about after the exploitation of comfort women was 
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acknowledged in the 1995 Murayama Statement (Statement by Prime Minister 
Tomiichi Murayama “ On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war’s end”, 
15 August 1995). 
Even after the Murayama Statement, it is still difficult to say whether the 
country’s responsibility as an aggressor is being sufficiently acknowledged in 
Japanese educational settings. If anything, under the current Abe administration 
Japan’s struggle to come to terms with the past is actually regressing. When the 
current state of affairs is observed in Japan, it is evident that criticisms of the 
Japanese historical policies modelled on German policies have still not lost their 
practical relevance, which Professor Hashimoto does not deny. However, beyond 
this, Hashimoto emphasises that we must now take research to the next step. He 
asserts that we need to recognise the ideological nature of the historical 
viewpoints that form the basis of German and Japanese historical policies; that 
we need to move beyond comparing the historical policies of two countries 
(Germany and Japan) to regional comparisons of historical awareness among 
central and eastern European countries (including Germany) and east/southeast 
Asia (including Japan); and that we must move towards comparisons broader in 
scope than comparisons merely between two countries. German and Japanese 
historical policies are predicated on the historical view of the Nuremburg and 
Tokyo trials; although Nazism, the Holocaust, and Japanese militarism are 
regarded as absolute evils, Soviet oppression in regions that came under their 
control via the secret protocol of the Treaty of Non-Aggression with Germany in 
1939 and Western countries’ responsibility for colonial rule in Asia are 
overlooked.  
For example, the three Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia 
came under Soviet control under the secret protocol of the Treaty of 
Non-Aggression between Germany and the Soviet Union. Though they were 
occupied by Nazi Germany during its war with the Soviets beginning in 1941, 
their incorporation into the Soviet Union was fixed after the war. After the 
revolutions of 1989, these three countries began to raise fierce objections to the 
then-prevalent Soviet historical view of the Great Patriotic War, in which the 
Soviet Union was seen as a liberator against Nazi Germany. In the German 
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historical context, Nazism and the Holocaust were seen as absolute evils, 
incomparable to other political regimes or genocides. Considering Nazism and 
Communism as two comparable totalitarian systems was strictly repudiated as 
an attempt to relativise the crimes committed by the Nazis. In contrast to this, 
the three Baltic states saw Soviet Communism as equivalent to Nazism, and at 
times as an even more repressive form of totalitarianism, and demanded 
apologies from Russia (the Soviet Union’s successor state) for atrocities 
committed by the Soviets against their people.  
After the beginning of Nazi Germany’s war with the Soviet Union, 
nationalists of the Baltic states saw the invading German Army as liberators and 
joined the Nazi Waffen-SS in order to fight the Soviets. Even after the defeat of 
Nazi Germany in 1945, this group continued their underground armed 
resistance against the Soviet regime, and were secretly dubbed the ‘Forest 
Brothers’ by the people of these three nations. While it was taboo to speak of the 
Forest Brothers during the Soviet era, following the dissolution of the USSR and 
the restoration of independence to the Baltic states, the rebels enjoyed a 
restoration to fame. It goes without saying that this move by the Baltic states 
agitated the Soviets. For the Soviet Union, which viewed the Great Patriotic War 
as the centre of its national identity, the repudiation of that war was difficult to 
tolerate. Furthermore, as some members of the Forest Brothers were Holocaust 
collaborators, the revival of their fame triggered an intense Jewish backlash.  
Nazi Germany was an occupier of the Baltic states during the Second 
World War, but was seen as a liberator when compared to another occupier, the 
Soviet Union. This type of skewed representation is also apparent in evaluations 
of Japan’s war of aggression. In the Asian countries that had been Western 
colonies, Japan was simultaneously invader and liberator, doing away with 
Western colonial rule. As such, some citizens of these former Western colonies 
collaborated with the Imperial Japanese Army during the Asian nationalist 
independence movement. 
In the Baltic states, historical judgments regarding the Nazi German and 
Soviet occupations are divided variously amongst Baltic nationalists, Jews and 
Russian nationalist groups. Similarly, memories and assessments of the 
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Japanese invasion of Asian countries also differ depending on the standpoint of 
those involved. In central and eastern Europe, as well as in east and southeast 
Asia, a number of different historical understandings of the Second World War 
are presently in marked conflict. For Professor Hashimoto, this type of historical 
conflict should not be cause for intolerance or the exclusion of those with differing 
historical understandings. Rather, the question is how do we foster peaceful 
co-existence among people with conflicting historical perceptions? Professor 
Hashimoto’s question is something that we must seriously consider.  
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Coming to Term with the Past in  
Democratic societies 
 
Siobhan Kattago 
 
The summer workshop in Tallinn on the politics of history and memory in 
CEE countries and Russia offered a chance for participants to develop a 
comparative framework for analyzing processes of coming to terms with the past 
after World War II and the fall of communism. The wide-ranging papers 
analyzed various aspects of the memory boom – from border conflicts, academic 
and popular representations of history to politics of regret and attempts at 
reconciliation. Although not explicitly addressed, an underlying theme of the 
workshop was the global connection between democracy, education and the 
politics of memory. As Nobuya Hashimoto outlined in this opening remarks, a 
comparative framework helps one to analyze both the historical particularities of 
a specific case and the processes common among nations and regions, whether in 
the Eastern or Western parts of the world. 
In the first part of the workshop, Raivo Vetik focused on how certain 
historical events are remembered differently. In particular, he examined how 
representations of the past cause a permanent reproduction of conflict between 
Estonia and Russia. As a political scientist, Vetik’s presentation raised 
methodological questions of the objective and subjective perception of historical 
events by distinguishing “eventual change” from “conceptual change.” If the 
former focuses on the chronology of historical events, the latter highlights the 
subjective meaning given by actors to those same events. It is precisely the shift 
from objective to subjective definitions of historical events that enables 
distortions of history and the denial of facts. Hence, one might have the same 
date, for example, 22 September 1944; however, one group recalls the date as the 
liberation of Tallinn, the other as the occupation of that same city. Vetik’s 
presentation set the stage for the large and ambiguous space between an 
historical event and the subjective meanings, associated with it. Collective 
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memory emerges precisely within this ambiguous zone between subjective and 
objective constructions of the past.   
In an age of mass tourism and rapid technological change, the writing of 
history is both an academic and popular activity. As a professional historian, Olaf 
Mertelsmann criticized how popular history tends to simplify historical events for 
the sake of emotional appeal and a good story. By distinguishing Estonian 
popular representations of the past from academic ones, we are better able to 
recognize the use of the past for political agendas. In agreement with Vetik, 
Mertelsmann highlighted the distortions that tend to occur on the subjective level 
of attaching feelings to historical events. He drew attention to the fact that key 
Estonian political activists during the 1980s and 1990s were also historians. It is 
important to note that influential members of the conservative Pro Patria party 
(Isamaa), such as Mart Laar (former Prime Minister) and Lauri Vahtre 
(parliamentarian) are also the primary writers of Estonian school history 
textbooks. Hence, their combination of political activism and popular history has 
a lasting impact on the Estonian understanding of recent history.  
The second part of the workshop emphasized the importance of “regional 
frameworks of memory” in the work of Wawrzyniak & Pakier, Hashimoto, 
Glowacka-Grajper and Kostyashov. Such regional analysis is a way in which to 
compare historical experience while avoiding the limitations of the nation. 
Moreover, it extends Halbwachs’ original insight of the social frameworks of 
memory to a regional framework of memory.   
In their article, “Memory Studies in Eastern Europe: Key Issues and 
Future Perspectives.” Joanna Wawrzyniak and Malgorzata Pakier were critical 
of “Western imperialism” within memory studies and emphasized the regional 
nuances of the East European memory landscape. Similar to Hashimoto, the 
authors presented a comparative regional approach to memory studies. In their 
opinion, East European memory studies are often overshadowed by Western 
historiography and sociological study. Recent attempts to write a transnational 
European memory emphasize the importance of learning how to confront the 
past for the sake of reconciliation (Daniel Levy, Natan Sznaider, Gesine Schwan, 
Claus Leggewie, Aleida Assmann). Hence the European project has its roots in 
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West German debates of coming to terms with the past 
(Vergangenheitsbewältigung). It is at this point that the authors complement the 
work of Nobuya Hashimoto and Konrad Jarausch. National reckonings and 
coming to terms with the past are cast in a “narrative of progress” and 
enlightened maturity. While Western European memory is Holocaust-centered, 
East Europeans focus on their communist past and victimization. Doubtful of a 
single common European memory or of a monolithic Eastern European memory, 
the authors suggested a regional focus of Baltic States, Central Europe, Balkans 
and Russia/ Belarus. 
 Malgorzata Glowacka-Grajper’s paper and presentation emphasized the 
importance of memory conflicts in relations between Poland and Ukraine and 
Poland and Russia. Her questionnaires demonstrated how people react 
emotionally to historical events. World War II and communism were the most 
important historical events in the recent past for citizens of Poland, Ukraine and 
Russia. Arguing that memory conflicts draw from fixed images of the past, she 
highlighted the important role of religion in Polish memory. Images of victims 
are similar to Christian martyrs and form moral patterns of commemoration. As 
a sociologist, she emphasized how painful memories create a social sense of 
solidarity. Polish social memory is associated not only with symbolic places like 
Katyn, Kresy and Volyn, but also with dates like 23 August 1939 (Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact) and 17 September 1939 (invasion of Poland). If communism 
was a period of what she calls, “frozen” social memory, then there has been a 
veritable explosion of hot memory after 1989.  
 As an example of cooperation between regions, Yury Kostyashov’s paper, 
“Trialog: the Experience of Cooperation of the Universities in Kalingrad, Torun 
and Frankfurt (Oder) in the Humanities” concentrated on how cooperation 
between universities can foster reconciliation between Poles, Russians and 
Germans. As an international project, Trialog strengthens research and teaching 
in the humanities within the region. If academics have common communication 
networks, they increase opportunities for mutual understanding and the 
overcoming of long-standing prejudices. Via conferences and summer schools, 
students meet and talk with one another. Trialog is an example of the vital link 
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between education and historical consciousness. Moreover, the project brings 
philosophical and political ideas into practice across two generations and three 
countries.  
In both their papers and workshop comments, Jarausch and Hashimoto 
addressed the concept of Vergangenheitsbewältigung in Germany, Eastern 
Europe and Eastern Asia. As Jarausch argued in this paper, “Contemporary 
History as Critical Perspective: American-German Debates about 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung,” confrontation with the past was given its strongest 
“impulse” with the Nuremberg Trials. The collection of documents, testimony 
and codification of “crimes against humanity” was unprecedented. Even if the 
Nuremberg trials were partially “victor’s justice,” they coincided with a growing 
sense of democratization and attempt to overcome past wrongs. Moreover the 
Eichmann trial (1961) and West German broadcast of the American TV-series, 
Holocaust (1979) signaled a “cultural shift” in which Jewish genocide became the 
center of German memories of World War II. In his comments, Jarausch 
cautioned against a competition of victimhood and the dangers of using one’s 
suffering to create new enemies. Moreover, he was wary of using Germany as an 
exemplary model for how nations should come to terms with their past.  
 In a similar vein, Hashimoto cautioned against facile distinctions 
between Europe as a model of reconciliation and Asia, as one of conflict. He pled 
for a more “globalized horizon” of analysis. Like Jarausch, Hashimoto focused on 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung, or a process of coming to terms with the past that 
includes confrontation, discussion, education, regret and remorse. In contrast to 
other presentations, Hashimoto highlighted the complicated role of collaboration 
and national liberation movements. Going against the grain of a “simplified 
binary formula,” he raised moral questions about the “bloodlands” of Eastern 
Europe and Eastern Asia. In short, both Hashimoto and Jarausch cautioned 
against oversimplifying or mythologizing the German model of coming to terms 
with the past. Under the careful organization of Hashimoto, the workshop in 
Tallinn established a new comparative framework for transitions to democracy 
and the politics of regret on a regional level. Interesting enough we may be 
coming full circle. If democratization was a key area of studies in the 1990s in the 
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work of Samuel Huntington, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, scholarship in recent 
decades has focused on the politics of memory and regret. The workshop in 
Tallinn indicates the need for more research on the connections between 
democracy, the politics of memory and education.  
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Memory of World War II and the education of 
history in Putin’s Russia 
 
                                                   Yoko Tateishi 
 
1. Introduction 
Recollections of war with Germany are the mainstay of Russian political 
ideology, and its policies concerning the depiction of WWII still attract scholarly 
attention. Earlier studies of this issue address two main topics: (1) how Russia’s 
democratization since the 1990s affects its depiction of the Soviet era1 and (2) 
how differing interpretations of the events during and after WWII  affect Russia’s 
interactions with Western and former Soviet satellites in the mid-2000s.2 Among 
the former scholarship, Kora Andrieu examines Russian policy concerning Soviet 
history under Putin from the perspective of transitional justice, arguing that 
destruction of civil society during 70 years of communist rule impairs the 
acknowledgement and investigation of crimes by the Soviet regime. Andrieu 
further argues that Russians find it difficult to regard the communist regime as 
an enemy imposed externally, and he views modern Russia as a case of “failed” 
transitional justice that “chooses not to confront its violent past.”3 Among the 
latter group of studies, Nikolai Koposov examines Russian policy toward 
historical memory in 2009–2010 in relation to the international conflict 
                                                       
1 Nanci Adler, In Search of Identity: The Collapse of the Soviet Union and the Recreation of 
Russia, in A. D. de Brito, C. Gonzaléz-Enríquez, and P. Aguilar (eds.), The Politics of 
Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001, Kora Andrieu, An Unfinished Business: Transitional Justice and Democratization in 
Post-Soviet Russia, The international Journal of Transitional Justice, vol.5, 2011. 
2 Nobuya Hashimoto, Rethinking of history and politics of memory in the Post-Soviet 
states: the case of Baltic states [in Japanese], Rekishi Kagaku, no. 206, 2011; M.V. Liñán, 
History as a propaganda tool in Putin’s Russia, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 
no. 43, 2010, pp.169-171, Pavel Polian, For Whom Did the Tsar Bell Toll?, Russian Politics 
and Law, vol. 48, no. 4, July-August 2010, Н. Копосов. Мемориальный закон и 
историческая политика в современной России. // Ab Imperio, no. 2, 2010. 
3 Andrieu, An Unfinished Business, pp. 205, 218. As an example of similar view, see, Adler, 
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concerning interpretation of WWII finding that the emergence of interest in the 
Soviet past during the late 1980s declined during the 1990s and is now reviving.4 
These studies show that depictions of the Stalinist period, including WWII, 
remain politically and ideologically controversial in Russia. However, studies of 
Russian democratization analyze the controversy over official interpretations of 
Russian history only from the view of the “authoritarian” Putin administration 
and the failed democratization of Russian society. They disregard the influence of 
the policies of foreign countries concerning history. On the other hand, studies of 
conflicting international interpretations of WWII during the mid-2000s disregard 
how Russia’s political and social reforms since the 1990s affect current official 
policies and public opinion. 
Therefore, present scholarship needs to focus on both Russia’s 
international situation and internal political, social, and educational reforms 
since the 1990s to examine the present controversies concerning depiction of 
Russian history. As a first step, this study analyzes the controversies concerning 
WWII in Russia by focusing on educational policy, considering Russia’s internal 
political and social reforms since the 1990s and Russia’s international situation 
in the 2000s. 
 
2. History Textbooks during the 1990s 
How Soviet history should be interpreted and depicted is a subject that 
attracted attention from historians, politicians, and ordinary people during 
perestroika. After the Soviet Union collapsed, the Ministry of Education and 
other authorities continued to reform education. In 1992, the Russian Ministry of 
Education and international organizations such as the Cultural Initiative 
launched “the reform of education of humanities in Russia” with support from 
the Soros Foundation.5 The program sought to diversify and liberalize textbooks. 
In this sense, educational reform during the 1990s reflected a rejection of the 
educational system of Soviet Russia. As a result of the rapid change in Russia’s 
                                                       
4 Копосов. Мемориальный закон. p.265.  
5 О.Н.Мясникова. Школьное историческое образование: политика и практика (Россия, 
1985-2004 гг.) Вологоград: Волгоградское научное издательство, 2007. С. 64-65. 
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educational system, numerous history textbooks were published during the 
1990s; some preserved official Soviet interpretations, whereas others distanced 
themselves from Soviet interpretations or radically denied them.6 
The 1992 textbook edited by Igor Dolutskii for 10th grade students 
emblemized the shift occurring during the 1990s. Its introduction announced 
“There is no unified view in this textbook.” Readers can “select the most reliable 
view” for themselves and “the most similar view to theirs” from various views or 
they can “show their own interpretation.”7 For example, the summary of the 
section about WWII juxtaposes the official Soviet interpretation and the view of 
Western scholars. The former insisted the USSR was crucial in the victory 
against fascist Germany and Imperial Japan; the latter viewed the USA as “a 
builder of the victory” and “arsenal of the democracy.” In addition, Dolutskii 
asked students to examine which view is more relevant by dividing WWII into 
periods and comparing each. 8 
In short, representative history texts during the 1990s sought to displace 
the legacy of Soviet officialdom and to give students materials with which to 
interpret events themselves. However, such drastic reform rendered confusion as 
educational quality is dependent on teaching ability, and made standardized 
examinations difficult.9 Moreover, like Dolutskii’s textbook, many texts present 
conflicting interpretations of events. Therefore, unifying the content of textbooks 
became the important task of education policy at the end of the 1990s. In 1999, 
the Ministry of Education took over the secondary school educational program 
and began to assess textbooks. The following year, the General Institute of 
Education of the Russian Federation published its draft of “the concept of 
                                                       
6 Joseph Zajda and Rea Zajda, The Politics and Rewirting History: New History Textbooks 
and Curriculum Materials in Russia, International Review of Education, no. 49, 2003, Igor 
Ionov, New Trends in Historical Scholarship, in Ben Eklof, Larry E. Holmes and Vera 
Kaplan eds., Educational reform in post-Soviet Russia : legacies and prospects, London ; 
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teaching history.” Although the concept was not adopted, the education reform 
after 1991 was criticized for the first time.10 This situation influenced educational 
reforms during the 2000s significantly.  
 
3. Unification of textbooks? The reform of history education during 
the 2000s 
The 2000s began with Putin’s inauguration as president in May. However, 
educational policy did not start anew in 2000. Rather, it assumed the trajectory of 
the 1990s. On August 30, 2001, the Ministerial Conference discussed Russian 
modern history textbooks. Prime Minister Mikhail Kasianov criticized them as 
“hopelessly abstract” and their “excessive politicization” and called for texts that 
show “one historical space that was tightly combined by a common historical 
mission and one state.” Minister of Education Vladimir Fillippov insisted that 
officially recommended textbooks present the official state view of Russian 
modern history, not authors’ views.11  
In 2003, the Ministry of Education began to list officially recommended 
textbooks. To be included, textbooks had to pass review by the Academy of 
Sciences and the Russian Academy of Education. Schools could buy 
“recommended” textbooks at government expense.12 Soon after the introduction 
of the list, Dolutskii’s textbook was excluded for its description of the Putin era. It 
quoted a journalist who described Russia under Putin as an “authoritarian 
dictatorship” and “police state” and asked students whether they agreed. Putin 
mentioned Dolutskii’s textbook at the meeting with historians and said that 
“negative descriptions of Soviet history during the Yeltsin era were 
understandable because at that time the task was to change from the old regime; 
however, Russia now faces new constructive tasks.” Criticisms also arose from 
historians and veterans. They demanded a more positive description of Soviet 
                                                       
10 Vera Kaplan, History teaching, pp. 262-264. 
11 Thomas Sherlock, Historical Narratives in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Russia: 
Destroying the Settled Past, Creating an Uncertain Future, New York : Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007, pp. 163, 171-173. 
12 Alexei Miller, Russia: Power and History, Russian Politics and Law, vol. 48, no. 4, July-
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history, in textbooks in 2002 and 2003. For example, historian Ludmilla 
Akaksashkina sympathized with the Ministry of Education resolution, saying 
that Dolutskii’s text lacked respect for the tragic aspect of Soviet history.13 
In addition, the textbook was considered too difficult for students to study 
by themselves. Liberal historian and author of Ministry-approved textbooks 
Areksandr Morozov, who taught history in the early 1990s, fondly recalls the 
early 1990s when everyone could teach freely. Under such circumstances, 
however, the quality of class depends on teachers and textbook authors, and 
therefore, he said, governmental control of education is necessary. In his opinion, 
the government needs to define a framework for content while maintaining the 
variety of textbooks.14 As his remarks show, many intellectuals support the 
creation of a framework for textbook content but not that of a single textbook, as 
during the Soviet period. 
 
4. Internationalization of the evaluation of WWII and the 
publication of textbooks 
The 60th anniversary ceremony of the victory against Germany in Moscow 
in May 2005 escalated evaluations of WWII to an international controversy. The 
president of Latvia attended and insisted on using their own official historical 
images. Moreover, Latvia lobbied the European Parliament and other 
international organizations for a reinterpretation of European history of WWII. 
On May 22, the European Parliament adopted a resolution: “The Future of 
Europe Sixty Years after the Second World War.” This resolution highlighted the 
“renewed tyranny inflicted by the Stalinist Soviet Union” on East European 
nations after the end of WWII. It also confirmed that the European Parliament 
present a united front against “all totalitarian rule of whatever ideological 
persuasion.” Many Russian politicians expressed displeasure against these 
actions. Sergei Iastrzemski, ambassador to the European Union, refused to 
consider calls for Russia to admit that the Soviet Union had illegally annexed the 
                                                       
13 Sherlock, Historical Narratives, p. 173.  
14 Interview with Morozov on December18, 2013.  
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Baltic states in 1940, insisting that their incorporation was peaceful, voluntary, 
and in complete accordance with international law.15 
In 2007, a textbook for teaching history was published in Russia at the 
direct request of the Presidential department and Ministry of Education and 
Science.16 The editor, Fillippov was the vice-director of the National Institute of 
Foreign Policy, a think tank tied to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 17 After the 
book’s publication in 2007, Putin met with teachers of history and social science 
and criticized that many textbooks were published by grants from foreign 
governments. He said, 
There are horrible pages in our history. Remember the events since 1937 
and do not forget them. But there were similar events in other countries … 
We have never used the nuclear weapon on humankind. We have never 
used chemical weapons like in Vietnam. There were no other black pages in 
our history, such as, for example, Nazism …  
He also emphasized the necessity for uniform standards for textbooks. 18 
Isak Karina, director of the department of state policy and normative-
lawful regulation within the Ministry of Education, also insisted that “100% of 
the textbooks of Russian history should be home products ….ontent of textbooks 
is one important means of molding the Russian nation, and it should not be 
imported goods.”19  
Publication of Fillipov’s textbook was considered a “scandal” in Russian 
media. Although its contents are not especially biased, it focuses on the 
                                                       
15 M. Mälksoo, The memory politics of becoming European: The East European subalterns 
and the collective memory of Europe, European Journal of International Relations, Tartu: 
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19 Людмира Рыбина. Последний писк истории государства российского. // Новая газета. 
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integration and strengthening of the Russian State.20  The editorial department 
of the journal Bol’shoi Gorod invited Fillipov, other historians, and teachers to 
discuss the textbook. Many attendees criticized it for interpreting Russian history, 
especially the Stalin period, too positively.  A lecturer at Moscow State University, 
A. A. Levandovskii, said the book gave the impression of rationalizing Stalin’s 
repression by emphasizing the rearing of cadre as a result of the Great Terror. 
He added that it describes that modern Russia achieved the democratization 
“against truth.” Editor-in-chief A. G. Kazakov called it irrelevant to describe the 
role of Gulag as a labor force in Russian industrialization. At the end of the 
meeting, Fillipov acknowledged he “went to excess” because he tried to escape 
“threatening morality.”21 Finally Fillipov’s textbook did not become the dominant 
one. If its official purpose was to control the content of textbooks, it was 
unsuccessful.  
 Another attempt to unify the interpretation of history was the 
establishment of the Presidential Commission of the Russian Federation to 
Counter Attempts to Falsify History to the Detriment of Russia’s Interests (the 
Presidential Commission) in May 2009. The Presidential Commission was 
headed by S. Naryshkin, director of the Presidential Administration and most of 
its members were politicians and government officials. It attracted intellectuals 
and the media from Russia and other countries; many researchers have analyzed 
this Presidential Commission unfavorably as the beginning of direct political 
control over the teaching of history. At the Presidential Commission’s first 
meeting, members discussed history textbooks, but direct intervention into 
education never materialized, perhaps because of criticism by Russian and 
foreign intellectuals. In February 2012, the Commission suddenly disappeared.  
In about two years, the Presidential Commission edited the materials 
concerning WWII, released archival materials, supported the publication of books, 
and held an international conference about history textbooks. Reflecting on the 
                                                       
20 Vladimir Solonari, Normalizing Russia, Legitimizing Putin, Kritika: Explorations is 
Russian and Eurasian History, vol. 10, No. 4, Fall 2009. 
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Presidential Commission, Alexander Dyukov, director of the Historical Memory 
Foundation, argued that it was useless to counter the “distortion of history” in 
Eastern Europe because many Commission members were not historians but 
bureaucrats, and could not determine the direction of its activities. He added that, 
despite one of the members, Nikolai Svanidze, who was a liberal journalist and 
member of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, officially stating that 
the incorporation of Baltic States to USSR in 1943 was an “occupation” by the 
USSR, the Commission did not react to his statement. In his opinion, Russia 
should create a more powerful governmental institution like the Institution of 
National Memory of Ukraine. However, Aleksandr Chubarian, member of the 
Presidential Commission and director of the Department of General History of 
the Academy of Sciences of Russia, evaluated its activities positively. That the 
Commission supported books contradicting the evaluation of WWII, he said, 
showed that its members could discuss freely without political pressure.22 
Although their evaluations of the Commission differed strikingly, both showed 
that the Commission worked for two years without a consistent policy. 
 
5. The Russian Historical Society and creation of the “standard” for 
textbooks  
Abolishing the Presidential Committee did not end authorities’ attempts 
to counter a hostile historical image of Russia. As early as March 2011, Regnum 
reported that the Presidential Committee would reconvene in the State Duma, 
headed by Naryshkin, in December 2011. On November 19, 2012, the Council 
of the Federation Committee on the Federal Structure, Regional Policies, Local 
Self-Governance, and Affairs of the North held a roundtable to discuss attempts 
to falsify history to the detriment of Russian interests, inviting delegates of the 
Federal Assembly, government agencies, archives, mass media, and historians.23 
The conference concluded that the Presidential Commission did not resolve all 
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distortions of history, such as identifying Nazism with Stalinism, denying the 
longstanding friendship of nations incorporated into Russia and the significance 
of their incorporation, and that the Russian Historical Society, a semi-
government organization that was established in 2012, should succeed the 
Presidential Commission .  
The Society’s official aims are to disseminate national and global history 
and to integrate Russian society, government, academe, artists, and historians by 
preserving national memory. 24Naryshkin, the chair of the State Duma and ex-
director of the Presidential Commission, was appointed Representative of the 
Society. Historian and ex-member of the Commission Chubarian was appointed 
co-representative.25 In an interview with Latvian media, Chubarian said that 
countering distortions of history is only a part of the Society’s goals.26  However, 
countering distortions of history apparently remains significant for political 
authorities. At the Council for Interethnic Relations on February, 14, 2013, Putin 
called for common textbooks that present and respect all Russian history without 
inconsistency. In addition, Putin said, the Russian Historical Society and Society 
of Military History should participate in making such textbooks.27  
Thereafter the Society created a 35-member working group for a 
“standard of textbooks” that included the Ministry of Education, historians, and 
artists. The working group was headed by Naryshkin and Chubarian as well as 
the Association of Russian History. However, according to Sergei Arkhangerov, a 
member of the Society and director of the State Central Museum of 
Contemporary History of Russia, drafting of “the standard” started two years 
                                                       
24 http://rushistory.org/?page_id=23 
25  http://rushistory.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Физические-лица.pdf. October 25, 
2014. 
26 In addition, he said that as representatives, he and Naryshkin do not use a word 
“distortion of history.” Виеструс Спруде. Александр Чубарьян – академик с «хваткой»  
дипломата. // InoСМИ. Ru. 4 декабря 2012. http://inosmi.ru/sngbaltia/20121204/	 
202967423.html. October 25, 2014. 
27 Заседание совета по межнациональным отношениям. // РИАНОВОСТИ. 19 февраля 
2013. http://ria.ru/trend/Moscow_meeting_council_international_relations_19022013/. 
October 25, 2014. 
 160 
earlier by 18 historians at the Academy of Sciences.28 Therefore, creating the 
“standard of textbooks” began at least in 2012, when the Presidential 
Commission ceased to exist. 
The draft was unveiled on July 1 at the websites of the Russian Historical 
Society, Society of Military History of Russia, the Society of Teachers of History 
and Social Studies, and the official website of the Ministry of Education and 
Science on Live Journal. More than 1,000 people, including veterans, parents, 
and teachers participated in discussion. Meetings to discuss the standard also 
were held throughout the republics and autonomous republics. According to the 
Society, many reactions focused on the history of the 20th century.29 After these 
meetings, the draft of “the standard” was approved at a meeting of the 
Association of Russian Historians in October 2013. The approved standard, “the 
concept of new studying-methodological books of national history” (the concept) 
declared its aim as creating a “social consensus” about Russian history. “The 
concept” outlines each historical period and important events and figures that 
should be depicted in Russian history textbooks, but it does not present specific 
interpretations of each historical event. Moreover, a list of 32 “difficult problems 
of Russian history” is attached to “the concept” as problems about which there 
are fierce discussions and that are difficult to teach.30 
Sergei Lukashevsky, director of the Sakharov Center in Moscow, says that 
although “the concept” was made by eminent historians, they avoided difficult 
problems in Russian history. According to Lukashevsky, this evasion leaves room 
for free discussion, but it also reflects the present lack of a common view about 
national history in Russia. As his comment conveys, “the concept” rather shows 
specific views about each historical event or period than lists numerous 
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important historical events. Historian Morozov, who prepared the list of “difficult 
problems in Russian history,” called a single textbook a dangerous idea, although 
he acknowledged the necessity for a framework for writing history texts.31 Now 
the content of textbooks based on “the concept” is being planned; however, it is 
yet uncertain whether “the concept” will become a means to politically control the 
content of history textbooks. Political authorities seem to understand quite well 
the possibility of invoking antagonism among intellectuals if they intervene in 
the education of history. At the meeting of the authors of “the concept,” President 
Putin emphasized that the creation of “the standard” does not mean unification 
of interpretations of national history by the government or the end of academic 
discussion. In addition, Naryshkin denied the speculation that they were making 
a “New Short Course.” Therefore, “the concept” will very likely not be a means for 
compulsion of a certain interpretation of history in textbooks, at least in the near 
future.32        
 
6.  History textbooks for ninth grade general school 
As we have seen, the Russian administration keeps trying to standardize 
Russian history textbooks, and the system of “recommended” textbooks is part of 
that attempt. Among the many school history textbooks in present Russia, some 
are officially “recommended” or “permitted” every year.33 Russian schools teach 
20th-century national history in ninth and eleventh grades. Students study 
ancient history (China, Greece, and India) in fifth grade and world and national 
history in grades six through nine. In grades 10 and 11, they repeat world and 
national history. History education during these grades is tied to the entrance 
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examination for higher education.34 This section examines textbooks used in 
ninth grade. Ten textbooks appear on the list recommended by the Ministry of 
Education and Sciences for the 2013/2014 school year. I could not find one of the 
textbooks, therefore I examine nine books below.35 
The Stalin period generally, including the Great Patriotic War, is 
presented critically in most textbooks, including descriptions of forced 
collectivization and the Great Terror. The Great Terror is explained not only as a 
repressive political policy but also as a social condition, such as the rise intention 
of ordinary people, personal antagonisms, hope to get residential. Students are 
required to think about why many in the 1930s believed people repressed during 
the Great Terror were guilty. Moreover, students must examine the fate of 
repressed people using materials in the electronic database “Recollections of the 
Gulag and their Authors.”36 Another textbook asks students their opinion of why 
repressed people later recollect the Stalin regime positively.37  
The situation of villages during the Stalin era is emphasized negatively. 
The textbook edited by Izmozik, Zhuravleva, and Rudnik explains that National 
Socialism sought to create strong military industries, to increase the population 
of cities, and to improve education in a short period. However, cities were 
developed at the expense of rural districts, and the cost included the deaths of 
millions through starvation and repression. Therefore, the textbook says, the 
achievements of the Stalin era spark bitter controversies. In addition, the 
textbook tasks students to listen to stories from family about their relatives and 
friends during the 1930s.38   
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The effort to inspire students to construct the meaning of historical events 
is evident in the textbooks’ use of historical document and questions and tasks for 
students. The textbook edited by Sukhov, Morozov, and Abdulaev tries to help 
students understand widespread famine in the villages and that other countries 
interpret Russian historical events differently. It asks students, “What is the 
reason for the famine in 1932–33?,” “What is the famine in the Ukraine called?,” 
and “Was it a coincidence that the famine spread in a specific region?”39 Other 
textbooks ask students whether the results of the industrial revolution and 
collectivization justify the sacrifices by Soviet citizens and asks them to interview 
older Russians about this problem.40 The textbook edited by D.D. Danilov and 
Liseitsev asks students to compare Stalin’s speech about the constitution in 1936 
with the secret report of the NKVD about the distress in villages.41 
Although international interpretations of WWII that call the Soviet Union 
and Nazi Germany totalitarian states offended the Russian government, certain 
textbooks use “totalitarianism” to describe the Stalin era. For example, the 
textbook edited by D.D. Danilov et al. asks students whether “Mussolini’s ideal of 
the relation between the state and society” fits 1930s Soviet society, whether the 
Soviet political system in 1930 was “totalitarian”, and whether it was a 
“democracy or dictatorship”.42  
All textbooks describe WWII and the Great Patriotic War in detail. As 
many scholars point out, it is one of the core events that created a Russian 
identity. One similarity among textbooks is their evaluation of the Munich 
Agreement in 1938—namely, that European leaders believed appeasement 
would free Germany to attack the Soviet Union and allow Europe to escape the 
war.43 It was no secret that the West pushed Germany toward war against the 
USSR and that Hitler tried to dominate Eastern lands. However, the textbooks 
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do not merely rationalize Soviet political policy. The textbook edited by A. A. 
Danilov says that the price the Soviet people paid for war was also the result of 
wrong policies by Soviet political leaders.44  
Many textbooks also urge students to find their own interpretation of the 
Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact of 1939. The textbook edited by Shestakov, 
Gorinov, and Viazemskii asks students why the evaluation of the Soviet-German 
Nonaggression Pact in 1939 remains controversial.45 This approach appears in 
other textbooks. The textbook edited by Sukhov, Morozov, and Abdulaev tasks 
students to compare descriptions in other textbooks and academic writings about 
the Munich Agreement in 1938, the Soviet-France negotiations, and the German-
Soviet Nonaggression Pact and to discuss their views on these events.46 
Many textbooks are critical of the 1939 incorporation of the Baltic 
countries. The textbook edited by Zagradin et al. indicates that authorities in 
Poland and the Baltic sought no agreement with the Soviet Union because they 
regarded it as their major enemy.47 The textbook edited by A. A. Danilov et al. 
says that “Faced with the fear of establishment of complete military control,” the 
governments of Baltic countries were compelled to agree with demands of the 
Soviet Union.48 Textbooks edited by Sukhov et al. indicate that Poland was 
“betrayed” and “fell victim to the confrontation between the Soviets and 
Germany.” After the incorporation of the Baltic countries into Soviet Union, 
many Baltic people were repressed and expelled to Siberia. In addition, the 
decline in living standards disappointed those who initially welcomed the Soviet 
army. The election was held under forced intervention by the USSR, and 
supporters of opposition candidates were arrested. People were forced to vote: a 
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seal was stamped on their passports at polling places, and absence of a seal 
denoted an “enemy of the people.”49  
As somehow exceptional description, the textbooks edited by Shestakov et 
al. say that countries other than the Soviet Union adopted policies that pushed 
Hitler to war. Even Poland and the Baltic countries, the first sacrifices of the 
Soviet-German Pact, sought an anti-Soviet agreement with Germany and it 
made possible for Germany to invade the USSR.50 A different view appears in the 
textbook edited by Izmozik. It says that in 1939 Soviets in western Ukraine and 
western Belarus asked to participate in the USSR and that the Baltic countries 
participated in the USSR with the support of their people.51 
As for Poland, the Katyn Massacre is explained in every textbook except 
that edited by Zagradin et al. The textbook edited by Izmozik states that the 
genuine document concerning the Katyn Massacre was not published until 
1993. 52  The textbook edited by D. D. Danilov says that Stalin wanted 
communists in power in postwar Poland and did not support the 1944 Warsaw 
uprising, which as a result was suppressed by the German Army.53  
One prominent similarity in descriptions of WWII is the emphasis on the 
moral and political solidarity of a multinational USSR. For example, the text 
edited by A. A. Danilov explains that Hitler falsely believed the multinational 
Soviet people would collapse under military attack.54 On the other hand, all 
textbooks mention collaboration with the German army and forced emigrations 
by Soviet authorities. The textbook edited by A.A. Danilov details the 
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and other movements in west Belorussia, 
the Baltic, Crimea, and the mountainous regions in Chechen-Ingush; 
collaboration with the German army; and forced emigration. These textbooks 
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agree that rigorous repression triggered new post-war national movements.55 
The textbook edited by Izmozik et al. also explains that Stalinist repression and 
forced collectivization prompted collaboration with Germany by citizens of the 
USSR, who regarded German soldiers as liberators from Bolshevism. In addition, 
the textbook edited by Izmozik et al. notes that entire nations and people loyal to 
the USSR shouldered betrayals by only some groups.56  
The textbook edited by D. D. Danilov explains the forced emigrations were 
accepted “as the crime for fellow Soviet citizens” in the 1980s and asks students 
whether they agree with the decision and why.57 Textbooks edited by Morozov et 
al. refer to collaboration with the German army not only by non-Russians but 
also by Russians in the Soviet Union, such as the movements led by Vlasov and 
Russian refugees abroad.58 The textbook edited by A.A. Danilov, Kosulina, and 
Brandt tasks students to study the troops that Germany formed from the Soviet 
people, and to consider the causes that pushed people to participate in such 
troops. In addition, students are asked to seek information about the fate of 
nations forcefully emigrated during the war. After describing the forced 
emigrations, it quoted a 1946 speech in which Stalin said that the multinational 
Soviet Union resolved the incorporation of nations better than other 
multinational countries and asks students their opinion about his speech.59 Only 
the textbook edited by Kiselev et al. does not criticize the forced deportations and 
explains that “official documents said” these measures were intended to root out 
anti-Soviet activities, bandits, spies, and German collaborators.60 
Many textbooks explain the post-war repression of anti-Soviet partisans in 
western Ukraine and the Baltic countries, the repression of ex-war prisoners 
returning from Germany, the heightened dissident mood after the war, and the 
                                                       
55 А. А. Данилов, Косулина, Брандт. История России. С. 237-238 
56 Измозик, Журавлёва, Рудник. История России. C. 170, 184. 
57 Д. Д. Данилов, Лисейцев, Клоков и др. История России. С. 252. 
58 Сухов, Морозов, Абдулаев. История России. C. 219. 
59 А. А. Данилов, Косулина, Брандт. История России ХХ – начало ХХI века. С. 260. 
60 Киселев, Попов. История России. C. 189. 
 167 
number of people sent to gulags.61 The textbook edited by Izmozik says that 
Stalin considered all ex-prisoners traitors, and their reputations were restored 
only in 1956.62 The textbook edited by Shestakov explains that soldiers who had 
fought in Eastern and Central Europe had seen higher standards of living and 
their convictions formed in 1920–30 had weakened. Moreover, the textbook uses 
the word “totalitarianism” to explain the final years of the Stalin era.63 The 
textbook edited by A.A. Danilov et al. asks students to collect Soviet placards and 
pamphlets published within 10 years after the war and consider the aims of 
official propaganda during those days.64  
We have seen that Russian textbooks recommended by the Ministry of 
Education and Science are not mere political tools, as generally supposed. They 
have also inherited the nature of textbooks published in the 1990s, which 
emphasized the teaching of multiple interpretations and on making students 
think about the meaning of historical events on their own. All textbooks contain 
primary materials, such as photos, diaries, letters, and recollections, to allow 
students to discuss and evaluate historical events. In addition, they require 
students to interview their grandparents or relatives regarding their experiences. 
Russian researcher Guzenkova offers three classifications of WWII in history 
textbooks of ex-Socialist countries: (1) those similar to Soviet textbooks, (2) 
transformed versions, and (3) radical reconsiderations. Textbooks from 
Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Belorussia fall under type (1); those from Russia, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Azerbaijan correspond to type (2); and those from 
the Baltic countries, Ukraine, Georgia, and Poland belong to type (3). Guzenkova 
asserts that type (2) show more diverse and complicated aspects of WWII than 
type (1) textbooks and describe negative events in their own countries. Compared 
with type (3) textbooks, they take a conciliatory approach and reconsider Soviet 
textbooks more mildly. Type (3) textbooks rewrite WWII history, often describing 
collaboration with Germany as “liberation movements” and USSR policy after 
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1944 as invasive. General Vlasov, considered a “traitor” in type (2) textbooks, is a 
hero in type (3).65  
However, we have seen that Russian textbooks are closer to the third than 
the second type, especially concerning the incorporation of Baltic countries, 
western Ukraine, and Belarus. Therefore, it might be better to classify Russian 
textbooks as an independent type or as hybrids of types (2) and (3).  
 
Conclusion 
Today’s Russian political authorities continue to try to control the 
education of history, although earlier attempts yielded no results, and current 
history textbooks present views of the Stalin era and WWII at odds with views of 
political authorities. They inherit the spirit of texts published during the 1990s, 
which emphasized the teaching of plural interpretations and encouraged 
students to examine the meaning of historical events. 
Russian intellectuals like Morozov and others who remember the freedom 
of teaching in the 1990s oppose reviving the Soviet era “uniform textbook,” 
although they embrace governmental intrusion into education as necessary for 
quality and support a framework that defines content while maintaining the 
variety of perspectives. In addition, Russia’s largest publishers oppose a single 
textbook.66 Therefore, it is unlikely that government will set the content of 
textbooks in the near future. 
       On the other hand, we must understand that Russia’s political 
authorities and its society share a wish to unify the textbooks, a tendency that 
arises from recollections of the educational confusion of the 1990s. Other factors 
also are involved. As Linan notes, Russia faces more difficulty constructing a 
national identity than other ex-Soviet and Socialist countries because of the long 
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Socialist era and its penetration into society.67 Russia, the successor state of the 
USSR, finds it difficult to regard Soviet authorities as “others” and to name 
criminals and victims.68 In addition, the decline of living standards and Russia’s 
international position, widening disparities, and rising crime and unemployment 
during the 1990s created identity crises among the Russian people and nostalgia 
for the Soviet period even before Putin became president.69 If these internal 
situations combine with the international disagreements over interpretations of 
WWII, the most important historical event for Russian political authorities and 
citizens, it could stoke desires for uniform textbooks that depict national history 
more positively.   
At the same time, as Tomas Sherlock points out, Russian civil 
organizations, such as the Memorial Human Rights Center, have a role in 
blocking the rehabilitation of Stalin, and nostalgia for the Soviet period does not 
mean affirmation of the Soviet system. Moreover, political elites understand that 
attempts to applaud the Stalin era unconditionally would “open unhealed 
wounds” in society.70 Irina Shcherbakova, director of the department of youth 
and educational program of the Memorial, says that the Memorial struggles to 
retain the diversity of history textbooks, which is the legacy of the educational 
reform in the 1990s, and that it is vital to teach people that history is not just 
black or white and that the world is complex.71  
In addition, the internal changes in Russia during the 1990s seem to have 
created better conditions for discussing the Stalin era and WWII in Russia today. 
According to Irina Galkova, Deputy Director for Research, Museum of GULAG in 
Moscow, notes an increased interest in the museum and a changed mood about 
the history of the Stalin era. People are less emotional and start to talk quietly 
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and undertake productive dialogs in the first couple of years. She believes that 
economic growth and social stability during these years enabled them to rest and 
think about serious topics again.72  
Sherlock also points out that Russia intended to cooperate with the West 
throughout the 1990s and during Putin’s first year, but the West failed to 
embrace Russia. He argues that high oil prices and NATO expansion, the 
unilateralism of the Bush administration, and the “color revolutions” in Ukraine 
and Georgia moved Russia toward more conservative policies concerning 
historical memory. In his opinion, ex-Soviet and Socialist countries and Western 
countries should not politicize the interpretation of history and should support 
Russia in confronting the history of Stalinism by academic means, such joint 
research.73  
The relationship of Russia with Ukraine, the EU, and the USA intensified 
after the March 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia. The Russian claim to the 
Crimean Peninsula correlates back to Crimea’s colonization since the reign of 
Catherine II, while Ukrainian politicians and historians emphasize its ties to 
Cossack mythology.74 Although analysis of these collective memories are beyond 
the scope of this article, we should continue to study the impact on the conflict 
between Russia and Ukraine that results from the political use of each country’s 
national history. Popular opinion that has grown throughout Ukraine since 1991 
tends to illustrate their national minorities—such as Russians, Jews, Poles, and 
Germans—as aggressors, oppressors, and exploiters in the struggle that 
ultimately resulted in the birth of the Ukrainian nation. One of the most 
important tasks of Ukrainian historical science is to study and write a 
multiethnic history of Ukraine to share with not only ethnic Ukrainians but also 
other ethnic groups in Ukraine, including Russians and Russian-speaking 
Ukrainians. In addition, this task is important for Russia and other ex-USSR 
countries with long-spanning ancient histories consisting of multicultural and 
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multiethnic exchanges similar to Ukraine. According to Plokhy, currently there 
are some positive developments in such approaches to academic studies by 
Ukrainian historians.75 Therefore, international support promoting academic 
discussions among Ukrainian historians and encouraging dialogue among 
Russian counterparts over historical identities while trying to refrain two 
countries from using history for political purposes is needed.                   
As we have seen in examining the situation concerning history textbooks 
in the 2000s, many Russian intellectuals resist abolishing pluralist historical 
interpretations in schools, and their resistance could prevent vigorous official 
intervention into education. In addition, internal changes within Russia 
compared with 1990s improve conditions for examining the Stalin era and WWII. 
Therefore, future conflicts over Soviet history depend on how Russia’s neighbors 
promote dialog and engage Russia by scholarly rather than political means.    
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